Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing

This article examines changes in supermarket prices in local markets following supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that prices rise following LBOs in local markets in which the LBO firm's rivals are also highly leveraged and that LBO firms have higher prices than their less leveraged rivals, suggesting that LBOs create incentives to raise prices. However, I also find that prices fall following LBOs in local markets in which rival firms have low leverage and are concentrated. These price drops are associated with LBO firms exiting the local market, suggesting that rivals attempt to “prey” on LBO chains.     

Predicting systematic risk: Implications from growth options

In accordance with the well-known financial leverage effect, decreases in stock prices cause an increase in the levered equity beta for a given unlevered beta. However, as growth options are more volatile and have higher risk than assets in place, a price decrease may decrease the unlevered equity beta via an operating leverage effect. This is because price decreases are associated with a proportionately higher loss in growth options than in assets in place. Most of the existing literature focuses on the financial leverage effect: This paper examines both effects. We show, with a simple option pricing model, the opposing effects at work when the firm is a portfolio of assets in place and growth options. Our empirical results show that, contrary to common belief, the operating leverage effect largely dominates the financial leverage effect, even for initially highly levered firms with presumably few growth options. We then link variations in betas to measurable firm characteristics that proxy for the fraction of the firm invested in growth options. We show that these proxies jointly predict a large fraction of future cross-sectional differences in betas. These results have important implications on the predictability of equity betas, hence on empirical asset pricing and on portfolio optimization that controls for systematic risk.     

LEVERAGE, RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND GROWTH

The effects of resource allocation on firms comprising the competitive economy are examined within the structure of a simple general equilibrium model. The study shows that capital structure of a firm is independent of its value, — a result that can be characterized as the mirror-image of the celebrated Modigliani-Miller proposition. The structure of present analysis highlights how costs of capital assets change, what affects the prices of the firms, and how these changes are reflected in the operations of the firms in an overall economic set up. The paper then establishes that if debt is increased, and the (relatively) levered firm expands, its stock price goes up and the (relatively) less levered firm shrinks and moves in the opposite direction in all respects. The appropriate conditions for profitable leveraged buyout are spelled out, and other conditions are also specified as to when merger is unprofitable. Finally, the paper is concluded with some thoughts on possible future research along the lines outlined in this work.     

The Intra-Industry Effects of Going-Private Transactions

We demonstrate that bids to take firms private generate significantly positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. These valuation effects cannot reflect either synergy or monopoly since no consolidation of operating firms is involved in such transactions. Participation by buyout specialists in the bid does not significantly affect these gains. Bids by outsiders and bids by incumbent managers generate similar valuation effects for industry rivals. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the capitalized values of rival firms relative to the target firm. We also report valuation effects for target firms.     

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

Investment policy with time-to-build

Most capital projects have an implementation lag. We examine the effect of implementation lag on a levered firm’s investment decision. The main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a levered company’s investment trigger, and this effect can be significantly different from that of an unlevered company. The exact relationship between lag and investment trigger depends on the level of debt used by the firm. For an optimally-levered firm, a crucial determinant of the lag-investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront. If this fraction is small, investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant. If this fraction is large, investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag, depending on parameter values, but the magnitude of the effect is not large. Optimally levering a firm makes the implementation lag more investment-friendly relative to an unlevered firm, thus it is possible that the lag has a negative effect on investment if the firm is unlevered but a positive effect if the same firm is optimally-levered. For an optimally-levered firm, implementation lag generally has a non-negative effect on investment.     

How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.     

Investment options with debt-financing constraints

A contingent claims model is used to study the impact of debt-financing constraints on firm value, optimal capital structure, the timing of investment and other variables, such as credit spreads. The optimal investment trigger follows a U shape as a function of exogenously imposed constraint. Risky, equity-financed R&D growth options increase firm value by increasing the option value on unlevered assets, while their impact on the net benefits of debt is small.     

