Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions     

Intermedia Substitutability and Market Demand by National Advertisers

We assess substitute and complementary relationships among eight national advertising media classes, as well as the magnitude of their own-price elasticities. We employ a translog demand model, whose parameters we estimate by three-stage least squares, based on 1960–94 annual U.S. data.We find aggregate demand by national advertisers for each of the eight media isown-price inelastic, and that cross-price elasticities suggest slightly more substitutethan complementary relationships, although both are rather weak. These patterns areconsistent with long prevailing institutional arrangements and media selection practices.     

Production of and trade in African indigenous vegetables in the urban and peri-urban areas of Durban,South Africa

This paper reports on the farming and trade of lesser known crops, here termed African indigenous vegetables (AIVs), in the Durban metropole. Most households grow AIVs, and collect them from the wild, primarily for home consumption. Modal income from sale was approximately R30 per month per farmer, most of whom were middle-aged to elderly females, with limited education, who had been cultivating AIVs here for many years. The main constraints to greater sales were deemed to be low market demand and adverse climate. The commonest AIVs grown were pumpkin leaves, taro and amaranth. Although most farmers sold very little, there is a thriving retail trade in AIVs. Generally, retailers were females, but younger and more educated than the farmers. The majority viewed retailing as a full-time occupation. Modal income for retailers was R450 per month, but included non-AIV produce. Most of the traders thought there was insufficient market demand for AIVs.     

Achieving relationship marketing effectiveness in business-to-business exchanges

Relationship marketing research and practice operate according to the paradigm that firms should invest in relationship marketing to build better relationships, which will generate improved financial performance. However, findings that relationship marketing efforts vary in their effectiveness across customers and may even be detrimental to performance challenge this belief. This article, therefore, offers a theoretical model that addresses three key issues: 1) what factors determine a customer’s need for relational governance (relationship orientation); 2) what mediating mechanism captures the negative effects of relationship marketing on performance (exchange inefficiency); and 3) how does a customer’s relationship orientation determine the effectiveness of relationship marketing, thus allowing for effective segmentation. The authors demonstrate in an empirical study that the trust in the salesperson and exchange inefficiency both mediate the effect of relationship marketing on seller financial outcomes. In addition, customers’ relationship orientation moderates the impact of relationship marketing on both trust and exchange inefficiency.     

尝试正式的TCM

Lisa Jack日前接受采访，讲述了她的研究——探索从农民到零售商的食品供给链条中采纳TCM（目标成本管理）的潜在可能性。     

Aid and Reform in Failing States

This paper reviews the policy implications of research on reform in failing states ( Chauvet and Collier 2006 , 2007a, 2007b , 2008 ; Chauvet et al. 2006 ; Chauvet et al. 2007a , 2007b ). After providing a precise definition of state failure and reform in such states, we present the internal constraints impeding reform in failing states. Élite preferences and insufficient social knowledge seem to be the major constraints on reform. We find that financial aid tends to allow the ruling élite to postpone reform. Technical assistance, however, has some effectiveness in relaxing the capacity constraint to implement reform, notably right at the beginning of reform.