Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses

In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.     

How Effective Is Foreign Aid at Improving Health Outcomes in Recipient Countries?

Since the United Nations’ establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 the world has observed an increasing trend in foreign aid provided by more affluent countries to developing nations. This paper examined whether foreign aid (total foreign aid and health sector aid) has been effective in improving the health of citizens in recipient nations since establishment of the MDGs. Five facets of population health were examined: infant mortality, life expectancy, the annual death rate, and immunizations against measles and diphtheria. Using a panel data set covering 90 developing countries, observed annually over 2001–2015, fixed-effects multivariate regressions with alternative specifications were estimated for each of these measures. The findings reveal that foreign aid has had little to no effect on population health since 2000. We found some evidence that foreign aid has improved life expectancy in developing countries, however, the effect is very small. In light of these findings, continued monitoring of the relationship between foreign aid and health outcomes would be both valuable and prudent.

     

Firm Heterogeneity and Export Pricing in India

We examine export pricing by Indian manufacturing firms in the early 2000s using a unique data set that matches firm characteristics with product and destination‐level trade data. We find that, in contrast to China and other countries, firm productivity is negatively associated with export prices, and export prices are negatively associated with distance while positively associated with remoteness. Our conjecture is that Indian innovation costs, which are higher than China's, drive down the scope for quality differentiation causing a negative association between productivity and prices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence consistent with heterogenous goods and short quality ladders, a theoretical possibility noted in the study by Antoniades (2012), an outcome that arises here because of domestic Indian economic and regulatory features.     

Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS) and Farmers’ Fertilizer Use in Rural Nigeria

Fertilizer use in Nigeria is estimated at 13 kg/ha, which is far below the 200 kg/ha recommended by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The objective of this investigation was to identify the determinant factors of farmers’ participation in Nigeria's Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS). In addition, we determined the impact of the GESS on fertilizer use in rural areas. A total of 1,200 rural farmers were sampled across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Results from the use of a recursive bivariate probit model indicated that GESS significantly impacted on the access and usage of fertilizer among the rural farmers; and that contact with extension agents, ownership of mobile phones, power for charging phone batteries, value output, mobile network coverage, ability to read and write were positive determinants of rural farmers’ participation in the GESS; whereas increased distance to registration and collection centers, and cultural constraints to married women reduced farmers’ tendency to participate in the GESS. The findings suggest that farmers’ participation in the GESS is a critical factor for raising fertilizer use in Nigeria. This implies that food security in sub‐Saharan Africa can be achieved by increasing the participation of rural farmers in the GESS.     

Mapping your competitive position

A price-benefit positioning map helps you see, through your customers' eyes, how your product compares with all its competitors in a market. You can draw such a map quickly and objectively, without having to resort to costly, time-consuming consumer surveys or subjective estimates of the excellence of your product and the shortcomings of all the others. Creating a positioning map involves three steps: First, define your market to include everything your customers might consider to be your product's competitors or substitutes. Second, track the price your customers actually pay (wholesale or retail? bundled or unbundled?) and identify what your customers see as your offering's primary benefit. This is done through regression analysis, determining which of the product's attributes (as described objectively by rating services, government agencies, R&D departments, and the like) explains most of the variance in its price. Third, draw the map by plotting on a graph the position of every product in the market you've selected according to its price and its level of primary benefit, and draw a line that runs through the middle of the points. What you get is a picture of the competitive landscape of your market, where all the products above the line command a price premium owing to some secondary benefit customers value, and all those below the line are positioned to earn market share through lower prices and reduced secondary benefits. Using examples as varied as Harley-Davidson motorcycles, Motorola cell phones, and the New York restaurant market, Tuck professor D'Aveni demonstrates some of the many ways the maps can be used: to locate unoccupied or less-crowded spaces in highly competitive markets, for instance, or to identify opportunities created through changes in the relationship between the primary benefit and prices. The maps even allow companies to anticipate--and counter-- rivals' strategies. R eprint RO711G     

Becoming the boss

Even for the most gifted individuals, the process of becoming a leader is an arduous, albeit rewarding, journey of continuous learning and self-development. The initial test along the path is so fundamental that we often overlook it: becoming a boss for the first time. That's a shame, because the trials involved in this rite of passage have serious consequences for both the individual and the organization. For a decade and a half, the author has studied people-particularly star performers-making major career transitions to management. As firms have become leaner and more dynamic, new managers have described a transition that gets more difficult all the time. But the transition is often harder than it need be because of managers' misconceptions about their role. Those who can acknowledge their misconceptions have a far greater chance of success. For example, new managers typically assume that their position will give them the authority and freedom to do what they think is best. Instead, they find themselves enmeshed in a web of relationships with subordinates, bosses, peers, and others, all of whom make relentless and often conflicting demands. "You really are not in control of anything, says one new manager. Another misconception is that new managers are responsible only for making sure that their operations run smoothly. But new managers also need to realize they are responsible for recommending and initiating changes-some of them in areas outside their purview-that will enhance their groups' performance. Many new managers are reluctant to ask for help from their bosses. But when they do ask (often because of a looming crisis), they are relieved to find their superiors more tolerant of their questions and mistakes than they had expected.     

Regional and Sector-specific Determinants of Industry Dynamics and the Displacement–replacement Effects

In this paper, we empirically assess the importance of regional and sector-specific determinants of industry dynamics. To this aim we test three hypotheses (originally proposed by Shapiro and Khemani (1987, Int J Indust Organ 5:15–26)) for the relationship between the entry and exit of firms: independence, symmetry and simultaneity. Estimates from a panel data system of equations seem to confirm the simultaneity hypothesis for Spain, i.e. we find evidence of a displacement (replacement) effect between the gross rate of entry (exit) and the gross rate of exit (entry). Also, our results show that, irrespective of the hypothesis we use, both sectorial and regional variables affect entry and exit.

Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)