Managing the risk of loan prepayments and the optimal structure of short term lending rates

Loan pricing is an extremely important aspect of bank operations because loans are typically over two-thirds of bank assets. Many researchers have analyzed the theoretical and empirical impact of how different factors should and do affect fixed rate loan rates and loan prepayments. However, a theoretical decision making model for maximizing expected profit in a declining rate environment has not been developed. After describing the conditions for the optimal loan rate, we develop numerical solutions for it under varying conditions. The varying conditions include the trend in interest rates, volatility of interest rates, and loan maturity. We thank Yen Low and Hamed Bagherpour for their assistance.     

The characteristics and development of the Swiss franc repurchase agreement market

With the reinterpretation of repurchase agreements (repos) by the tax authority and the revision of the national bank law in 1997, allowing the Swiss national bank (SNB) to use repos as monetary policy instrument, the prerequisites for the development of a Swiss franc repo market were given. The development of the repo market in Switzerland only came up in 1999 with the provision of an integrated trading and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration with the SNB. The following paper provides an overview of the basic characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well as of the development it has undergone since 1999. It also discusses what motives and reasons the banks possess to actively participate in the Swiss franc repo market. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of Credit Suisse.     

An application of the two-stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to corporate financing decisions

Most of the previous studies on the firms’ debt-equity choice utilize the standard single equation Probit (or Logit) model as if firms face a single dichotomous decision to issue debt or equity, but not both. The main purpose of this study is to use a two stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to examine the factors affecting the choice between internal and external funding and between debt and equity as well as the size of issues. Our results indicate that the Bivariate-Probit estimation is more efficient than that of two independent Probit equations. An examination of factors that affect the choice of financing form and the size of issue support the predictions of trade-off theory. The pecking order’s prediction that, if external funding is needed, firms issue debt first and then equity finds no support in this study as firms with higher information asymmetry have propensity to issue equity rather than debt. While information asymmetry affects the choice between debt and equity, we find no evidence that it influences the size of issue.     

The welfare ranking of prices and quantities under noncompliance

We study the welfare ranking of an emission tax and emissions trading when firms self-report their emissions to the regulator and may be noncompliant. We allow for the subjective probabilities of auditing and, using conventional assumptions, find that an emission tax produces a higher level of welfare than emissions trading under noncompliance. The main driver of the result is that the compliance pattern of the firms affects the marginal compliance cost (price of emissions) in the case of permits, thus affecting the level of emissions and welfare. The result also holds when enforcement and sanctioning costs are taken into account and differs from the result found by Montero (J Public Econ 85:435–454, 2002). We also show that the ranking may be reversed if these costs are taken into account and the regulator must audit at least one firm. We also analyze the welfare ranking when the expected penalties depend on relative violations.     

Taxation without representation: local fiscal response to intergovernmental transfers in China

This paper studies the effects of intergovernmental transfers on local public spending in China, an authoritarian country where local politicians are not largely accountable to residents. The identification exploits a discontinuity from the central government’s designation of National Poor Counties. We find that additional transfers to county governments increase local public spending one-for-one. We further confirm that counties receiving additional transfers do not reduce the effective tax burden borne by firms. The results echo the empirical anomaly of the flypaper effect found in developed economies under democratic governments.     

Product market competition and cost stickiness

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm’s operating environment affects the firm’s cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm’s investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings (Li et al. in J Account Res 51(2):399–436, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips in Rev Financ Stud 23(10):3773–3811, 2010; J Polit Econ, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms’ financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.