全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1557篇 |
免费 | 79篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 347篇 |
工业经济 | 96篇 |
计划管理 | 267篇 |
经济学 | 394篇 |
综合类 | 10篇 |
运输经济 | 10篇 |
旅游经济 | 11篇 |
贸易经济 | 332篇 |
农业经济 | 43篇 |
经济概况 | 109篇 |
邮电经济 | 17篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 22篇 |
2022年 | 15篇 |
2021年 | 23篇 |
2020年 | 44篇 |
2019年 | 74篇 |
2018年 | 73篇 |
2017年 | 67篇 |
2016年 | 72篇 |
2015年 | 52篇 |
2014年 | 64篇 |
2013年 | 181篇 |
2012年 | 89篇 |
2011年 | 91篇 |
2010年 | 71篇 |
2009年 | 80篇 |
2008年 | 43篇 |
2007年 | 46篇 |
2006年 | 45篇 |
2005年 | 31篇 |
2004年 | 31篇 |
2003年 | 30篇 |
2002年 | 27篇 |
2001年 | 19篇 |
2000年 | 29篇 |
1999年 | 12篇 |
1998年 | 10篇 |
1997年 | 16篇 |
1996年 | 13篇 |
1995年 | 10篇 |
1994年 | 14篇 |
1993年 | 12篇 |
1991年 | 9篇 |
1990年 | 9篇 |
1989年 | 9篇 |
1987年 | 6篇 |
1986年 | 5篇 |
1985年 | 11篇 |
1984年 | 11篇 |
1983年 | 8篇 |
1982年 | 10篇 |
1981年 | 6篇 |
1980年 | 14篇 |
1978年 | 14篇 |
1976年 | 13篇 |
1975年 | 9篇 |
1970年 | 5篇 |
1966年 | 6篇 |
1959年 | 4篇 |
1958年 | 5篇 |
1956年 | 6篇 |
排序方式: 共有1636条查询结果,搜索用时 156 毫秒
961.
Alexander E. Saak 《The Journal of industrial economics》2017,65(2):309-335
This paper studies the case in which a firm delegates quality control to an independent monitor. In a repeated game, consumers’ trust provides incentives to acquire information about whether the good is defective, and withhold defective goods from sale. If third‐party reports are observable to consumers, delegation lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs. Internal quality control is optimal only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information is sufficiently precise. This result holds in the presence of the possibility of collusion, fully non‐verifiable presale information, and economies of scale in external quality control. 相似文献
962.
Effects of Farm Size on Technical Efficiency in China's Broiler Sector: A Stochastic Meta‐Frontier Approach
下载免费PDF全文
![点击此处可从《Revue canadienne d](/ch/ext_images/free.gif)
Xiangfei Xin Yi Zhang Jimin Wang John Alexander Nuetah 《Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie》2016,64(3):493-516
This paper employs the stochastic meta‐frontier approach to measure technical efficiency and to investigate the effects of farm size on the technical efficiency in China's broiler sector. Empirical results show a positive association between farm size and technical efficiency in China's broiler sector. The medium and large farm sizes exhibit increases of 0.058 and 0.160, respectively, in technical efficiency scores, relative to small farms, which have a mean technical efficiency score of 0.722. Results indicate that there are significant differences in technical efficiency across regions. Technical efficiency in the southern region, which is dominated by yellow‐feathered broilers, is significantly lower than that in the northern region where white‐feathered broilers are the dominant species. Also, the technical efficiency scores estimated from the meta‐frontier model vary substantially across farm sizes in the southern region. Increased farm size improves the technical efficiency for yellow‐feathered broiler production. Dans la présente étude, nous avons utilisé l'analyse métafrontière stochastique pour mesurer l'efficience technique et pour déterminer les effets de la taille de la ferme sur l'efficience technique du secteur du poulet à griller en Chine. Les résultats empiriques indiquent qu'il existe un lien positif entre la taille de la ferme et l'efficience technique. Les fermes de moyenne et grande taille affichent une augmentation du pointage d'efficience technique de 0,058 et de 0,160 respectivement, comparativement aux fermes de petite taille dont le pointage d'efficience technique moyen est de 0,722. Les résultats indiquent que l'efficience technique varie considérablement d'une région à l'autre. L'efficience technique dans la région du Sud, où l’élevage du poulet à griller blanc domine, est significativement plus faible que celle de la région du Nord, où l’élevage du poulet à griller jaune domine. De plus, les pointages d'efficience technique estimés à partir du modèle de métafrontière varient considérablement dans la région du Sud. L'augmentation de la taille de la ferme améliore l'efficience technique de la production du poulet à griller jaune. 相似文献
963.
