Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers

We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of information quality choice to an independent agent who is precluded from sharing in trading profits results in efficient implementation. This result provides a game-theoretic rationale for current institutional arrangements where a private organization that is independent of market traders, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, determines the standards for public disclosures.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D42, D82.     

Ranking agencies under moral hazard

Summary. We provide rankings across uncertain outputs generated by agents functioning within the Principal-Agent paradigm. For agents who are identical except for their productivity, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an agent to be preferred is that her output dominates that of lower agents in the sense of First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FDSD) at every level of effort. Sufficient conditions are based on Blackwells ranking of information systems and involves a characterization of FDSD using stochastic matrices. Our conditions for ranking outputs extends earlier results concerning the value of information within the agency framework. We also show how our techniques can be adapted to rank agents even if the first-order approach for determining optimal contracts fails to hold.Received: April 2, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Equilibrium Unemployment Rate and Customs Union

This paper utilizes the macroeconomics concept of the equilibrium rate of unemployment for theorems on free trade and the formation of customs union. The notion of an equilibrium rate of unemployment appears in the literature on labour, macroeconomics, business cycles and trade theory. Such an equilibrium rate can be derived in a number of ways, for example, by introducing labor–leisure choice in the utility functions of the workers; a labor turnover model and/or by introducing shirking. We extend the two sector-two factor Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model for a small open economy by relaxing the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Specifically, we consider the classical labor supply function obtained from the representative consumer's utility maximisation problem. This consideration allows for the existence of unemployment and we analyse the effects trade policies have on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Given the movement towards free trade (either via the implementation of GATT and/or formation of customs union) it is important to examine its implications for the equilibrium rate of unemployment.     

Auditor Size,Market Segmentation and Litigation Patterns: A Theoretical Analysis

We provide a theoretical rationale for the observed audit industry structure where well-capitalized auditors hold an extremely large market share. Our analysis focuses on the economics of trading in an adverse selection market where audit quality is unobservable. We show that concentration of market share can arise even if well-capitalized auditors have no relative advantage with regard to supplying high-quality audits, and that the strategy of attracting a narrow base of high-margin clients is typically unsustainable in rational expectations equilibrium. Other results derived from our analysis of strategic competition for clients also conform (qualitatively) with empirical findings regarding audit fee structures and litigation rates. In particular, we show that better-capitalized auditors get a dominant market share, produce more accurate reports and are more profitable. In addition, we show that the imposition of high minimum standards increases the market power of wealthy auditors, even though smaller auditors can potentially provide the same level of audit quality at lower fees. All these results are demonstrated within a framework that endogenizes both a securities trading market and profit-maximizing auditors who strategically compete for clients.JEL Classification: C72, D43, D82, K23, K41, L15     

Factor market distortions and gains from trade revisited

Zusammenfassung Gesamtwirtschaftliche Au\enhandelsgewinne bei unvollkommenen Faktorm?rkten. — In diesem Aufsatz werden die Standardtheoreme über die Vorteilhaftigkeit des Au\enhandels unter der Annahme untersucht, da\ auf beiden Faktorm?rkten (für Kapital und Arbeit) intersektorale Faktorpreisunterschiede bestehen. Wenn Unvollkommenheiten auf beiden Faktorm?rkten angenommen werden, ergeben sich Resultate, die erheblich von denen bei Unvollkommenheiten auf nur einem Faktormarkt abweichen. Die interessanteren Ergebnisse der Untersuchung sind: 1. Alle üblichen Theoreme über Wohlfahrtsgewinne aus dem Au\enhandel k?nnen auf einer niedrigeren inferioren Transformationskurve gelten; 2. eine Zunahme (Abnahme) des Verzerrungsgrades kann die Wohlfahrt erh?hen (reduzieren); 3. eine Verbesserung (Verschlechterung) der Terms of Trade kann gr?\ere Wohlfahrtsgewinne (-Verluste) bewirken, als es ohne Verzerrungen der Fall w?re; 4. sollte der Grad der Verzerrung auf dem Kapital- und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt gleich gro\ sein, dann entspricht eine Politik der Produktionsbesteuerung mit Subventionen einer Politik der Faktorbesteuerung mit Subventionen; folglich gibt es dann keine ?second? und ?first best?-Politik.

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Résumé Les distorsions sur les marchés des facteurs de production et les gains de l’échange international. — Cet article examine les théorèmes usuels de gains de l’échange international sous la supposition qu’il y a une différenciation intersectorielle des prix de facteurs sur le marché de capitaux et assi sur le marché du travail. Les imperfections sur les deux marchés conduisent aux résultats qui sont bien différents de ceux qu’on obtient sur la base d’une différenciation des prix de seulement un facteur de production. Les résultats intéressants sont les suivants: (1) Tous les théorèmes usuels de gains de l’échange international sont probablement valables pour des courbes inférieures de transformation; (2) si le degré de la distorsion s’accro?t (décro?t), le bien-être peut s’améliorer (se détériorer); (3) l’amélioration (détérioration) des termes de l’échange peut conduire à une augmentation (diminution) du bien-être qui est plus grande que dans le cas ou il n’y a pas de distorsions; (4) si le degré de la distorsion est aussi haut sur le marché de capitaux que sur le marché du travail, une politique de la taxe sur la production en combinaison des subventions est équivalente à une politique de la taxe sur le facteur en combinaison des subventions; à cause de cela elles cessent d’être une politique de ?second best? et de ?first best?.

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Resumen Revisión de las distorsiones del mercado de factores y de los beneficios del comercio. — Este trabajo examina los teoremas corrientes sobre beneficios del comercio, bajo el supuesto que ambos mercados (capital y trabajo) se caracterizan por una differencia intersectoral en los precios de los factores. Imperfecciones en ambos mercados de factores dan resultados bastante diferentes a los que se obtienen sobre la basis de una ?nica diferencia en el precio de los factores. Los resultados más interesantes son: (1) todos los teoremas corrientes sobre beneficios del comercio pueden ser válidos para las curvas de transformación inferior; (2) un aumento (disminución) del grado de distorsión puede aumentar (disminuir) el bienestar; (3) un mejoramiento (deterioro) en los términos del intercambio puede resultar en una ganancia (pérdida) de bienestar, que es máyor que en el caso en que no hay distorsiones; (4) si el grado de distorsión en ambos mercados, el de capitales y el de trabajo, es igual, entonces una pol?utica de impuestos en combinación con subsidios a la producción se torna equivalente a una politica de impuestos en combinación con subsidios a los factores y, por lo tanto, ellas ya no constituyen más políticas ?second best? y ?first best?.

     

The Intergenerational Effects of Recessions

Several studies analyze the contemporaneous effects of recessions on individuals and their children. This paper shows that recessions also affect future offspring, not born yet. By linking fathers and offspring from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that a percentage-point increase in the national unemployment rate experienced by men between ages 16 and 20 reduces their future offspring's annual wages by 4 percent, occupational prestige by 3 percent, and education by 0.2 years. We then investigate the mechanisms explaining our findings.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.