Trade Agreement vs. Open Shop: Employers' Choices before WWI

Neither cultural individualism nor hostility to craft control adequately explains American employers' rejection of collective bargaining before World War I. Evidence from selected cases in the U.S. and Britain suggests both that open-shop policies and trade agreements helped employers manage workplace conflict amid major changes in production practices, and that the relative timing and pace of changes in technology, market structure, and union growth shaped employers' choices.     

Nursing Turnover and Hospital Efficiency: An Organization-Level Analysis

This study tests the competing arguments that organization-level turnover is positively associated with organizational inefficiency or, alternatively, positively related to organizational inefficiency only in those organizations experiencing very high or very low turnover. Findings from multivariate analyses support the former argument: in a national sample of 333 hospitals, turnover among registered nurses was found to be associated in a positive linear fashion with both nonpersonnel operating and personnel costs per adjusted inpatient day.     

How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?

The double taxation of corporate income should discourage firms from incorporating. We investigate the extent to which the aggregate allocation of assets and taxable income in the United States between corporate and noncorporate firms responds to the size of this tax distortion during the period 1959–1986. In theory, profitable firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax distortion is large, and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our empirical results provide strong support for these forecasts, and imply that the resulting excess burden equals 16 percent of business tax revenue.     

The Effects of Mission-Oriented Public R & D Spending on Private Industry

This paper addresses the question of how government mission-oriented R & D spending affects private R & D spending and thereby the total investment in technology. The problem is approached within the context of the capital asset pricing model in which the firm views investment projects in terms of their risk and return characteristics. The firm is assumed to produce jointly an established product and an R & D-intensive product, where the latter generates an additional output of technology, or spillover, that is used as an input into the former. By investing in R & D the firm alters its risk and return characteristics in two ways: through the expected profits from the sale of the R & D-intensive good; and through the expected profits from the spillover. In this model, government mission-oriented R & D contracting affects the firm by enabling it to separate to some extent these two sources of risk and return. The main implication of the analysis is that while some public crowding out of private R & D is likely, this is almost certain to be incomplete. The empirical evidence from the U.S. transport industry supports the model and suggests that each dollar of government funding adds around 92 cents to total R & D spending; crowding out private investment by as little as eight percent.     

IRS Attention

We study how public and private disclosure requirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firm disclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel data set of IRS acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine the implementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRS attention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements, and Schedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRS attention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased following Schedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting to influence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosure requirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ public disclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their tax‐related disclosures, consistent with lower tax‐related proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS's behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and, relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to change firms’ public disclosure behavior.     

SPECIALIZED SUPPLIER NETWORKS AS A SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUTO INDUSTRY

This study examines the relationship between interfirm asset specificity and performance in the auto industry. More specifically, I examine the extent to which differences in supplier–automaker asset specialization may explain performance differences between Japanese automakers (Nissan and Toyota) and U.S. automakers (Chrysler, Ford, General Motors). The findings indicate a positive relationship between supplier–automaker specialization and performance. In particular, the data suggest a positive relationship between interfirm human asset cospecialization and both quality and new model cycle time. Moreover, site specialization is found to be positively associated with lower inventory costs. The findings suggest that in the auto industry a tightly integrated production network characterized by proximity and a high level of human cospecialization will outperform a loosely integrated production network characterized by low levels of interfirm specialization.     

Strategic Subsidiary Disclosure

Although subsidiary disclosures in firms’ filings with the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC; Exhibit 21) represent the most granular required public disclosure of a firm's geographic footprint, little is understood about the quality of the disclosure, and anecdotal evidence suggests firms may not fully comply with the disclosure requirements. We use data provided by multinational firms to the Internal Revenue Service regarding their foreign subsidiary locations to explore the accuracy of public subsidiary disclosures on Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K per SEC rules. The overall incidence of nondisclosure is low, suggesting that most firms comply with Exhibit 21 disclosure rules, and that for most applications, Exhibit 21 disclosures provide a reasonable proxy for locations of significant subsidiaries. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of nondisclosure, particularly when subsidiaries are in tax havens, when the firm is more highly scrutinized in the media, or when the firm has other characteristics consistent with low-quality disclosures such as SEC comment letters.     

Environmental Standards in a Large Open Economy

The small‐country price‐taking assumption of Oates and Schwab is relaxed to consider a large open economy that can influence its net capital return. This creates an incentive for the country to distort its policies. The key question asked is whether this induces inefficient outcomes. The result is that if the country has a dedicated tax on capital and uses this tax optimally, the Oates and Schwab first‐best result still holds. However, efficiency in a large open economy requires that the tax on capital be nonzero, unlike Oates and Schwab where the capital tax must be zero for first‐best efficiency.