论经济活动中的会计监督

会计监督作为一种经济监督形式或活动,是经济监督系统中的一个组成部分,为了规范会计行为,提高会计信息质量,加强会计监督己成为建立现代企事业单位制度中一项重要内容。会计监督分为内部会计监督和外部会计监督,从内外两个方面探讨如何加强会计监督、提高会计信息质量、防范会计造假的问题。     

关于强化会计监督的思考

会计监督作为企业内部控制制度的一个重要组成部分,正视会计地位,充分有效发挥会计监督职能,对于维护国家财经法规,规范企业经营管理,帮助企业向利益相关者提供真实公允的会计信息起到重要作用.文章从会计监督的概念和内容着手,阐述了会计监督的重要性,通过对当前会计监督弱化原因的简单分析,提出了加强会计监督,完善会计监督职能的具体对策.     

传承创新发展——会计信息质量检查十周年

1999年以来,财政部门开展会计信息质量检查已有十年。十年探索,会计信息质量检查走向规范,占据了会计监督工作的半壁江山,促进了会计监督工作稳步发展;十年跋涉,会计信息质量检查与会计师事务所执业质量检查有机结合,有力地打击了会计造假和舞弊行为,为整顿规范市场经济秩序、确保财税政策执行发挥了巨大作用。值此会计信息质量检查十周年和2009年度会计监督工作交流会召开之际,本刊隆重推出会计信息质量检查十周年暨2009年度会计监督工作交流会专题,以浓墨重彩宣传会计信息质量检查与会计监督工作,系统总结十年来的成功经验做法,谋划会计信息质量检查科学发展之路;展现会计信息质量检查的巨大成效,让社会各界更多地了解会计监督工作、参与会计监督工作、支持会计监督工作。     

国有企业会计监督体系的构建研究

会计监督的主要目的是为了保障会计信息质量对会计信息展开的监督活动.会计信息质量保障的要素即为会计监督.同时会计信息失真的发生则是由于会计监督不力造成的,会计监督工作对改进企业治理结构具关键性效用,尤其对改制中的国企更具特殊意义.     

论会计透明度

普华永道关于“不透明指数”的研究报告 ,引发了本文对会计透明度的进一步讨论。会计透明度是一个全面、综合性的概念 ,它不仅同时顾及了会计信息自身的质量标准以及实现会计信息质量标准的方式 ,而且还丰富了会计信息质量标准和实现会计信息质量标准的方式 ,是一套全面的会计信息质量标准和一个进行会计信息全面质量管理的“工具箱”。本文还分析了会计透明度的制度基础 ,并以我国证券市场为例 ,讨论了实现高会计透明度的方式。     

完善会计信息质量检查公告模式的设想

会计信息质量检查公告是会计监督工作的一个环节，建立会计信息质量检查公告制度、完善会计信息质量检查公告模式是加大会计监督检查力度、综合冶理会计信息失真的重要手段。2006年11月3日，财政部发布了第12号会计信息质量检查公告，通报了部分企业存在严重的会计造假行为和部分会计师事务所执业质量低下的情况。公告指出，会计信息失真问题仍然存在，个别企业甚至存在严重的会计造假行为。公告的主要内容被广大媒体转载，社会影响广泛。虽然会计信息质量检查公告对于加强会计监督、扩大社会影响起到了重要作用，但是总体来看，现行公告模式95有待完善。[第一段]     

提高会计信息透明度对策探析

提高会计透明度是保证公司会计信息质量的重要途径,而我国公司的内外多因素导致会计透明度不高,因此我国应通过制定科学清晰的会计准则,提供真实可靠的会计信息,及时有效地进行会计披露,坚定有力地实施会计监督来保证会计信息质量,以促进我国市场经济的稳定、健康发展。     

论会计监督与现代企业制度的相关性

近年业国有资产流失。企业收支混乱与会计信息失真的现实，引发了人们对会计监督职能的讨论。在讨论中出现了一种否定会计监督职能的论点。为了建立现代企业制度。不仅不能否定，而且应该强化会计监督。     

强化会计监督 提升会计信息质量

会计监督作为会计基本职能之一,与会计核算相辅相成。然后目前由于会计监督弱化,导致假账错账时有发生,会计信息质量下降,使企业、社会和国家利益严重受损,同时失实的会计信息扰乱了整个经济社会的发展。笔者就会计监督弱化存在的问题进行深层剖析,提出强化会计监督的切实措施,以期达到加强会计监督职能,提升会计信息质量的目的。     

政府委派会计制质疑

无论是健全市场机制,还是加强宏观调控,都离不开真实可靠的会计信息。否则,有效的市场体系是不可能建立起来的。当前会计信息失真的严重后果,决定了会计监督的重要性。为了强化会计监督,解决会计秩序混乱和会计信息失真的问题而将会计独立于企业之外,实行“政府委派...     