Local Risk,Local Factors,and Asset Prices

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Calculating The Cost of Capital of an Unlevered Firm For Use in Project Evaluation

The adjusted present value requires an estimate of the cost of equity of an unlevered firm. Traditional approaches for calculating this cost assume that firms maintain a constant market-value percentage of debt when in fact firms typically use a book-value percentage of debt. In this paper, we present an approach to correctly estimate the cost of equity of an unlevered firm whenever the firm fails to maintain a constant market-value-based leverage ratio. We also demonstrate that both the Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980) approaches may yield substantial valuation errors when firms determine debt levels based on book-value percentages. In contrast our method makes no errors as long as managers know the marginal tax benefit of debt.     

Raising rival's costs in the securities settlement industry

The competition between a central securities depository (CSD) and a custodian bank is analyzed in a Stackelberg model. Investor banks decide whether to use the services of the CSD or of the custodian bank, depending on the prices and their preferences for their inhomogeneous services. Since the custodian bank uses services provided by the CSD as input, the CSD can raise its rival's costs. The CSD's equilibrium market share is higher than socially optimal, unless the CSD is not allowed to charge negative prices. This result has important policy implications that are related to a discussion currently taking place in the securities settlement industry.     

Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatements Due to Accounting Irregularities

Abstract:  This paper investigates the intra-industry effects of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities. We detect a significant contagion effect for rival firms whose cash flow characteristics are similar to those of the restating firm. The restatement doesn't seem to influence all the firms in the industry or firms that have a high probability of involving the same type of accounting irregularity as the restating firm does. We do not detect any competitive effect; nor do we find a significant change in the implied cost of equity capital of the rival firms, suggesting that the contagion effect is due to the revision in the expected short-run future earnings of the rival firms.     

Nonlinear pricing and exclusion: I. buyer opportunism

We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price‐quantity schedules in an Aghion‐Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes, depending on whether and how the price charged by the dominant firm depends on the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downward. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the dominant firm to pocket quantity rebates. We show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing.     

Political scrutiny and earnings management in the oil refining industry

The fortunes of the oil refining industry have historically been tied to the political process. In periods of high gasoline prices public outcry increases pressure on the political process to increase regulation, taxation, and other costs on the industry. This study explores the relationship of gasoline prices and oil firm earning with accounting earnings management of oil firms. Findings indicate that firms make accounting changes and discretionary accruals to decrease (increase) earnings in periods when gasoline prices and oil firm earnings are rising (falling).     

Growth LBOs

Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

PERSONAL TAXES,INFLATION AND MARKET VALUATION

In an inflation-non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation results in a “bracket-creep” effect that reduces the demand for corporate debt while the tax-deductibility of nominal interest makes the use of debt financing cheaper. The interactive effect of inflation and differential dividend and capital gains taxes on the value of a levered firm is analyzed in this paper. Under a non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation decreases the value of the unlevered firm but the effect of inflation on the firm's debt-to-asset ratio is theoretically indeterminate. The gain from leverage is also derived and compared with other valuation models.     

The spillover effect of focal firms’ cybersecurity breaches on rivals and the role of the CIO: Evidence from stock trading volume

This study investigates whether there is any spillover uncertainty regarding a rival firm’s future operations upon a focal firm’s announcement of cybersecurity breaches and whether the existence of a chief information officer (CIO) in rival firms can reduce this spillover uncertainty. Using abnormal trading volume to capture the change in investors’ expectations, we show that compared with the focal firms, rival firms experience an increase in abnormal trading volume following the focal firm’s announcement of a security breach. The findings suggest that the spillover effect generates even more uncertainties toward these nonbreached rival firms regarding the impact of the focal firm’s security breach. However, CIOs in nonbreached rival firms can play a shielding role in mitigating such effects. Our study contributes to the literature on the impact of cybersecurity and has policy implications for encouraging a strategic perspective when managing cybersecurity risks.