Optimal Regulation Under Uncertainty

This paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain. Uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm's owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return. We argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors. The deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement-return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach. We present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty. ¹ 1 A recent paper by Baron 1 furnishes an excellent review of a host of diverse issues involving the behavior of the firm under uncertainty and the role of financial markets.
In our approach, the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors' perceptions and preferences over riskreturn characteristics. We portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value, given the prices set by regulators. Within this framework, it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors. We also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm.     

An Equilibrium Model of Investment Under Uncertainty

We analyze the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneousfirms in a competitive, uncertain environment, characterizingfirms' investment strategies explicitly and deriving closed-formsolutions for firm value. Real option premia remain significant,and are even unmitigated relative to the standard partial-equilibriummodel when both are calibrated to observables. Firms consequentlydelay investment, choosing not to undertake some positive NPVprojects. We compare competitive behavior to that of a strategicmonopolist, and quantify the welfare loss associated with monopoly.Finally, the model predicts business cycle dependence on firmreturns, with returns negatively skewed during industry expansionsbut positively skewed in industry recessions.     

Farmland Investment Under Conditions of Certainty and Uncertainty

This study investigates the potential for farmland to improve mixed-asset portfolio efficiency. Three major conclusions are drawn from the research. First, in a world with certainty, farmland can be shown to statistically improve mixed-asset portfolio efficiency. Second, with the introduction of uncertainty into the portfolio allocation model, investors can justify small or no allocations of farmland in a mixed-asset portfolio, although it appears that even with uncertainty prudent investors should evaluate the asset class. Third, with respect to farmland investment and geographic diversification, the results question the ability of an optimized mean–variance portfolio to provide substantial improvement in comparison to a naïve portfolio. The marginal improvement in portfolio efficiency of an optimized farmland portfolio versus a naïve farmland portfolio is not statistically significant.     

Optimal Consumption Taxes and Social Security Under Tax Measurement Problems and Uncertainty

A representative individual lives for two periods; works when young and depends on savings and a government operated social security system when old—the returns on both sources of income, when old, are random. Due to administrative problems the returns to savings are observed with some measurement error. Two alternative consumption tax systems are considered; the Registered Asset Treatment (RAT) and the Non-Registered Asset Treatment (NRAT). The advantage of the RAT is that it can perform a social insurance role while the disadvantage is that it imposes measurement error risk. Correlation between the random return on saving and its measurement error can provide a risk-hedging role that can be further strengthened by the RAT version. The NRAT version neither provides social insurance nor imposes measurement error risk. Both tax systems hedge against the uncertainties in the social security system. The taxpayer engages in precautionary saving in response to future uncertainty.     

经济政策不确定性对人寿保险需求的影响

根据背景风险理论推测,经济政策不确定性作为一类不可保的宏观政策风险,可能对保险需求变动产生影响。本文利用Baker等(2013)测算的中国经济政策不确定性指数,实证检验了经济政策不确定性对中国各省人寿保险需求变动的影响,以及在不同异质性条件下的影响差异。结果发现:第一,经济政策不确定性对寿险需求有显著正影响,且其在经济周期的不同阶段存在显著差异;第二,教育水平的提升会一定程度促进经济政策不确定性对寿险需求的正影响;第三,经济政策不确定性对不同类型寿险需求的影响存在差异,具有保障功能的普通寿险和投资收益灵活稳健的万能险需求受到显著正影响;最后,经济政策不确定性对人寿保险保费增长的影响主要集中在新单保费。因此,政府部门应在保证经济政策连贯性的同时,提升民众的教育水平和避险意识,引导其主动购买保险,尽量降低政策波动产生的影响,分类推进不同类型人寿保险市场的扩大。     

Neutral Property Taxation Under Uncertainty

In a framework where no uncertainty arises, Arnott (J Publ Econ Theor 7:27–50, 2005) investigates a neutral property taxation policy that will not affect a landowner’s choices of capital intensity and timing of development. We investigate the same issue, but allow rents on structures to be stochastic over time. We assume that a regulator implements taxation on capital, vacant land, and post-development property so as to expropriate a certain ratio of pre-tax site value as well as to achieve neutrality. We find that the optimal taxation policy is to tax capital and subsidize properties before and after development. We also investigate how this optimal policy changes in response to changes in several exogenous forces related to demand and supply conditions of the real estate market.

Optimal Decentralized Investment Management

We study an institutional investment problem in which a centralized decision maker, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO), for example, employs multiple asset managers to implement investment strategies in separate asset classes. The CIO allocates capital to the managers who, in turn, allocate these funds to the assets in their asset class. This two-step investment process causes several misalignments of objectives between the CIO and his managers and can lead to large utility costs for the CIO. We focus on (1) loss of diversification, (2) unobservable managerial appetite for risk, and (3) different investment horizons. We derive an optimal unconditional linear performance benchmark and show that this benchmark can be used to better align incentives within the firm. We find that the CIO's uncertainty about the managers' risk appetites increases both the costs of decentralized investment management and the value of an optimally designed benchmark.     

