Persistence of Shocks to Output in Austria and Theories of Economic Growth

The paper analyzes the degree of output persistence in GDP in order toempirically discriminate between the Solow growth model, the perfect competition endogenous growth model and the imperfect competition endogenous growth model for the case of Austria. Wefind that a shock in the growth rate of output induces a permanent and larger effect on the level of GDP. This leads us to refute the Solow growth model and the perfect competition model of endogenous growth.We may not reject the imperfect competition growth model.     

Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court

The foundation upon which accounts of policy-motivated behaviorof Supreme Court justices are built consists of assumptionsabout the policy preferences of the justices. To date, mostscholars have assumed that the policy positions of Supreme Courtjustices remain consistent throughout the course of their careersand most measures of judicial ideology—such as Segal andCover scores—are time invariant. On its face, this assumptionis reasonable; Supreme Court justices serve with life tenureand are typically appointed after serving in other politicalor judicial roles. However, it is also possible that the worldviews,and thus the policy positions, of justices evolve through thecourse of their careers. In this article we use a Bayesian dynamicideal point model to investigate preference change on the USSupreme Court. The model allows for justices' ideal points tochange over time in a smooth fashion. We focus our attentionon the 16 justices who served for 10 or more terms and completedtheir service between the 1937 and 2003 terms. The results arestriking—14 of these 16 justices exhibit significant preferencechange. This has profound implications for the use of time-invariantpreference measures in applied work.     

Uncertainty and sustainability in the management of rangelands

We analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. The ecosystem is driven by stochastic precipitation. A risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategy under uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from farming income. Grazing management strategies are rules about which share of the rangeland is given rest depending on the actual rainfall in that year. In a first step we determine a myopic farmer's optimal grazing management strategy and show that a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy such as to obtain insurance from the ecosystem: the optimal strategy reduces income variability, but yields less mean income than possible. In a second step we analyze the long-run ecological and economic impact of different strategies. We conclude that a myopic farmer, if he is sufficiently risk averse, will choose a sustainable grazing management strategy, even if he does not take into account long-term ecological and economic benefits of conservative strategies.     

Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security

This paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents, who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime, share death-related risks. When annuity markets operate, a non-discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources. In the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities, such a program will lead to a non-optimal intragenerational allocation of resources. However, the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a Pareto improving role for a mandatory non-discriminatory social security program.     

Gold,liquidity and secured loans in a multistage economy Part I: Gold as money

This work relates to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-86-K0220 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR 047-006. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the Government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. Revised with support of NSF contract SES-8812051.The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, non-exclusive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all or any portion of this work.     

The recent failure of U.S. monetary policy

Summary The very slow growth of the broad money supply has been a primary source of U.S. economic weakness in 1990 through 1992. The velocity link between M2 and the subsequent level of nominal GDP has not declined. But changes in bank reserves brought about by open market operations have had much less effect onM2 than the Fed anticipated for two reasons: (1) reserve requirements now apply to only a small fraction of totalM2; and (2) the new bank capital requirements limit some banks ability to lend. The Federal Reserve failed to appreciate the importance of these conditions and misjudged the strength of the monetary policy stimulus that it was providing.Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Sixth Tinbergen Lecture delivered on October 2, 1992, in The Hague for the Royal Netherlands Economic Association.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations

We study the short‐ and long‐term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra‐group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra‐group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra‐conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.