On the Existence of Minimax Martingale Measures

Embedding asset pricing in a utility maximization framework leads naturally to the concept of minimax martingale measures. We consider a market model where the price process is assumed to be an ^d‐semimartingale X and the set of trading strategies consists of all predictable, X‐integrable, ^d‐valued processes H for which the stochastic integral (H.X) is uniformly bounded from below. When the market is free of arbitrage, we show that a sufficient condition for the existence of the minimax measure is that the utility function u : → is concave and nondecreasing. We also show the equivalence between the no free lunch with vanishing risk condition, the existence of a separating measure, and a properly defined notion of viability.     

Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading

Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.     

Tax Riots

This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income is private information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found to be underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard mechanism design techniques has a bad equilibrium (a tax riot) where households underreport their incomes, precisely because other households are expected to do so as well. We then consider three alternative approaches to designing a tax scheme when one is worried about bad equilibria.     

The Important Thing Is Not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests

This paper considers a public good game with heterogeneous endowments and incomplete information affected by extreme free riding. I overcome this problem through the implementation of a deterministic contest in which several prizes may be awarded. I identify a monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment. I prove that it is optimal for the social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected contribution is invariant to the prize structure. Finally, I show that private provision via a contest Pareto‐dominates public provision and is higher than the total contribution raised through a lottery.     

JOINT PRODUCTION AND GRAVITATION

This paper considers the problem of determining the new systemof production that will be utilised when, starting with a givenset of methods of production, a new set becomes available whichis more profitable than the original. The question is examinedin the context of joint production and seeks to model the processof gravitation to a new system of production in order to providean answer to the question of which system will be used.     

THE JOB CREATION EFFECT OF R&D EXPENDITURES*

In this study we use a unique database covering 25 manufacturing and service sectors for 15 European countries over the period 1996–2005, for a total of 2,295 observations, and apply GMM‐SYS panel estimations of a demand‐for‐labour equation augmented with technology. We find that R&D expenditure – fostering product innovation – have a job‐creating effect, in accordance with the previous theoretical and empirical literature discussed in the paper. Interestingly enough, the labour‐friendly nature of R&D emerges in both the flow and the stock specifications. These findings provide further justification for the European Lisbon targets.     

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF RISING OIL PRICES IN OIL‐IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Oil prices began climbing consistently in 2002, reaching a record high in July 2008. Though this trend slipped back thereafter, owing to the global economic crisis, oil prices seem to be gradually regaining upward movement. Through an analysis of counterfactual simulations based on a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, this paper shows that the negative impact on GDP of the most recent oil price boom has been substantial in six oil‐importing developing countries, as high as 2% to 3% of GDP per year in some cases, producing unemployment and higher consumer prices and, as a consequence, reduced welfare. Importantly, welfare losses have been much less for countries that have witnessed gains from higher export‐commodity prices. Even for these countries, however, policy action is called for to soften the impact of potential future oil price booms.     

ELECTORAL CYCLES THROUGH LOBBYING

In this paper, we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our setup to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures, and real exchange rates.