Investment, Uncertainty, and Liquidity

We analyze the dynamic investment decision of a firm subject to an endogenous financing constraint. The threat of future funding shortfalls lowers the value of the firm's timing options and encourages acceleration of investment beyond the first‐best optimal level. As well as highlighting another way by which capital market frictions can distort investment behavior, this result implies that (1) the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be greatest for high‐liquidity firms and (2) greater uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on investment.     

Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles

We document cycles in corporate investment corresponding with the timing of national elections around the world. During election years, firms reduce investment expenditures by an average of 4.8% relative to nonelection years, controlling for growth opportunities and economic conditions. The magnitude of the investment cycles varies with different country and election characteristics. We investigate several potential explanations and find evidence supporting the hypothesis that political uncertainty leads firms to reduce investment expenditures until the electoral uncertainty is resolved. These findings suggest that political uncertainty is an important channel through which the political process affects real economic outcomes.     

Irreversibility,Uncertainty and Housing Investment

Housing represents a form of “irreversible” investment. Theoretically, increased uncertainty should lower housing investment. Empirically, finding a proxy for uncertainty has proven problematic. Some recent papers have investigated the effect of uncertainty on real estate investment, with varying proxies for uncertainty and mixed results. This paper employs a technique used in modern macroeconomic studies, the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity-in-Mean model, which has been shown to correspond as closely as any known measure to theoretical concepts of uncertainty. Results indicate that uncertainty indeed has a negative impact on housing starts.     

Optimal Asset Abandonment and Replacement: Tax and Inflation Considerations

The tax and inflation effects on the abandonment and replacement policies are examined for capital assets. The tax effect is shown to defer abandonment for some classes of assets while the asset duration is shortened for others depending on the characteristic of the marginal rates of return of extending asset life. Moreover, inflation may increase or decrease the asset duration depending on the rates of inflation growth of asset nominal cash flows and abandonment value and depending on the relative benefit of asset abandonment. In addition, the Fisher hypothesis of constant real returns relative to anticipated inflation is also examined in the case of asset abandonment and replacement. The results derived for a single cycle of replacement carry over to the replacement policy in an infinite cycle of replacement.     

Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

Agency problems limit firms’ access to capital markets,curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual waysto mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment?We present a theory of a firm’s investment dynamics inthe presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financialcontracts. We derive results relating firms’ investmentdecisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure,and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasingin current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positivelyserially correlated over time (after controlling for investmentopportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.(JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92)     

Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment

We analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures. Optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk-shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe. Worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level. Moreover, aggregate leverage decreases with the risk-shifting problem and increases with the effort problem.     

偿二代与资产负债匹配约束下寿险公司最优资产配置

保险公司资产配置需要同时考虑资产负债匹配和风险-收益均衡.本文在偿二代对保险资产负债匹配的隐性要求和保险资产负债管理监管规则对资产负债匹配的显性要求下,考察了资本占用和久期匹配约束下的险资投资策略,研究了保险公司的最优资产配置问题.结果 显示:负债久期较长的寿险公司很难同时满足偿二代资本要求和资产负债久期匹配要求;保险...     

经济增加值:盛誉下的思索

本文从价值问题入手 ,通过对价值和价值创造的分析与评述 ,阐明了经济增加值和企业价值的内在联系及其在价值计量和评价上的作用。并通过对EVA的概念实质、适用范围等方面的解析 ,阐明了EVA对传统会计准则的修正及其使用中可能出现的问题和相应的解决方案。最后 ,针对EVA的一些特点提出了进一步的思索 ,以求学术界讨论。     

Simple Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty

Using stochastic simulations and stability analysis, the paper compares how different monetary policy rules perform in a moderately nonlinear model with a time-varying NAIRU. Rules that perform well in linear models but implicitly embody backward-looking measures of real interest rates (such as conventional Taylor rules) or substantial interest rate smoothing perform very poorly in models with moderate nonlinearities, particularly when policymakers tend to make serially-correlated errors in estimating the NAIRU. This challenges the practice of evaluating policy rules within linear models, in which the consequences of responding myopically to significant overheating are extremely unrealistic.     

Information Acquisition Under Uncertainty in Credit Markets

This article studies information acquisition through investmentin improved risk assessment technology in competitive creditmarkets. A technology has two attributes: its ability to screenin productive borrowers, and its ability to screen out unproductiveborrowers. The two attributes have fundamentally different effectson acquisition incentives and the structure of equilibrium informationalexternalities between lenders. The article also studies howuncertainty associated with the quality of superior technologyaffects information acquisition incentives. Uncertainty influencesinformation acquisition even with risk-neutral banks. Increaseduncertainty may raise or dampen incentives, depending on whetheruncertainty is, respectively, about screening out or screeningin quality.     

论公共卫生最优支出策略

公共卫生支出具有极强的正外部性.如果由地方政府或私人选择公共卫生支出的水平,那么他们的最优选择是较低的公共卫生支出和较高的个人消费(内含个人医疗支出),整个社会的福利将会处于较低的水平状态.本文在一个动态的框架下分析了发生这种现象的经济学原因,说明中央政府而非地方政府或私人应该对公共卫生的建设承担更大的责任,应由中央政府负责全国公共卫生体系的建设.