IPO first‐day returns: Skewness preference,investor sentiment and uncertainty underlying factors

In this paper, we investigate the initial public offering (IPO) first-day returns. Our focus is to examine the irrational component of the agent behavior towards IPO lotteries. Based on 234 French IPOs performed between 2002 and 2012, we find that IPOs with high initial returns have higher idiosyncratic skewness, turnover and momentum. This finding provides empirical evidence for investors' preference for stocks with lottery-like features and investor sentiment. In addition, we show that the skewness preference and the investor sentiment effect are stronger during periods of favorable market conditions. Our results are robust to the integration of uncertainty underlying factors.     

The relationship between size,book-to-market equity ratio,earnings–price ratio,and return for the Hong Kong stock market

In this paper, we investigate the relation between stock returns and β, size (ME), leverage, book-to-market equity ratio, and earnings–price ratio (E/P) in Hong Kong stock market using the Fama and French (FF) [J. Finance 47 (1992) 427] approach. FF find that two variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with β, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and E/P ratios. In this paper, similar to previous studies in Hong Kong and US stock markets, we find that β is unable to explain the average monthly returns on stocks continuously listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange for the period July 1984–June 1997. But three of the variables, size, book-to-market equity, and E/P ratios, seem able to capture the cross-sectional variation in average monthly returns over the period. The other two variables, book leverage and market, are also able to capture the cross-sectional variation in average monthly returns. But their effects seem to be dominated by size, book-to-market equity, and E/P ratios, and considered to be redundant in explaining average returns when size, book-to-market equity, and E/P ratios are also considered. The results are consistent across subperiods, across months, and across size groups. These suggest that the results are not driven by extreme observations or abnormal return behavior in some of the months or by size groups.     

How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

Determinants of target capital structure: The case of dual debt and equity issues

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO stock performance: evidence from China

This paper examines the cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO long‐term stock returns in China. We document that the aftermarket P/E ratio has the most robust negative association with post‐IPO stock returns. The negative relation indicates that the market corrects the aftermarket overvaluation of IPO firms in the long run. Underwriter reputation has a positive effect on post‐IPO stock returns, while board size has a negative impact, consistent with the views that reputable underwriters mitigate the information asymmetry in IPO pricing and over‐sized boards reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, we find little evidence indicating that the equity ownership structure is significantly associated with post‐IPO stock returns.     

Underwriter learning about unfamiliar firms: Evidence from the history of biotech IPOS

This study examines the ability of underwriters to properly value unfamiliar firms prior to issuance. I use a sample of IPOs in biotechnology, a relatively new but thriving industry. The first American biotech IPO was in 1980. Through the end of 2004, almost 500 biotech IPOs have appeared in the public market. I find that biotechnology differs from other industries in the attributes of individual firms valued by the market. In particular, R&D and the quality of human capital (e.g., star scientists on the staff) are much more important for biotech valuations. I find also that underwriters appeared not to appreciate this distinction for early biotech IPOs; in those cases, first-day market returns were predictable by firm attributes not used by underwriters to establish IPO issue prices. I also find that underwriters have learned over time, albeit slowly. Over the 20+ years of biotech history, IPO issue prices have become more dependent on firm attributes unique to biotechs while first-day market returns have become less predictable.     

Equilibrium "Anomalies"

Many empirical “anomalies” are actually consistent with the single beta capital asset pricing model if the empiricist utilizes an equity‐only proxy for the true market portfolio. Equity betas estimated against this particular inefficient proxy will be understated, with the error increasing with the firm's leverage. Thus, firm‐specific variables that correlate with leverage (such as book‐to‐market and size) will appear to explain returns after controlling for proxy beta simply because they capture the missing beta risk. Loadings on portfolios formed on relative leverage and relative distress completely subsume the powers of the Fama and French (1993) returns to small minus big market capitalization (SMB) portfolios and returns to high minus low book‐to‐market (HML) portfolios factors in explaining cross‐sectional returns.     

Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

The Initial Public Offerings of Listed Firms

A number of firms in the United Kingdom list without issuing equity and then issue equity shortly thereafter. We argue that this two‐stage offering strategy is less costly than an initial public offering (IPO) because trading reduces the valuation uncertainty of these firms before they issue equity. We find that initial returns are 10% to 30% lower for these firms than for comparable IPOs, and we provide evidence that the market in the firm's shares lowers financing costs. We also show that these firms time the market both when they list and when they issue equity.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets

Market returns before the offer price is set affect the amountand variability of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing.Thus an important question is "What IPO procedure is best adaptedfor controlling underpricing in "hot" versus "cold" market conditions?"The French stock market offers a unique arena for empiricalresearch on this topic, since three substantially differentissuing mechanisms (auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price)are used there. Using 1992–1998 data, we find that theauction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lowervariance of underpricing. We show that the auction procedure'sability to incorporate more information from recent market conditionsinto the IPO price is an important reason.     

