Asian Economic Integration and Stock Market Comovement

Using daily returns from 1988 to 1998, we investigate to what degree twelve equity markets in Asia are integrated with Japan's equity market and examine the factors that affect the level of economic integration. We find that the equity markets of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore are highly integrated with the stock market in Japan. There is also evidence that these Asian markets become more integrated over time, especially since 1994. A higher import share as well as a greater differential in inflation rates, real interest rates, and gross domestic product growth rates have negative effects on stock market comovements between country pairs. Conversely, increased export share by Asian economies to Japan and greater foreign direct investment from Japan to other Asian economies contribute to greater comovement.     

Is it tax competition or tax exporting?

This paper extends the basic tax-competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders. If firms within the jurisdiction are competitive, the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly-rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output. It is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework. In this framework, the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well-known effects identified by the tax competition model.     

Unravelling the HRM–Performance Link: Value‐Creating and Cost‐Increasing Effects of Small Business HRM*

abstract The majority of empirical studies on the HRM–performance link report a positive story. The costs associated with the productivity rise due to high performance work practices (HPWP) have been largely neglected. The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual framework that maps both the value‐enhancing and cost‐raising impact of HPWP. In addition, we want to pronounce upon their overall effect on financial performance. To test our model, we rely on a sample of small businesses. Understanding both performance and cost‐related effects of the implementation of HPWP is particularly valuable for small businesses since they often lack financial resources to implement HPWP and benefit less from economies of scale compared to their larger counterparts. Study results indicate that although greater use of HPWP is associated with increased productivity, this effect is offset by increased labour costs. However, we find an overall positive effect of HPWP on firm profitability.     

THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE QUEBEC EXPERIENCE

ABSTRACT ** ** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.
: Have public enterprises become obsolete policy instruments? Should they be privatized or can their governance be radically transformed so that they could still be used as policy instruments? The world around them has changed and forced governments to move. After a discussion on the arguments in favour of privatization, this article suggests an analysis of three cases in the Canadian province of Quebec. Considering the pressures linked to the liberalization of trade resulting from NAFTA, this article suggests that the governance of public enterprises can be transformed and adapted and that consequently, it is not useful or necessary to privatize them. There is in reality a lot of room in the public enterprise governance to reform them, room that has been neglected over the last decades.     

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3.     

Lessons from the global financial crisis – the case of Mainland China and Hong Kong

Abstract

The analysis of the intertwined reactions of Hong Kong and Mainland China to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is considered in this study through the lenses of their stock markets. The GARCH-based analysis of stock market performance over the period December 2011–December 2014 shows that trade and equity sectors were the sectors most affected by the global recession; volatility was prevalent on the Shanghai stock market, whereas volatility persistence characterised the Hong Kong stock market. The results also show that the two stock markets recovered quite quickly. Tight controls applied by the financial authorities helped ensure some stability during the crisis.     

Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries.     

The ownership of ratings

We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.