Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

我国婚姻中的理性策略

任何一种行为选择都存在理性和非理性之分。理性是相对的,并非是绝对的。婚姻过程的选择也不例外,在某种意义上也是一种理性策略。从社会学的视角出发试图分析婚姻策略中的理性选择问题,目的在于认识和了解婚姻策略的合理性。     

工程量清单招标方法的探讨

工程量清单招标是国际上普遍使用的通行做法。它适应市场并合理配置资源,有利于施工企业合理报价,实现优胜劣汰,有利于标底的管理和控制,合理分散风险等,是我国工程造价体制改革的必然走向。     

理性的限度——素质教育漫谈之三

素质教育的任务之一是要引导民众从过于执著的感性追求的迷雾中走出来,在提高 理性观照层面的同时,也能够意识到理性的残缺之所在,并形成一种自我弥补的内在动力。在普 遍失落的理性当中,值得注意的是工具理性对认知理性的屏蔽,群体理性对个体理性的排斥,造 成理性的悬置和知与行的分离,并最终导致理性力量的丧失。因此,通过学与思,提升个体的认 知理性,由此而提升群体理性的层次,将成为当前素质教育的第一要义     

论社会经济人

人是具有社会性的.作为经济学研究假设前提的经济人,不能只表示个体经济人,还必须要有对社会经济人的假设抽象.缺失社会经济人假设的经济学研究只能从社会经济中的个体出发分析和探讨人类的经济行为,在宏观经济领域的研究是难以展开的,因此迄今为止的宏观经济理论仍只是局限于解释经济个体之间的利益之争,而没有体现出更高层次上的对社会整体利益的理性思考和自觉维护.在这种状态下,已经进入21世纪的经济学主要的宏观经济理论,不仅不完全适用于像中国这样快速发展的发展中国家,就是在其提出的发达市场经济国家,也基本上不被政府的宏观调控接受为指导理论.因而,深化经济人研究,增加社会经济人假设,必将成为推动21世纪经济学理论创新的制高点.     

考虑社会责任的异质有限理性制造商产量博弈均衡复杂动力学分析

通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。     

Ex-post full surplus extraction,straightforwardly

Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments. Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard McLean and Jeroen Swinkels.     

从经济理性到有限理性:经济学研究理性假设的演变

"经济理性"是经济学的传统研究假设,却因背离现实而受到质疑.基于行为人稀缺的心理资源和系统固有的不确定性而产生的"有限理性"正逐步取代"经济理性"成为经济学研究的理性假设.不同的理性观点可以从决策的视角得到系统地解释和比较.并且,随着理性假设的演变,经济行为的决策标准也相应从单一静态最优向多元动态平衡转变.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.