Market wage or discrimination? The remuneration of male and female wool spinners in the seventeenth‐century Dutch Republic1

In the historical debate, the gender wage gap is usually attributed either to productivity differences or to gender discrimination. By analysing a newly constructed series of spinning wages in the seventeenth‐century Dutch Republic, the wages of male and female textile workers for the same work could be investigated. At first sight, the evidence on equal piece rates for spinning men and women seems to rule out wage discrimination. Nevertheless, more deeply rooted gender discrimination resulting from the segmented seventeenth‐century labour market restricted women's access to many professions. Exactly this segmentation determined differences in wage earning capacities between men and women.     

SHIFT WORKING AND TRADE IN LABOUR SERVICES WITH TIME ZONE DIFFERENCES

Using a two‐factor (labour and capital), two‐good (shift‐working and non‐shift‐working commodities) model with two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labour services (via communications networks) on the comparative advantage of countries capable of such trade. It is shown that a comparative advantage in a shift‐working commodity is held by pairs of countries in different time zones and connected through a good communication network. Concerning factor prices, if the shift‐working commodity is capital (respectively, labour) intensive, the wage rate for day‐shift labour will decrease (respectively, increase) as a result of trade in labour services. It is also demonstrated that this labour service utilization is mutual: some of Home's day‐shift labour will be utilized for the Foreign night shift, and vice versa. Thus, periodic trade in labour services occurs across countries.     

ENDOGENOUS CONSUMER PARTICIPATION AND THE RECYCLING PROBLEM*

We endogenise the extent of consumer participation in the recycling process, and analyse its effect on the ‘recycling problem’. When recycling requires consumers to undertake costly sorting activities to separate scrap from household waste, they will participate only if the net reward from sorting is positive. Consumers' sorting cost is subject to a network effect arising due to social norms. With heterogeneous consumers differing in terms of their sorting cost, the entire output of the recyclable product may not be subsequently available as scrap to the recycling firms. This increases the virgin producer's monopoly power, and may also lead to multiple equilibria if the network effect of sorting is sufficiently large. The latter result suggests a role for the government in influencing equilibrium selection to improve social welfare. Depending on the fraction of consumers that participate in recycling, increased societal pressure on consumers to recycle may decrease consumer participation and increase the virgin producer's market power.     

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN MITIGATING THE SOCIO‐ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS IN TWO FREE STATE COMMUNITIES1

Social grants may play an important role in mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS. Eligibility for these grants is driven in part by the increasing burden of chronic illness, the mounting orphan crisis and the impoverishment of households associated with the epidemic. This article investigates the role of social grants in mitigating the socio‐economic impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, using data from a panel study on the household impact of the epidemic. Social grants reduce inequality and decrease the prevalence, depth and severity of poverty in affected households. However, these transfers also have disincentive effects on employment, while non‐uptake is in some cases higher amongst the poorest.     

A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations

This paper introduces a new incentive‐compatible mechanism which, for general preference environments, implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. We provide an example that having a mechanism induce a supermodular game is not typically sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability of equilibrium. However, for the new mechanism, inducing a supermodular game guarantees that the best reply mapping is a contraction. Thus, this new mechanism provides a connection between the desirable welfare properties of Lindahl allocations and the theoretical/convergence properties of games whose best reply mappings are a contraction.     

Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance, and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perspective

In a model with housing collateral, the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth shifts the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. A decrease in house prices reduces the collateral value of housing, increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and increases the conditional market price of risk. Using aggregate data for the United States, we find that a decrease in the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth predicts higher returns on stocks. Conditional on this ratio, the covariance of returns with aggregate risk factors explains 80% of the cross‐sectional variation in annual size and book‐to‐market portfolio returns.