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81.
This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration. 相似文献
82.
Kenji Kondoh 《Review of International Economics》2006,14(2):248-260
We analyze the welfare effects of international migration in the presence of transboundary pollution. We use a simplified Copeland and Taylor (1999) model, where the (developed) home country's pollution abatement technology is superior to that of the (less developed) foreign country. If there is no trade, workers will migrate from the foreign country to the home country. The foreign country gains from migration, but whether the home country gains or not depends on the abatement‐technology gap and the magnitude of the coefficient of transboundary pollution. World welfare will increase under migration. If there is free trade in goods, international migration occurs when the home country specializes in the production of the environmentally sensitive good. In this case, migration will result in increased production of the manufactured good and increase the level of world pollution. 相似文献
83.
84.
Smooth, noncooperative, multistage, concave games are formulated so that a new uniqueness condition—based on the Poincaré-Hopf theorem—can be applied. The new condition is the weakest to appear in the uniqueness literature. The uniqueness subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained and examples are given. 相似文献
85.
Summary This paper considers the explicit, real time dynamic processes in which cooperation emerges in a class ofbinary decision mechanisms, each of which determines funding for a public project. This class includes the Voluntary Contribution and the Majority Voting mechanisms. The population is subject to turnover so that new individuals enter society with possibly different beliefs about the future evolution of societal behavior than their predecessors. Individuals in this society maximize their discounted expected utilities. Due to the frequent turnover, however, these expectations may not be mutually consistent. Nevertheless, we find, for each mechanism, the nonempty set of the parameters for which the behavior pattern starting from states with nonprovision is absorbed into states with full provision with probability one. Moreover, for a sufficiently large population, outcomes with full provision are absorbing states if and only if certain types of voting mechanisms are used.We wish to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments. We have also benefitted from the helpful comments of Srihari Ghovindan, Peter Linhart, George Mailath, Stephen Morris, Roy Radner, Rafael Rob, Nicholas Yannelis, and numerous seminar participants. 相似文献
86.
This article considers an infinitely repeated economy with divisible fiat money. The economy has many marketplaces that agents choose to visit. In each marketplace, agents are randomly matched to trade goods. There exist a variety of stationary equilibria. In some equilibrium, each good is traded at a single price, whereas in another, every good is traded at two different prices. There is a continuum of such equilibria, which differ from each other in price and welfare levels. However, it is shown that only the efficient single‐price equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. 相似文献
87.
Kenji Fujiwara 《Japan and the World Economy》2008,20(3):326-337
Constructing a two-country oligopolistic model with product differentiation, this paper revisits welfare effects of free trade. The hybrid of procompetitive and variety expansion effects means that trade liberalization has definite benefits for the consumer, while it is contingent whether it is beneficial to oligopolistic firms and national welfare. We illustrate how these two effects interactively affect the possibility of gains from trade with simple diagrams. 相似文献
88.
Constructing a model of polluting oligopoly with product differentiation, we consider how product differentiation, together with the presence and absence of free entry, affects optimal pollution tax/subsidy policies. The sign of the short- and long-run optimal pollution taxes are highly sensitive to the parameter measuring product differentiation as well as the presence of free entry. How they are affected by a change in product differentiation, which is not addressed in the existing literature, is also made clear. 相似文献
89.
90.
We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long‐term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold. 相似文献