Optimal Redistribution with Unobservable Preferences for an Observable Merit Good

This paper considers a government thatseeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discouragethe consumption of a certain good. This good is assumed to beeither a merit or demerit good. Individuals differ in their exogenousincome and in their preferences for the merit good. The onlyvariable the government can perfectly observe is each individual'sconsumption of the merit good. In order to account for meritgood considerations, we consider a modification of the utilitariansocial welfare function in which the government imposes uniformpreferences, despite the heterogeneous individual preferences,at a level which will depend on the merit or demerit nature ofthe observable good. We derive the optimal nonlinear redistributivepolicy and compare our results to the ones that would be obtainedunder a utilitarian social welfare function that respects theown preferences of individuals.     

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is “paternalistic”: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals.      

Profit sharing and investment by regulated utilities: A welfare analysis

We analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on the endogenous size of a firm's investment. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not delay a firm's start-up investment compared to a pure price-cap scheme. Profit sharing does not necessarily affect total investment either, if the threshold for profit sharing is high enough. Only a profit sharing intervening for low profit levels could delay further investments. We also evaluate the effects of profit sharing on social welfare, determining profit level that should optimally trigger tighter regulation: profit sharing should be less stringent in sectors where there is more opportunity for larger investment.     

The Welfare State in a Changing Environment

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual self-insurance and by costly social insurance. We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfare state and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full social insurance can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii) The optimal welfare state is not necessarily larger the less costly it is. (iv) The welfare state need not optimally expand when risks increase that it insures. (v) It should, however, expand when risks increase that it does not insure.     

Optimal investment under multi-factor stochastic volatility

We consider a model for multivariate intertemporal portfolio choice in complete and incomplete markets with a multi-factor stochastic covariance matrix of asset returns. The optimal investment strategies are derived in closed form. We estimate the model parameters and illustrate the optimal investment based on two stock indices: S&P500 and DAX. It is also shown that the model satisfies several stylized facts well known in the literature. We analyse the welfare losses due to suboptimal investment strategies and we find that investors who invest myopically, ignore derivative assets, model volatility by one factor and ignore stochastic covariance between asset returns can incur significant welfare losses.     

区域一体化、环境污染与社会福利

如何在区域协调发展中实现减排和社会福利的双增进已成为中国绿色高质量发展所面临的重大现实问题。本文在空间经济模型框架下探讨了区域一体化的环境和社会福利效应。基于1995-2016年中国30个省级行政区的数据,运用动态空间面板杜宾模型和广义空间二阶段最小二乘模型验证了区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)区域一体化对不同类型污染物的影响存在差异,区域一体化显著抑制了本地性污染物排放,但同时促进了全域性污染物的排放。(2)区域一体化与社会福利间呈现倒“U”形关系。在临界水平内,区域一体化有利于增进社会福利。(3)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在地区交互影响,即邻近地区的区域一体化促进了本地工业粉尘的排放,同时抑制了本地二氧化碳的排放,邻近地区的区域一体化有利于增进本地的社会福利。(4)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在显著的空间边界。本研究认为应对不同类型的污染物制定差异化环境政策,通过强化空间管理以充分利用区域一体化促进地区协同减排和增进社会福利的双重红利。     

区域一体化、环境污染与社会福利

如何在区域协调发展中实现减排和社会福利的双增进已成为中国绿色高质量发展所面临的重大现实问题。本文在空间经济模型框架下探讨了区域一体化的环境和社会福利效应。基于1995-2016年中国30个省级行政区的数据,运用动态空间面板杜宾模型和广义空间二阶段最小二乘模型验证了区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)区域一体化对不同类型污染物的影响存在差异,区域一体化显著抑制了本地性污染物排放,但同时促进了全域性污染物的排放。(2)区域一体化与社会福利间呈现倒“U”形关系。在临界水平内,区域一体化有利于增进社会福利。(3)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在地区交互影响,即邻近地区的区域一体化促进了本地工业粉尘的排放,同时抑制了本地二氧化碳的排放,邻近地区的区域一体化有利于增进本地的社会福利。(4)区域一体化对环境污染和社会福利的影响存在显著的空间边界。本研究认为应对不同类型的污染物制定差异化环境政策,通过强化空间管理以充分利用区域一体化促进地区协同减排和增进社会福利的双重红利。     

False advertising

There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policy maker can punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers and analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives. We establish precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising and show how these conditions vary intuitively with demand and market parameters. We also consider the implications for product investment and industry self‐regulation and connect our results to the literature on demand curvature.     

A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process

We study the impacts of the recently proposed risk retention regulation for asset securitization, i.e. the issuer has to retain a certain proportion of securitized assets. We also consider the frequently discussed measure to require the issuer disclose certain information of the securitized assets. In a dynamic model with asymmetric information between a risk-averse originating bank and a continuum of risk-averse investors, we find that it is impossible for a flat-rate retention requirement to be optimal for all asset types. Although both risk retention and information disclosure regulations are effective in reducing investors’ informational loss, neither can unconditionally enhance social welfare upon the unregulated case. For both measures, there are associated regulatory cost: risk retention regulation aggravates adverse selection problem because it undermines the channel of informational revelation by the choice of securitization intensity, and information disclosure requirement incurs a signalling cost by distorting banks’ securitization intensity in sending signals. Under an appropriate set of conditions we find that information disclosure requirement complements risk retention regulation when investors are sufficiently risk averse.     

Education and social mobility

This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degrees of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.     