An analysis of the adoption, perceived benefits, and expected future emphasis of western management accounting practices in Chinese SOEs and JVs

This paper considers the adoption, perceived benefits, and expected future emphasis of western management accounting practices in the Chinese emerging market economy based on a sample of 64 joint ventures (JVs) and 115 State Owned Enterprises (SOE) gathered from a questionnaire survey. The study finds that the level of adoption of management accounting practices is most influenced by ownership type of the enterprise (JV or SOE) and to a lesser extent by the nature of the management accounting techniques to be adopted. A further significant finding is that management accounting practices such as budgeting for controlling costs, profit and sales budgeting, and target costing are perceived to be more beneficial for SOEs compared to JVs. However, responsibility accounting which is traditionally associated with SOEs and accounting for decision making is perceived to be less beneficial to SOEs compared with JVs.     

Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

We examine the association between borrower (firm) and lender (bank) state ownership and accounting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. We hypothesize that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) adopt less conservative accounting than non‐state‐owned enterprises (NSOEs) because lenders are less concerned with downside risk for SOEs than for NSOEs. We also hypothesize a negative relation between conservatism and the fraction of total loans a firm borrows from state‐owned banks (SBs) because SBs have weaker demand for assurance of sufficient net assets to cover loan repayments than non‐state‐owned banks (NSBs). We find support for both hypotheses. Further analyses reveal that: (1) firms that borrow from commercial SBs exhibit more conservative accounting than firms that borrow from policy SBs and (2) firms adopt more conservative accounting as they get more loans from banks with foreign ownership or exclusively foreign banks. However, the results of these additional analyses are to some extent sensitive to alternative measures of accounting conservatism.     

金融风险的信息质量特征与我国金融会计制度改革

本文着眼于巴塞尔新资本协议第三次征求意见稿提出的金融风险监管和信息披露框架,以我国金融会计制度的国际化协调为切入点,分析了信用风险、市场风险和操作风险等金融风险的构成要素,指出现有监管信息系统和会计体系存在的问题.同时,本文还评价了我国新<金融企业会计制度>等规范对金融风险的披露和监管特征,分析了新制度对银行类上市公司所产生的影响,并提出了建立以风险计量会计披露为核心的监管体系的构想.本文最后对协同新巴塞尔协议的监管原则,建立完整的银行业信息披露框架,形成动态信息披露机制提出了一些建议.     

体制不协调与监管瓶颈:我国会计监管体制的演变及路径选择

我国的会计制度改革是为满足国企改革的需要而启动展开的,是我国体制转轨中的一项基础性制度建设。在改革起点上,首先是解决市场会计规则的制定和施行问题,通过新、旧会计制度转换,为国企产权改革提供支持。当国企进入以现代企业制度建设为目标的改革阶段之后,随之出现的大面积会计行为失范和会计秩序混乱,从反面提出了加强会计监管的改革需求。本文认为,在我国体制改革初期制定的会计监管框架与委托代理关系的企业制度存在脱节和错位,会计监管之所以成为制度瓶颈,原因在于对现行会计监管安排的路径依赖。     

Can corporatization improve the performance of state-owned enterprises even without privatization?

This paper examines an important reform program in China concerning State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), namely, corporatization without privatization. It finds that corporatization has had a significantly positive impact on SOE performance. It further shows that the sources of efficiency engendered by corporatization can be traced to the reform of the internal governance structure of these firms. The results indicate that, even without privatization, corporate governance reform is potentially an effective way of improving the performance of SOEs; such reforms represent a policy alternative for countries seeking to restructure SOEs without massive privatization. The results also suggest that it may be optimal for governments to carry out corporatization of SOEs before eventual privatization.     

