公众股份制是我国现阶段的一种公有制主要实现形式

根据马克思主义基本原理，社会主义公有制既根本区别于私有制，也完全不同于其他任何公有制(例如原始公有制)，它的本质特征有三个：其一，它是劳动者所有制，劳动者成为所有者主体，劳动者与生产资料直接结合。其二，它是劳动者社会联合所有制，在社会化生产和协作劳动的基础上，以社会结合的形式实现劳动者的所有权。其三，它是劳动者个人所有制，在社会主义公有制中，每一劳动者个人都是主人翁，公有生产资料的所有权最终都要落实到每一劳动者个人身上。     

《政治经济学》社会主义部分(上)

一、怎样理解全民所有制的性质和特点? 1、社会主义全民所有制是社会全体劳动人民共同占有生产资料的一种公有制形式,是和高度社会化大生产相适应的公有制形式。在全民所有制范围内,消灭了剥削,全体劳动者成为生产资料的主人,他们的关系是平等互助合作关系。 2、相对于共产主义全民所有制,社会主义全民所有制还是不成熟的。表现在:①我国全民所有制采取国家所有制形式;     

加强人才能力建设合理配置人力资源

马克思主义认为，生产力是最活跃最革命的因素，是社会发展的最终决定力量。生产力与生产关系、经济基础与上层建筑的矛盾，构成社会的基本矛盾。社会基本矛盾的运动，决定着社会性质的变化和社会经济政治化的发展方向。—部人类社会发展史，就是先进生产力不断取代落后生产力的发展历史。在生产力中，人是最具有决定性的力量，先进生产力的主     

对个体私营经济问题的理性认识

对个体私营经济的存在和发展可以从以上三个方面认识：（1）实践证明私有制能包容各种层次生产力。在简略的诸要素中,劳动是决定占有生产资料方式的主要因素,人们利已思想说明私有制有其存在的客观其础;（2）生产的社会化包括劳动的社会化,信息的社会化、交易规则的社会化等诸多内容。所有制已不是社会化生产的基础,知识与完善的市场才是社会化生产的先决条件;（3）个体私营经济既有较高的生产力水平,又能再生产出社会主义的生产关系,因而个体私营经济是社会主义市场竞争领域的主体,国有经济是纲,个体私营经济是目。     

第二讲 社会主义国家财政的本质与职能

一、社会主义国家财政存在的必要性从财政的起源来说,财政存在的必要性是与私有制和国家相联系。而在以生产资料社会主义公有制为基础的社会主义社会,除了由于国家的存在和需要这个具体历史共性的原因外,主要应从社会主义社会的经济和政治条件的客观要求去分析财政存在的必要性。     

浅析工业企业财务管理存在的问题及对策

企业是现代社会最常见最基本的经济组织。企业是一个历史范畴概念,它是社会经济发展到一定历史阶段的产物,是现代社会化大生产和商品经济的产物。社会主义社会是以社会化大生产、以生产资料公有制为基础的有计划商品经济社会,所以企业这种经济组织形式也必然大量存在着并不断地发展着。工业企业从其成立的宗旨和本质看,不仅要在使用价值上满足社会需要,而且要实现价值的增值,要创造利润。所以这种经济组织必然大量存在并不断地发展着。但当前,工业企业的财务管理存在着一些问题,本文具体通过几个方面分析了工业企业财务管理存在的问题,并对如何加强工业企业财务管理提出了一点建议。     

关于银行经营责任制问题的探讨

社会主义企业的经营责任制,是在国家计划指导下,以提高经济效益为目的,责、权、利紧密结合的生产经营管理制度。它是社会化大生产的必然产物,是生产资料社会主义公有制的客观要求。四川省从1979年开始进行了扩大企业自主     

从历史看对外战争与美国经济关系

资本主义高度社会化的生产力发展,与生产资料及产品被私人占有的资本主义生产关系之间产生了尖锐的矛盾,这个矛盾是资本主义的基本矛盾。这种生产力和生产关系之间的矛盾,会产生资本主义生产无限扩大的趋势和亿万劳动群众购买力相对缩小的矛盾。为了缓解这种矛盾资本主义国家所采用的主要途径是对外战争。在文中从历史资料出发就对外战争与美国经济的关系进行了分析。     

新中国政府财政教育支出基本矛盾的研判

纵观新中国50多年政府财政教育支出的历程，其基本矛盾表现为政府财政教育支出供应紧缺与社会公众受教育需求日益膨胀之间的矛盾。它实质上是社会基本矛盾——生产力与生产关系的矛盾在教育财政中的具体反映。从生产力的角度来看，主要体现在教育财政资源配置的层面上；从生产关系的角度来看，重点反映在利益关系调整的层面上。本文以教育财政资源配置和利益关系调整为线索，对建国以来中国政府财政教育支出基本矛盾进行了回顾和分析，并预计了未来政府财政教育支出矛盾变化趋向。     

关于我国私营经济几个理论问题的思考

我国现阶段的私营经济在整个国民经济体系中发挥了十分重要的作用，但它仍然是以雇佣劳动为基础的资本主义性质的经济，因此，必须坚持以公有制为主体的条件下，发展私营经济，同时，我们还必须看到我国的私营经济与资本主义政权条件下的私营经济相比有着自身的特点，我们鼓励和支持私营经济的发展是符合生产关系一定要适合生产力性质这一客观规律的要求，我们现在发展私营经济正是为了发社会生产力，为彻底消灭私有制创造条件。     

Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationships between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study to provide large‐scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family‐controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U‐shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non‐family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.     

