Exact Ruin Probabilities and the Evaluation of Program Trading On Financial Markets

For a compound Poisson process with negative drift and jump distribution consisting of a mixture of exponentials on [0) and on (-, 0), an exact expression is derived for the probability of hitting the level c, c > 0. the problem is motivated by modeling the returns from trading on financial markets.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.     

The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management: Evidence From the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers

Enterprise risk management (ERM) has captured the attention of risk management professionals and academics worldwide. Unlike the traditional "silo-based" approach to corporate risk management, ERM enables firms to benefit from an integrated approach to managing risk that shifts the focus of the risk management function from primarily defensive to increasingly offensive and strategic. Despite the heightened interest in ERM, little empirical research has been conducted on the topic. This study provides an initial attempt at identifying the determinants of ERM adoption. We construct a sample of firms that have signaled their use of ERM by appointing a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) who is charged with the responsibility of implementing and managing the ERM program. We use a logistic regression framework to compare these firms to a size- and industry-matched control sample. While our results suggest a general absence of differences in the financial and ownership characteristics of sample and control firms, we find that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely to appoint a CRO. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that firms appoint CROs to reduce information asymmetry regarding the firm's current and expected risk profile.     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

应该将扩大消费需求提升到国家战略的高度

消费问题经过几十年的讨论,至今仍没有得到一些人的高度重视。重投资,重GDP的增长,不重视消费拉动的老毛病,一直制约着我国经济的可持续发展。事实上,如果我国消费水平再不上一个新台阶,还将制约我国经济的持续发展。应该将扩大消费需求提升到我国发展的战略高度来认识。一、应     

From 'static' gold to the floating dollar

In this paper we discuss some features of the balance of paymentsposition of the country that issues the key currency under differentinternational monetary standards. The analysis takes a Sraffian‘standpoint’, where the monetary rate of interestof the central country is seen as an independent policy variable.The critical analysis of the theories and experiences of earlierstandards helps us to understand the current ‘floatingdollar standard’ in which the US economy becomes completelyfree of any balance of payments constraint.     

Are differences in firm size transitory or permanent?

An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.