HIGH-TECH IPOS: A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS

The typical price behavior of an initial public offering (IPO), consisting of a price upsurge on the first trading day followed by subpar performance in the (longer-run) after-market, is one of the most intriguing puzzles in corporate finance. This study focuses on high-tech IPOs in Europe and the U.S. over the period 1998–2001, both to compare the European and U.S. IPO markets and to determine how the price behavior of high-tech IPOs compares to that of IPOs in general. Average initial-day returns were 39% and 64% for the European and U.S. samples, respectively. The median returns were significantly lower, however, indicating that the sample averages are affected by a small group of exceptionally strong performers. But, for the first full year of trading, the median market-adjusted returns were negative for both samples. Not surprisingly, this substandard aftermarket performance was most apparent in companies that failed to generate operating profits.
As with IPOs in general, high-tech IPOs showed higher initial-day returns in "hot" markets than in "cold." Strong first-day performance was a good predictor of IPO volume in the high-tech market, with strong first-day returns triggering a flood of IPOs in subsequent months. Overall, then, the authors' study concludes that the price behavior of high-tech IPOs provides an exaggerated version of the general tendency of IPOs to be underpriced initially but underperform over the longer term.     

Fundamental Drivers of Dependence in REIT Returns

We analyse the empirical relationships between firm fundamentals and the dependence structure between individual REIT and stock market returns. In contrast to previous studies, we distinguish between the average systematic risk of REITs and their asymmetric risk in the sense of a disproportionate likelihood of joint negative return clusters between REITs and the stock market. We find that REITs with low systematic risk are typically small, with low short-term momentum, low turnover, high growth opportunities and strong long-term momentum. Holding systematic risk constant, the main driving forces of asymmetric risk are leverage and, to some extent, short-term momentum. Specifically, we find that leverage has an asymmetric effect on REIT return dependence that outweighs the extent to which it increases the average sensitivity of REIT equity to market fluctuations, explaining the strong negative impact of leverage on firm performance especially during crisis periods that has been documented in recent empirical work.     

U.S. leveraged loan and debt markets: Implications for optimal portfolio and hedging

This paper offers fresh empirical evidence on the relationship between leverage loans and US debt markets by investigating the distributional predictability and directional predictability between leveraged loans and treasury bonds, fixed income securities and corporate bonds in the U.S economy. We use daily price data from January 2013 to April 2021. First, we analyze the causal relationship between variables by applying non-parametric causality-in-quantiles test and find that quantile causality in variance shows the stronger impact of leverage loan market returns on US debt market returns over the entire quantile range. Second, quantile dependence and directional predictability between leverage loan market and US debt markets are analyzed by applying cross-quantilogram approach and estimated results show the heterogeneous quantile relations from leverage loan market to US debt market. Moreover, the cross-quantile correlation results demonstrate the evidence of negative predictability from leverage loan market to US debt market in low, medium and high quantile range. These evidences are important for US investors and portfolio managers.     

THE MARKET'S PRICING OF DEBT IPOs

Based on the authors' recent study published in the Journal of Financial Economics , this article summarizes new evidence on the first-day and aftermarket price performance of a firm's first public offer of bonds after its equity IPO. Unlike equity IPOs, such bond IPOs are not underpriced on average. However, bonds that are more equity-like (junk bonds) are underpriced at the initial offer whereas high-grade debt is actually overpriced. This finding supports the view that riskier debt issues have a larger equity component and, as a consequence, a higher degree of information asymmetry.
The authors' study also showed that less prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpriced offers, and that the issuer's stock market listing plays an important role in determining the first-day price performance of bond IPOs. The degree of underpricing is lower for bonds issued by firms whose equity is listed on NYSE/AMEX than for bonds issued by firms listed on Nasdaq. Finally, the aftermarket performance for the full sample and various subsamples is consistent with bond market efficiency in the sense that, once prices adjust after the first day of trading, there are no clearly exploitable opportunities for excess returns.     

An introduction to security returns

The equity premium - the difference between the return achievable from investment in the equity market (R_M ) and the risk-free rate of return (R_F )- plays an important part in corporate finance. The expression equity premium (sometimes referred to as the equity risk premium) is used to denote the ex ante expectation of investors. The term excess return refers to the ex post achievement of stock returns over and above the risk-free return. If we compare US and UK returns, we find that total returns, real returns and the value of (R_M - R_F ) are all marginally higher for the UK. Summarized evidence appears in Table 1 and Table 6. Such greater returns may be due to an increased risk premium related to increasing unexpected inflation. Particularly important in estimating the equity risk premium is whether excess returns are measured using a geometric or an arithmetic mean return. To a significant extent, this question revolves around mean reversion in stock returns. Evidence of mean reversion is substantial, although it cannot be proved unequivocally. Given the weight of evidence of mean reversion, there may be a strong case for the use of a geometric mean with an equity premium of between 3% and 5% - or even less.     

Pension funds and IPO pricing. Evidence from a quasi-experiment

We exploit a quasi-experiment arising from the government-forced changes to the assets under management and investment policy of the Polish pension funds. We test whether this new regulation and its resultant demand shock on the investors' side, leads to changes in the IPO pricing and the subsequent stock's performance. We report material and a statistically significant decrease in the IPO proceeds (IPO size) in the post-treatment period equal to over 107 million PLN (34 million USD). We find no empirical evidence that the treatment had a significant effect on the first-day IPO underpricing or on the long-term underperformance. We conclude that the demand shock resulting from the pension system reform that primarily aimed at solving fiscal problems effectively eliminated the so-called ‘pension premium’ of higher IPO valuations. Thus, it indirectly impaired companies' power of raising money in the public stock market. Furthermore, we report a decrease in the average first-day IPO returns among big issuers that is consistent with the book building literature.