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used.     

Forcing firms to talk: financial disclosure regulation and externalities

We analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and thedesirability of disclosure regulation. In our model disclosureis costly, it has private and social value, and its precisionis endogenous. We show that (i) a convexity in the value ofdisclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy;(ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game isoften socially inefficient; (iii) regulation that requires aminimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare;(iii) the same is true for subsidies that change the perceivedcost of disclosures; and (iv) neither regulation method dominatesthe other.     

Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform under endogenous participation and unemployment: an ordinal approach

This paper analyzes the social welfare effects of tax-benefit reforms in a framework integrating endogenous labor supply and unemployment. We adopt an ordinal approach to social welfare comparisons by searching for “socially desirable” reforms that would improve social welfare for an entire class of social welfare functions. In the model, there is a discrete distribution of individuals’ productivities and individuals are heterogeneous with respect to leisure preferences (or disability of work). Labor supply decisions are limited to the participation decision. Unemployment is modeled in a search and matching framework with individual wage bargaining. For the social welfare analysis, the model is calibrated for Switzerland. Starting from a situation with an unemployment benefit scheme, the introduction of in-work benefits is shown to be a “socially desirable” reform: it would be unanimously preferred to the current situation according to all social welfare functions based on the criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers. This result holds for two different types of preference heterogeneity (leisure preferences or disability of work) and also for the case where job search effort cannot be monitored.     

Regret in health insurance post‐purchase behavior

Unlike other forms of insurance, individuals with health insurance generally expect to make claims through the policy period. Selecting an appropriate level of cost‐sharing is difficult and individuals may, ex‐post, regret the choice of a less‐than‐suitable coverage amount. Using a national health insurance survey of private market consumers from 2013 to 2017, we evaluate the potential for post‐purchase regret in the health plan purchasing decision. We employ an ordered logistic model and find that consumers whose plan choices were likely financially dominated by a foregone alternative are significantly more likely to express regret through reporting significantly lower likelihood of renewal, even when controlling for confounding considerations including affordability, self‐assessed risk, and satisfaction with the plan.     

我国民间组织工作人员社会保障的现状与政策建议——对青岛的个案调查

改革开放以来，我国民间组织发展迅速，但由于各种原因，民间组织工作人员社会保障现状很不令人满意。通过对青岛的个案调查，发现民间组织工作人员社会保障存在着一系列的问题，如法规不健全、不愿参保等。完善民间组织工作人员社会保障制度，既需要坚持政府主导、机制创新等原则，更要考虑到民间组织工作人员的特殊性。从模式选择上，应将民间组织工作人员与公务员、事业单位职工和企业单位职工一起考虑，建立一个统一的城镇社会保障制度。     

Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the populations ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function.We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority.     

职工福利、剩余索取权分享与国有企业的社会成本问题

本文研究了我国特有的、具有社会保障性质的国有企业职工集体福利制度。从职工福利制度的变迁过程来看,我国社会保障制度改革与企业职工福利制度的变迁具有较为明显的同步性,但是,社会保障制度改革并非推动我国职工福利制度持续变迁的根本原因。本文通过深入分析我国职工福利制度的本质及其造成的外部性问题,指出我国职工福利制度实际上已演化为一种职工参与国有企业剩余索取权分享的机制,这项机制的实施会由于外部性问题的存在,增加社会成本从而降低宏观经济效率,而这正是推动我国职工集体福利制度持续变迁的动因,因此,对该制度的进一步改革必须注意这些问题。     

What Makes a Better Annuity?

Given costly and limited annuity products, we investigate how annuity market innovation could improve participation and increase individual welfare. We find that participation gains are most likely with new annuity products that concentrate on late‐life payouts. Our welfare analysis suggests that annuity innovation should focus on adding survival contingencies to assets commonly held by individuals. Finally, in a complete market setting, we find demand only for those annuity contracts with a significant time gap between purchase and payout (a rarity in current contracts). Overall, our analysis indicates ample opportunity for innovation to spur annuity demand and improve individual welfare.     

Survival analysis of pension scheme mortality when data are missing

Missing data is a problem that may be faced by actuaries when analysing mortality data. In this paper we deal with pension scheme data, where the future lifetime of each member is modelled by means of parametric survival models incorporating covariates, which may be missing for some individuals. Parameters are estimated by likelihood-based techniques. We analyse statistical issues, such as parameter identifiability, and propose an algorithm to handle the estimation task. Finally, we analyse the financial impact of including covariates maximally, compared with excluding parts of the mortality experience where data are missing; in particular we consider annuity factors and mis-estimation risk capital requirements.     

Social security, life insurance and annuities for families

In this paper we ask whether an aspect of social security, namely its role as a provider of insurance against uncertain life spans, is welfare enhancing. To this end we use an OLG model where agents have a bequest motive and differ in sex and marital status and where families are formed and destroyed and their characteristics evolve (exogenously) according to U.S. demographic patterns of marriage, divorce, fertility and mortality. We compare the implications of social security under a variety of market structures that differ in the extent to which life insurance and annuities are available. We find that social security is a bad idea. In economies where the private sector provides annuities and life insurance, it is a bad idea for the standard reason that it distorts the intertemporal margin by lowering the capital stock. In the absence of such securities social security is still a very bad idea, only marginally less so compared with economies with annuities and life insurance. We also explore these issues in a world where people live longer and we find no differences in our answers. As a by-product of our analysis we find that the existence of life insurance opportunities for people is important in welfare terms while that of annuities is not.