Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.     

Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation

We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is sufficiently strong relative to the “face‐value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justified.     

The Effects of Contextual and Wrongdoing Attributes on Organizational Employees’ Whistleblowing Intentions Following Fraud

Recent financial fraud legislation such as the Dodd–Frank Act and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, [H.R. 4173], 2010; U.S. House of Representatives, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763], 2002) relies heavily on whistleblowers for enforcement, and offers protection and incentives for whistleblowers. However, little is known about many aspects of the whistleblowing decision, especially the effects of contextual and wrongdoing attributes on organizational members’ willingness to report fraud. We extend the ethics literature by experimentally investigating how the nature of the wrongdoing and the awareness of those surrounding the whistleblower can influence whistleblowing. As predicted, we find that employees are less likely to report: (1) financial statement fraud than theft; (2) immaterial than material financial statement fraud; (3) when the wrongdoer is aware that the potential whistleblower has knowledge of the fraud; and (4) when others in addition to the wrongdoer are not aware of the fraud. Our findings extend whistleblowing research in several ways. For instance, prior research provides little evidence concerning the effects of fraud type, wrongdoer awareness, and others’ awareness on whistleblowing intentions. We also provide evidence that whistleblowing settings represent an exception to the well-accepted theory of diffusion of responsibility. Our participants are professionals who represent the likely pool of potential whistleblowers in organizations.     

Synergies and competition: Export survival in Africa and Latin America

Using firm-level export data from six African (Burkina Faso and Senegal) and Latin American (Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay) countries, we examine factors that determine the survival of export flows. We explore the effects on export survival of changes in the number of home-country exporters serving the same destination, firm-level export diversification, and country-level factors. Unlike previous studies, we find that export survival rates decrease with the number of co-exporters selling the same product to the same country. We also find that the relationship between firm-level product diversification and export flow survival is hump-shaped: firms that do not diversify or are highly diversified have lower survival of product-destination flows. Our findings are robust to various alternative specifications. The main findings hold across both regions and all countries. However, the number of co-exporters negatively affects survival in Africa more than in Latin America.     

A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation

We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A perfect price discriminating mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any perfect price discriminating mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information.We establish a characterization for dominant strategy implementation: Any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a perfect price discriminating mechanism. We apply this characterization to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining.     

Name-Based Behavioral Biases: Are Expert Investors Immune?

The market comprises investors with a broad range of expertise. As a result, investors may make decisions differently from one another. Research reveals that investors use name-based heuristics, or short-cuts, including alphabetical ordering (Itzkowitz, Itzkowitz, and Rothbort []), name fluency (Anderson and Larkin [], Green and Jame []), and name memorability (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston []) when trading stocks, resulting in irrational decisions. Because experts and novices process information differently, name-based biases may not affect all investors equally. The authors test and confirm the hypothesis that, compared to novices, expert investors are relatively immune to name-based biases.     

Psychographic profiles of media usage segments

Although the specific guidelines suggested by this study are interesting, perhaps the most significant conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that audiences of the various media do exhibit distinct psychographic characteristics. While the psychographic profiles of media audiences presented here are insufficient for completely guiding advertisers in the complex tasks of developing and coordinating creative and media strategies, these results may be useful in future research dealing with psychographic dimensions of media audiences. Hopefully, this will reduce the exploratory work needed in subsequent research which will ultimately provide advertising managers with a more complete characterization of audiences for the various media. The authors wish to thank W.R. Hamilton and Staff and the James B. Somerall Fund of The University of Alabama for supporting this research.     

Revenue and expenditure variance analyses for local governments

Managerial accounting techniques do not appear to be widely applied to local governmental units by accounting educators. This article explains how variance analysis procedures used in the private sector can be modified for analysis of governmental operations to identify the components contributing to changes in actual revenues or expenditures from year to year. Specifically, changes in funding levels due to inflation, population and funding decisions are isolated. The changes due to funding decisions are desegregated further to determine the extent of shifts in funds and the proportional share of the remaining increase or decrease in funds. This latter “shift and share” component of the analyses (similar to mix variance computations) can more clearly identify the funding emphasis of the local political unit.     

Cognitive science and decision making research in accounting

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relevance of cognitive science to decision-making research in accounting. First, the context into which it interfaces the field of accounting is reviewed. Next, the cognitive science applications to accounting are presented and evaluated as they relate to four levels of investigation. The paper concludes with implications for future research as well as a discussion of methodological issues which must be addressed.