Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

Let’s Not Go Down that Path Again: Lessons from the Past Applied to Immigrant-Targeted Discrimination

Immigrants, both legal and illegal, are a staple of the modern United States workplace. While much of the discussion of this fact centers on negative consequences for the U.S., far less attention has been paid to the detrimental impact on immigrants resulting from their workplace experiences, particularly relating to being targets of discrimination. In this article, we outline: a) a variety of types of workplace discrimination potentially relating to immigrant status; b) potential negative outcomes arising from said discrimination for both immigrant employees and their employers, and; c) how existing and predicted employment law standards place organizations in a legally vulnerable position when such discrimination goes unchecked. We further discuss implications of immigrant-targeted discrimination (ITD) for organizations and managers, and plausible extensions of workplace discrimination laws to specifically include ITD.     

Contracting With Wealth-Constrained Agents

We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input (e.g., effort) when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth. Truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and, if necessary, a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts. The project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators. Under plausible conditions, limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner.     

Solving the “Lachmann Problem”: Orientation,Individualism, and the Causal Explanation of Socioeconomic Order

This article examines the question of whether social institutions should be treated as possessing the sui generis causal power to influence people's actions. It does so by means of a case study of the work of the Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann. Lachmann's account of how social institutions facilitate intentional human agency in the face of uncertainty contains significant ambiguities and tensions, stemming from his reluctance to acknowledge the causal efficacy of social institutions. The conceptual resources required to overcome these problems are to be found in realist social philosophy and social theory. The proposed resolution comes at a price, however, for it calls into question Lachmann's self‐avowed commitment to methodological individualism.     

The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects

Interstate river compacts are widely used to allocate water among riparian states. Twenty-one compacts are currently in force in the western United States, and these compacts are mostly of two types: those that allocate a fixed amount or flow of water to individual states; and those that allocate percentages of available water to the riparian states. This study compares the performance of the two resulting allocations with that resulting from basin-wide optimization without compact constraints. While widely varying hydrologic and economic characteristics of river basins create a large set of possible outcomes, a range of stylized case studies indicates that percentage compacts are likely to generate greater net benefits and to result in more equitable risk-sharing than fixed compacts under many circumstances. In light of recent compact negotiations in the southeastern United States, it is recommended that efficiency analyses under present and future conditions be made a part of all compact negotiations.     

Otra Empanada en la Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia

One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share “bad news” (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross‐cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information‐sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision‐makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision‐makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision‐makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.     

Odd Prices at Retail Gasoline Stations: Focal Point Pricing and Tacit Collusion

This study empirically investigates the theory that odd‐numbered pricing points can be used as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion. Like other retailers, gasoline stations in the United States disproportionately sell at prices ending in odd digits. I show that station prices are higher and change less frequently in locations using more odd prices (particularly those ending in 5 or 9), even after controlling for other market characteristics. The evidence suggests that the use of pricing points can be an effective mechanism for tacitly coordinating prices, providing an alternative explanation for the widespread use of odd prices in retail markets.     

The Pragmatic and Ethical Barriers to Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: The Nike Case

Numerous studies have documented the demand for information regarding corporations’ relationships to society. Much recent research has demonstrated why stakeholders need this information, and how it benefits both companies and the public. These studies suggest numerous methods by which companies can effectively disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) information to the public, but in practice, reporting this type of information is fraught with legal and ethical uncertainty often unexplored in most literature. This article represents a fresh analysis of the numerous pragmatic consequences and legal and ethical complications inherent in CSR reporting, using Nike Corporation as a case example. The article discusses the theoretical viewpoints surrounding the ethics of CSR disclosure, and presents the case of Nike and the complications it encountered while advertising CSR information. The article ends with an analysis of CSR auditing as a possible solution to companies seeking to improve the method and transparency of social responsibility reporting.