Does Internal Corporate Governance Complement or Substitute for External Auditing? Evidence from China's Anti‐corruption Campaign

Two competing hypotheses have been developed for the relationship between internal corporate governance and external auditing. One proposes a complementary relationship, while the other suggests it is substitutable. This study takes advantage of China's recent anti‐corruption campaign as a quasi‐natural experiment to explore this relationship. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that, after the campaign, internal corporate governance improved more in SOEs (state‐owned enterprises) than in non‐SOEs. SOEs were less likely to choose Big 10 auditors after the campaign, while audit firms assigned less experienced auditors to their SOE client firms and charged lower audit fees. These effects were more pronounced in SOEs that exhibited greater improvement in corporate governance. Overall, we find the anti‐corruption campaign improved corporate governance in SOEs but, at the same time, reduced external audit quality, which supports the substitution view. We argue that this result might be driven by the fact that SOEs have limited demand for high‐quality accounting information because the Chinese government maintains strong control over the capital markets.     

Ownership and performance in Chinese manufacturing industry

The relation between various ownership types and performance measures for 1036 firms in China is examined. State owned enterprises (SOE) are consistently less profitable than mixed enterprises (ME), collective owned enterprises (COE), joint ventures (JV), and foreign owned enterprises (FOE). The SOEs and FOEs are also less productive than MEs, COEs and JVs. The surprisingly low productivity for FOEs may result from the learning curve for international investors doing business in China. Owned by local governments, COEs are more profitable and productive than the central government owned SOEs, possibly because of closer monitoring and harder budget constraints, and better employees and management. The performance of MEs, mostly newly privatized firms, is weaker when related to assets, possibly due to the anomaly that capital investments following their public offerings are not yet on line. The co-existence of economies of scale and over-employment is also evident among Chinese enterprises.     

论国有企业会计控制

会计控制弱化是我国国有企业普遍存在的问题，究其根源，主要是所有者和经营者目标的背离、所有者虚位、会计行为失当等原因所致，要保证经营者有效履行受托经营责任，维护所有者利益，就必须加强国有企业会计控制，鉴于此，本文提出了建立多层次会计控制系统，完善企业激励机制、加强企业内部控制管理，强化外部监督与约束机制等会计控制对策。     

Price informativeness and state-owned enterprises: Considering their heterogeneity

State owned enterprises (SOEs) play a pivotal role in the world economy. However, how state ownership affects price informativeness is less-explored, much less the impacts of differing forms of state ownership. We find that the price synchronicity of SOEs is about 9.0% to 15.4% larger than that of non-SOEs, indicating that SOEs have less informative stock prices. Institutional environment and government regulations such as anti-corruption campaigns are important mediating factors in reducing price synchronicity, but the price synchronicity of SOEs is still significantly larger than that of non-SOEs. Differences in state ownership matters for price synchronicity. SOEs associated with local governments (SOELGs), as well as those represented by state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), have larger price synchronicity than non-SOEs. Although SOEs controlled by central governments (SOECGs) also have larger price synchronicity than non-SOEs based on univariate tests, this difference becomes statistically insignificant when controlling for other factors. SOEs are less likely to be publicly exposed for fraud, implying that state ownership provides a buffer for SOEs. Overall, we evidence that state ownership has an important role in deprecating stock-price informativeness, with the impact differing depending on whether SOEs are controlled by central or non-central governments.     

管理控制工具的整合模式:理论分析与中国企业的创新——基于中国国有企业的多案例研究

引入和应用西方管理会计(控制)工具是近年来我国企业的一个热门话题,纵观相关文献就会发现每一个管理控制工具(包括预算管理、平衡记分卡、EVA、作业管理等)都试图被定位于一个"全能"的管理控制系统,有意无意地忽略了与其他工具之间的相互补充与整合。由于种种原因,这一问题尚未得到国内学术界足够的重视,而且对西方管理会计工具的介绍性文献远远多于以我国企业为背景的应用研究文献。有鉴于此,本文首先通过对相关理论的归纳、剖析,并依据我们对中国华润集团、中化集团和五矿集团这三个大型国企管理控制工具运用的实地调查,力图对这一问题进行深入的理论分析和实践总结,以期丰富我国企业管理控制的理论,并予以引导实践。