Within‐Subject Intra‐ and Inter‐Method Consistency of Two Experimental Risk Attitude Elicitation Methods

We compare the consistency of choices in two methods used to elicit risk preferences on an aggregate as well as on an individual level. We ask subjects to choose twice from a list of nine decisions between two lotteries, as introduced by Holt and Laury 2002, 2005 ) alternating with nine decisions using the budget approach introduced by Andreoni and Harbaugh ( 2009 ). We find that, while on an aggregate (subject pool) level the results are consistent, on an individual (within‐subject) level, behaviour is far from consistent. Within each method as well as across methods we observe low (simple and rank) correlations.     

Management Roles and Sustainability Information. Exploring Corporate Practice

Little empirical research has been conducted on perceptions of the types of sustainability information dealt with by different managers in internal company processes. In this study the roles of different managers are distinguished based on contingency theory and using the categorisation in the sustainability balanced scorecard concept. Expected sustainability information types are identified for these roles and hypotheses are derived and tested about perceptions of the types of sustainability information in different management roles. Interviews identified 116 roles involved with sustainability information in a set of leading German and UK sustainability reporting companies. Results from analysing sustainability information types contingent upon different management roles contribute to the understanding of sustainability accounting systems and practices and how companies can best support different management roles with appropriate sustainability information.     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.     

Local Democracy Ltd

Abstract

A number of European countries have witnessed a proliferation of local government enterprises in recent years. Norwegian local councillors are seemingly particularly exposed to this ‘enterprise fever’. Our article explores local governments' approaches to the political control of such companies. We observe a reluctance to intervene directly in the affairs of an enterprise, but there is a last-resort preparedness to take more resolute action. Lastly, in contrast to what the prototypical agency model postulates, we find that those who attach strong aspirations of increased capacity to the establishment of companies appear to lack trust in the same companies' performance capability.     

On the tradeoff between wage indexation and foreign exchange intervention

Zusammenfassung Zum “trade-off” zwischen Lohnindexierung und Intervention auf dem Devisenmarkt. - In diesem Aufsatz analysieren die Verfasser die Beziehung zwischen dem optimalen MaΒ für Lohnindexierung und dem für Wechselkursinterventionen. Die optimalen Gr?Βen für diese beiden wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente werden mit Hilfe einer gemeinsamen Optimierung unter Berücksichtigung ihrer wechselseitigen Interdependenz ermittelt. Das bei der Untersuchung verwendete Modell wird gepr?gt durch die Charakteristika der stochastischen Schocks, die die Volkswirtschaft beeinflussen, und durch das Informations-bündel, das die Wirtschaftssubjekte annahmegem?Β besitzen. In der Analyse wird sowohl geprüft, wie der optimale Lohnindexierungsgrad mit dem gesamten Spektrum m?glicher Wechselkurssysteme zusammenh?ngt, als auch untersucht, wie das optimale AusmaΒ der Wechselkursinterventionen von dem gesamten Spektrum m?glicher Lohnindexierungsgrade abh?ngt. Eines der Hauptergebnisse ist, daΒ es keine monotone Beziehung zwischen den optimalen Werten der beiden wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente gibt. Worin der “trade-off” zwischen ihnen genau besteht, wird in der Untersuchung im einzelnen dargelegt.

---

Résumé Le ?trade-off? entre l’indexation salariale et l’intervention en taux de change. — Dans cet article les auteurs analysent la relation entre les degrés optimum de l’indexation salariale et l’intervention en taux de change. Les valeurs optimum des deux instruments de politique sont obtenues par une ?optimisation? jointe considérant leur interdépendance mutuelle. Le modéle utilisé est déterminé par les caractéristiques des chocs stochastiques qui affectent l’économie et par les informations des individus. L’ analyse examine la dépendance du degré optimum de l’indexation salariale du spectre total des régimes possibles de taux de change et, vice-versa, la dépendance du degré optimum de l’intervention du spectre total des degrés possibles de l’indexation salariale. Un des résultats principaux est l’absence d’une relation monotone entre les valeurs optimum des deux instruments de politique. De plus, l’analyse détermine la nature précise du ?trade-off? entre eux.

---

Resumen Sobre el ?trade-off? entre la indexaci?n de salarios y la intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios. - En este trabajo los autores estudian la relaci?n entre grados óptimos de indexaci?n de salarios y de intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios. Mediante una optimizaci?n simultánea, que toma en cuenta la interdependencia de estas medidas, se obtienen valores óptimos para ambos instrumentos de politica económica. El modelo utilizado incorpora las caracterfsticas de los shocks estocásticos que afectan a la economfa y el conjunto de informaciones a disposici?n de los individuos. El análisis examina la dependencia del nivel ?ptimo de indexaci?n de salarios de todo el espectro de polfticas cambiarias posibles, como también la dependencia del nivel ?ptimo de intervenci?n en el mercado de cambios de todo el espectro de grados de indexaci?n de salarios posibles. Uno de los resultados centrales es la ausencia de una relaci?n monot?nica entre los valores óptimos de ambos instrumentos; en el análisis se détermina la naturaleza exacta del ?trade-off? que existe entre ellos.

     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

Interdependence between The Netherlands and Germany: Forecasting with VAR models

Summary The German economy is usually assumed to take a leading position. In principle this gives smaller countries, which are dependent on Germany, the opportunity to predict their own economic future conditional on the state of the German economy. This paper uses this opportunity for The Netherlands by applying a Vector Auto Regressive model on Dutch and German series. Because the traditional VAR models appear to be overparameterized, their forecast performance can be improved significantly by using shrinkage estimators based on the so-called Minnesota prior. Such a Bayesian VAR forecasts well and confirms the interdependence between Germany and The Netherlands. Variance decomposition of forecast errors and impulse response simulations strengthen the impression that the BVAR model properties are plausible.The author works at the Econometric Research and Special Studies Department of the Nederlandsche Bank. He is grateful to M.M.G. Fase, C.C.A. Winder and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and to R.B.M. Vet for his assistance in various calculations.     

The role of affect in consumers' temporal judgments

The role of time and mood as consumer behavior constructs has seen increasing independent attention over the past several years. Two studies on the impact of transient affective states on consumers' temporal judgments are reported. In accordance with the research hypotheses, both studies demonstrated strong mood effects on subject's time perception and orientation. The findings were validated across two different mood-inducing manipulations and supported the general theoretical foundation of the mediating roles of affective states on consumers' temporal judgments. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.