Francesca Gerini Frode Alfnes Alexander Schjøll 《Journal of Agricultural Economics》2016,67(2):471-490
To understand the market for sustainable foods, it is important to allow for heterogeneous preferences. However, most studies of consumer preferences for sustainable foods only investigate average consumer preferences. They do not take into account that some consumer segments attempt to purchase as much sustainable food as possible, others are almost indifferent to the notion of sustainable food, and still others consider sustainable food a complete hoax. The aim of this study is to explore the preferences for various types of premium eggs across three consumer segments. We conduct a choice experiment including 900 Norwegian consumers and perform a behavioural segmentation based on the frequency of organic food purchase. We find that the segment purchasing the most organic food is, as expected, willing to pay a significant premium for organic eggs over eggs displaying only enhanced animal welfare. However, most consumers, who only occasionally purchase organic products, are unwilling to pay more for organic eggs than for enhanced animal welfare eggs, suggesting diminishing marginal utility for additional attributes. We find that a third consumer segment attempts to avoid organic eggs, even when they cost the same as other eggs. Our findings suggest that organic products will be unsuccessful in acquiring a larger share of the market as long as most consumers are unwilling to pay a premium for organic products with all their cost increasing sustainable attributes over products that have only a single sustainable attribute, in our case enhanced animal welfare. 相似文献
964.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its potential impact on the demand for human labour has become a fashionable topic — particularly among economic policy advisors. However, most papers that warn about high substitution rates of conventional jobs use questionable data and methodologies. Future economic policy advice ought to include a company perspective — and discover that disruption will be much more gradual and less dramatic than proclaimed by the current topical papers. As this AI revolution is just at its very beginning, economic policy makers are advised to accompany and support digital change instead of actively intervening in digital value chains with taxes and/or subsidies. 相似文献
965.
966.
967.
Wirtschaftsdienst - Die Niedrigzinspolitik der EZB hat in vielen Ländern des Euroraums zu einem starken Anstieg der Wohnimmobilienpreise beigetragen. In einigen Mitgliedstaaten mündeten... 相似文献
968.
969.
We analyze the determinants of buyout funds’ investment decisions. We argue that when there is imperfect competition for private equity funds, the timing of funds’ investment decisions, their risk-taking behavior, and their subsequent returns depend on changes in the demand for private equity, conditions in the credit market, and fund managers’ ability to influence perceptions of their talent. We investigate these hypotheses using a proprietary dataset of 207 U.S. buyout funds that invested in 1,957 buyout targets over a 30-year period. Our dataset contains precisely dated cash inflows and outflows in every portfolio company, links every buyout target to an identifiable buyout fund, and is free from reporting and survivor biases. Thus, we are able to characterize every buyout fund's precise investment choices. Our findings are as follows. First, established funds accelerate their investment flows and earn higher returns when investment opportunities improve, competition for deal flow eases, and credit market conditions loosen. Second, the investment behavior of first-time funds is less sensitive to market conditions. Third, younger funds invest in riskier buyouts, in an effort to establish a track record. Finally, following periods of good performance, funds become more conservative, and this effect is stronger for first-time funds. 相似文献
970.
Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade‐off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame‐perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk‐neutral and risk‐averse agent, respectively. 相似文献