全文获取类型
收费全文 | 19267篇 |
免费 | 174篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 2978篇 |
工业经济 | 846篇 |
计划管理 | 3126篇 |
经济学 | 4609篇 |
综合类 | 495篇 |
运输经济 | 86篇 |
旅游经济 | 83篇 |
贸易经济 | 5034篇 |
农业经济 | 88篇 |
经济概况 | 1479篇 |
信息产业经济 | 44篇 |
邮电经济 | 573篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 5篇 |
2023年 | 48篇 |
2022年 | 43篇 |
2021年 | 58篇 |
2020年 | 108篇 |
2019年 | 149篇 |
2018年 | 2461篇 |
2017年 | 2262篇 |
2016年 | 1364篇 |
2015年 | 187篇 |
2014年 | 238篇 |
2013年 | 596篇 |
2012年 | 570篇 |
2011年 | 2028篇 |
2010年 | 1919篇 |
2009年 | 1613篇 |
2008年 | 1571篇 |
2007年 | 1908篇 |
2006年 | 126篇 |
2005年 | 447篇 |
2004年 | 492篇 |
2003年 | 579篇 |
2002年 | 280篇 |
2001年 | 100篇 |
2000年 | 67篇 |
1999年 | 18篇 |
1998年 | 37篇 |
1997年 | 13篇 |
1996年 | 24篇 |
1995年 | 14篇 |
1994年 | 8篇 |
1993年 | 8篇 |
1992年 | 5篇 |
1991年 | 7篇 |
1989年 | 6篇 |
1987年 | 2篇 |
1986年 | 14篇 |
1985年 | 6篇 |
1984年 | 4篇 |
1983年 | 7篇 |
1982年 | 5篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1978年 | 3篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 3篇 |
1974年 | 2篇 |
1973年 | 3篇 |
1969年 | 2篇 |
1968年 | 2篇 |
1961年 | 2篇 |
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
991.
Petros G. Sekeris 《Economics of Governance》2011,12(3):237-258
In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract
rents. Instead of viewing the favors’ beneficiaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous entity, we allow the king to decide
whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential support—their strength—they could bring to the regime.
While the ruler can select the elites on the basis of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in
introducing some uncertainty in the cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients’ cooptation
price since in the event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that
weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society’s strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the composition
of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt
subjects. 相似文献
992.
Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for
local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition
in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the
existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure
provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our
results suggest that a Japanese local government’s choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers
to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government’s policy choices. As the value of
the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts’ lobby activities and their industrial park values,
we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the
central government in this unitary state. 相似文献
993.
Dmitriy Volinskiy Michele Veeman Wiktor Adamowicz 《Decisions in Economics and Finance》2011,34(2):121-139
A decision problem—allocating public research and development (R&D) funding—is faced by a planner who has ambiguous knowledge
of welfare effects of the various research areas. We model this as a reverse portfolio choice problem faced by a Bayesian
decision-maker. Two elements of the planner’s inferential system are developed: a conditional distribution of welfare ‘returns’
on an allocation, given stated preferences of citizens for the different areas, and a minimum risk criterion for re-allocating
these funds, given the performance of a status quo level of funding. A case study of Canadian public research funds expended
on various applications of agricultural biotechnology is provided. The decision-making methodology can accommodate a variety
of collective expenditure and resource allocation problems. 相似文献
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.
In this article, we propose a model selection approach for testing structural breaks in a semiparametric panel varying coefficient
model. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the proposed model selection approach performs well in finite sample settings. Applying
the method to an empirical data, we find evidence of structural breaks in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) health expenditure data by allowing for income elasticity to be state (income)-dependent. The relationship between
health expenditure and income is subject to two types of structural changes: smooth changes over income and structural breaks
in the time dimension. The findings hold for both foreign exchange rate-converted and Purchasing Power Parity-converted expenditure
and GDP. 相似文献