Expensing stock-based payments: A material concern?

Using SFAS 123 disclosures, Botosan and Plumlee [Botosan, C., & Plumlee, M. (2001). Stock option expense: The sword of Damocles Revealed. Accounting Horizons, 15, 311-327] find that if stock-based compensation were to be expensed rather than not recognised on the face of financial statements, the impact on key measures used to assess the performance of the fastest growing US firms would be material. Street and Cereola [Street, D. L., & Cereola, S. (2004). Stock option compensation: impact of expense recognition on performance indicators of non-domestic companies listed in the U.S. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 13, 21-37] subsequently also use SFAS 123 disclosures to determine that the average impact of expensing stock-based compensation on diluted EPS for non-US domiciled firms listed on US exchanges will be material and approximately 40%. In this paper, we examine whether these findings apply across international borders to firms that are required from 2005 to adopt IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment to expense stock-based payments, and across a broad range of industries and firms’ growth phases. Based on Australian Stock Exchange-listed firms’ 2002 stock-based compensation disclosures of the value of options granted to directors and the top 5 executives, the expensing of options will have a significant negative effect on approximately 20% of our sample firms’ financial performance ratios. It appears that the materiality of the impact is neither industry specific nor restricted to high growth firms. As the IFRS 2 expensing requirement extends to stock-based compensation issued to all employees, our findings are conservative estimates of the impact. The findings suggest that a stock-based compensation accounting policy change will affect recognised financial numbers and could have consequential ramifications for contractual specifications and valuations of firms across a range of industries and growth phases. Our sample of Australian firms provides an interesting context for the study, since these firms have neither traditionally expensed nor necessarily disclosed stock-based payments but from 2005, all stock-exchange listed Australian firms will be at the forefront of IFRS 2 adoption.     

Information for Policy Design: Modelling Participation in a Farm Woodland Incentive Scheme

Incentive schemes which use farmers and landowners as agents of policy are now the main driving force for modifying the countryside environment. Nevertheless, policy-makers lack quantitative models that describe farmers' response to schemes, and specifically their entry decisions. This paper examines the benefits from modelling entry decisions with and without additional information generated through surveys of participants and non-participants. It uses logit models to predict the probability of entry into a farm woodland incentive scheme, initially using only those explanatory variables that are available to policy-makers from the annual farm census. The model performs well in identifying those factors pre-disposing farmers to entry. The potential gains from enhancing the information set by incorporating lifestyle and other variables not recorded in the census are examined. The cost of additional surveys, and their small sample size compared with the census, casts doubt on the value of such an approach which may reduce rather than enhance predictive power.     

The Progression from Voluntary to Mandatory Derivative Instrument Disclosures – Look Who's Talking

The growth of derivative markets over the past decade suggests that many entities are using these instruments. The transparency of firms' exposures and their accounting treatment have become critical issues, particularly given the media attention to derivative-related losses by some high-profile corporations. This paper focuses on derivative instrument disclosures during a three-phase disclosure regime — pure voluntary disclosure (1992–94), coercive voluntary disclosure (1995–97) and mandatory disclosure (1998). The time frame provides an insight into firms' and regulators' responses to information demands by stakeholders. Increases in disclosure of information, even if incomplete, are particularly noticeable in 1995, the beginning of the coercive regime, and in 1998 when the disclosures became mandatory.