Multivariate Process Monitoring Using the Dynamic Biplot

In this article, we present a method for monitoring multivariate process data based on the Gabriel biplot. In contrast to existing methods that are based on some form of dimension reduction, we use reduction to two dimensions for displaying the state of the process but all the data for determining whether it is in a state of statistical control. This approach allows us to detect changes in location, variation, and correlational structure accurately yet display a large amount of information concisely. We illustrate the use of the biplot on an example of industrial data and also discuss some of the issues related to a practical implementation of the method.     

Audit and non-audit fees and capital market perceptions of auditor independence

This study provides evidence on whether auditor independence-in-appearance, proxied by earnings response coefficients, is related to the non-audit fee ratio (non-audit to total fees from a client) or client importance (total fees from a client as a percentage of the total revenues of the audit firm). The results from large samples over the period 2001–2006 show, contrary to popular belief and the findings of some prior studies, that there is no evidence of a relation between perceived auditor independence and the non-audit fee ratio. However, perceived auditor independence is negatively associated with client importance, consistent with the economic theory of auditing. Our paper adds to the literature by examining the relative importance of non-audit fee ratios and client importance as determinants of independence-in-appearance.     

Pricing of Initial Audit Engagements by Large and Small Audit Firms*

We investigate the extent to which auditors of U.S. companies reduce fees on initial audit engagements (“fee discounting”). We hypothesize that rivalries among sellers, in terms of client turnover and price competition, are more intense among small audit firms. The data support this hypothesis. New clients account for 34 percent of all clients for small audit firms, but only 9 percent of all clients for large audit firms. We theorize that differences in client turnover rates between large and small audit firms can be explained by the market structure of the audit industry, which consists of an oligopolistic segment dominated by a few large audit firms and an atomistic segment composed of many small audit firms. We further hypothesize and confirm that fee discounting is more extensive in the atomistic sector, and our results confirm this hypothesis. Our analysis of audit fee changes indicates that clients who switch auditors within the atomistic sector receive on average a discount of 24 percent over the prior auditor's fee. However, clients who switch auditors within the oligopolistic sector receive on average a discount of only 4 percent. Given that price competition is known to be less intense in oligopolistic markets than in atomistic markets, we believe that market structure theory can explain why fee discounting is lower when larger audit firms compete for clients.     

Development of Research in Experimental Design in India

Cet article présente un panorama de la recherche indienne des 70 dernières années dans le domaine des plans d’expériences. Le travail accompli dans ce cadre est considérable, tant par le volume que par l'importance des contributions, et nous nous sommes attachés à en présenter un historique cohérent. Les sujets traités incluent les carrés latins mutuellement orthogonaux, les plans en blocs incomplets, les plans factoriels, les plans factoriels fractionnaires, les surfaces de réponse, les plans mixtes, les plans ligne‐colonne et les études croisées.     

Asymmetric valuation of sustained growth by bond- and equity-holders

Viewing equity as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to contractual debt obligations yields an asymmetric prediction on how debt and equity markets view sustained growth. Debt holders are expected to benefit from sustained growth when the default risk is high, while equity holders value such growth when risk is low. Using Altman’s z-score and debt ratings as alternative proxies for the default risk, we document a negative association between bond yield spreads and sustained growth in earnings for firms with high risk only. In sharp contrast, using earnings multiples from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for equity market rewards, we find that earnings multiples are larger when earnings growth is sustained for the low risk sample only. Decomposing earnings growth into revenue and nonrevenue growth, we find that the debt market rewards for firms with revenue growth are confined to the high risk sample only, while nonrevenue growth firms are not rewarded for either sample. Equity investors value revenue-led earnings growth for low and high risk samples while nonrevenue growth is rewarded for the low risk sample only. Our study adds to our understanding of how changes in firm value from sustained earnings and revenue growth are divided between key providers of capital and how default risk plays an instrumental role in this valuation process.     

Sustained Earnings and Revenue Growth,Earnings Quality,and Earnings Response Coefficients

We show that firms reporting sustained increases in both earnings and revenues have (1) higher quality earnings and (2) larger earnings response coefficients (ERCs) in comparison to firms reporting sustained increases in earnings alone. With respect to earnings quality, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have more persistent earnings, exhibit less susceptibility to earnings management, and have higher future operating performance. With respect to response coefficients, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have both higher ERCs and lower book value response coefficients, consistent with the implications of the Ohlson (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research 12, 661–687) model.JEL Classification: G12, M41     

Small asymmetric fractional factorial plans for main effects and specified two-factor interactions

Fractional factorial plans represented by orthogonal arrays of strength two are known to be optimal in a very strong sense under a model that includes the mean and all the main effects, when all interactions are assumed to be absent. When a fractional factorial plan given by an orthogonal array of strength two is not saturated, one might think of entertaining some two-factor interactions also in the model. In such a situation, it is of interest to examine which of the two-factor interactions can be estimated via a plan represented by an orthogonal array, as also to study the overall efficiency of the plan when some interactions are in the model alongwith the mean and all main effects. In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine these issues by considering some practically useful plans for asymmetric (mixed level) factorials with small number of runs.     

Audit Fee Differential,Audit Effort,and Litigation Risk: An Examination of ADR Firms

Prior studies find that audit fees are higher for cross‐listed firms, and these studies primarily attribute the incremental fees to added litigation costs. In this study, we investigate whether the higher audit fees that foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay are also attributable to incremental audit effort associated with U.S. disclosure requirements and a more stringent U.S. auditing environment. By comparing audit fees of foreign cross‐listed firms to U.S. domiciled firms and to non‐cross‐listed foreign firms, we are able to decompose incremental audit fees into portions attributable to added audit effort and to added litigation costs. We find that, on average, foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay significantly higher fees than domestic U.S. firms and foreign firms that do not cross‐list. Furthermore, we find that audit effort is almost as important as litigation costs in explaining the higher fees associated with foreign cross‐listed firms; our estimates suggest that between 29 percent and 48 percent of the incremental fees are attributable to incremental audit effort. In addition, the total cross‐listing premium is increasing in the difference between the U.S. auditing regulatory environment and that of the home country of the cross‐listed firm. Our study improves our understanding of the role of audit effort in explaining the added fees charged by auditors when foreign firms cross‐list in the United States.