An experimental study on real-options strategies

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether people intuitively use real-option strategies in a dynamic investment setting. The participants were asked to play as an oil manager and make production decisions in response to a simulated mean-reverting oil price. Using cluster analysis, participants can be classified into four groups, which we label ‘mean-reverting’, ‘Brownian motion real-option’, ‘Brownian motion myopic real-option’, and ‘ambiguous’. We find two behavioral biases in the strategies of our participants: ignoring the mean-reverting process, and myopic behavior. Both lead to too frequent switches when compared with the theoretical benchmark. We also find that the last group behaved as if they have learned to incorporate the true underlying process into their decisions, and improved their decisions during the later stage.     

Broken promises and breaking ground for responsible innovation – intervention research to transform business-as-usual in nanotechnology innovation

Despite repeated calls for novel forms of innovation and governance, including responsible innovation, anticipatory governance, and sustainability-oriented governance, nanotechnology continues to be mainly innovated following conventional schemes – with persistent shortcomings and negative impacts. Shifting these schemes towards sustainable and responsible innovation and fully utilising the benefits of sustainable nanotechnologies will necessitate difficult changes across all stages of and actors in the innovation process. We outline an agenda for intervention research in support of such changes. The article synthesises insights from four years of research on nanotechnology innovation, anticipatory governance, and sustainability in urban environments, with a focus on Phoenix, Arizona.     

Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans

Despite the popularity of price-cap regulation in practice, the economic literature provides limited guidance on how to determine the X factor, which is the rate at which inflation-adjusted output prices must fall under price-cap plans. We review the relevant basic principles, and then determine how to set the X factor: (1) when only a subset of the firm's products are subject to price-cap regulation, and when product-specific costs and productivity cannot be measured; (2) when changes in regulated prices affect the economy-wide inflation rate; and (3) in the presence of such structural changes as strengthened competitive forces.     

Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed

We use the founding of the Federal Reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort. We examine stock return and interest rate volatility during September and October, when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest. Stock volatility fell by 40% and interest rate volatility by more than 70% following the monetary regime change. The drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis, however. Because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises, our results suggest that the existence of the Federal Reserve reduced liquidity risk.     

News implied volatility and disaster concerns

We construct a text-based measure of uncertainty starting in 1890 using front-page articles of the Wall Street Journal. News implied volatility (NVIX) peaks during stock market crashes, times of policy-related uncertainty, world wars, and financial crises. In US postwar data, periods when NVIX is high are followed by periods of above average stock returns, even after controlling for contemporaneous and forward-looking measures of stock market volatility. News coverage related to wars and government policy explains most of the time variation in risk premia our measure identifies. Over the longer 1890–2009 sample that includes the Great Depression and two world wars, high NVIX predicts high future returns in normal times and rises just before transitions into economic disasters. The evidence is consistent with recent theories emphasizing time variation in rare disaster risk as a source of aggregate asset prices fluctuations.