Government Intervention and Investment Comovement: Chinese Evidence

This study examines whether government intervention affects corporate investment comovement, and whether this impact varies across firms with different types of ownership. We use a large Chinese sample to investigate these questions, and perform a regional as well as firm‐level analysis. We show that government intervention is positively and significantly associated with investment comovement. We also find that the impact of government intervention on investment comovement is higher and more significant for state‐owned firms than for domestic private and foreign firms. Finally, we show that investment comovement hinders corporate performance for state‐owned and domestic private firms but not for foreign firms.     

Audit effort and fees under concentrated client ownership: Evidence from four international audit firms

Using proprietary audit hour and fee data from the internal records of four Big Six firms in Finland, this study examines the influence of audit client ownership type on audit effort and fees. The primary argument is that there are differential effects of ownership concentration depending on the particular nature of concentrated ownership (i.e., firms in which the majority of shares are manager-owned versus foreign-owned versus state-owned). Consistent with this, the paper documents that audit hours and fees are lower for companies majority-owned by their management and higher for subsidiaries of foreign companies than for other firms. However, no difference between companies owned by the state or municipalities and companies with a more diverse ownership structure can be found. This suggests that governmental ownership is actually closer to a dispersed than a concentrated ownership structure in terms of audit quality.The results show that replacing the variable indicating majority-ownership with the variables capturing the type of a controlling owner increases the explanatory power of the models significantly, which demonstrates the importance of ownership type in the production and pricing of an audit. The findings have important implications for those examining audit markets with client firms owned by different types of controlling shareholders.     

Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China

Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state‐owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Does Ownership Identity Matter? A Meta‐analysis of Research on Firm Financial Performance in Relation to Government versus Private Ownership

We examine whether reported ownership–performance relations systematically differ for government versus private ownership by integrating the diverse empirical results for listed corporations in emerging markets. Our meta‐analysis confirms popular perceptions that, compared to private ownership, government ownership is associated with inferior performance. We find that, on average, the underlying ownership–performance relation is negative for government ownership and positive for private ownership, and the difference between these relations is significant. We also find that the positive private ownership–performance relation is stronger for institutional/foreign ownership compared to family/management ownership. Further analysis shows that negative (positive) government (private) ownership and performance relations have weakened (strengthened) over time. Our assessment of the sources of heterogeneity shows that reported relations are biased by estimation methods that fail to adequately control for endogeneity. Our results suggest that the nature of ownership–performance relations in emerging markets remains very dynamic and warrants ongoing research interest.     

Majority and Minority Ownership of Publicly-Traded Firms: A Test of the Value of Control Using Market Multiples

Publicly-traded companies that are controlled by other publicly-traded companies provide a unique setting in which to test whether the market values of majority and minority ownership interests are proportionate to their ownership percentages. Test results indicate that the value of subsidiary net assets and net income are greater to majority shareholders than to minority shareholders. However, comparison of asset and income valuation with a sample of diffusely-held firms indicates that this valuation asymmetry is not due to a wealth transfer from the minority to the majority owners but to a discounting of the portion of the subsidiary owned by the minority shareholders.     

中国保险业产权制度创新研究

本文从中国保险业产权制度变迁历史出发,运用制度经济学理论,在概括出中国保险产权制度变迁的特征和存在问题的基础上,提出引入战略投资者、化解产权变革与公共物品供需矛盾及设计投资者退出机制等中国保险产权制度创新构想。     

Wealth Effects of Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Singapore

We examine institutional characteristics and the wealth effects of private equity placements in Singapore. Our findings show that private placements in Singapore generally result in a negative wealth effect and a reduction in ownership concentration. We find that at high levels of ownership concentration, the relation between abnormal returns and changes in ownership concentration is significantly negative. We also show that the market reacts less favorably to placements in which management ownership falls below 50%, but more favorably to issues to single investors. We do not find evidence suggesting that our results are due to an information effect.     

关于停止国有股减持的再思考

本文认为 ,停止国有股减持只是说明在国有股减持的方法、步骤、时机以及价格等方面存在着不合时宜的地方 ,而决不意味着放弃解决国有股流通、国有股“一股独大”的问题。从改革和发展的角度来看 ,国有股减持是经济体制改革、资本市场发展必过的大关 ,是一种必然的趋势。当然 ,减持国有股必须注意处理好多方面的关系 ,包括国有股减持与证券市场发展、社保体系完善、股权全流通的关系 ,稳定与发展的关系 ,政府各部门之间的关系等 ;同时 ,还要坚持公平、多样化、稳步推进的原则 ,积极妥善地解决国有股减持问题。