Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

German unification: What have we learned from multi-country models?

This study reviews early simulations of the effects of German unification using three different rational expectations multi-country models. Despite significant differences in their structures and in the implementations of the unification shock, the models delivered a number of common results that proved reasonably accurate guides to the direction and magnitude of the effects of unification on key macroeconomic variables. Unification was expected to give rise to an increase in German aggregate demand that would put upward pressure on output, inflation, and the exchange rate, and downward pressure on the current account balance. The model simulations also highlighted contractionary effects of high German interest rates on EMS countries.     

Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Could a monetary union in West Africa (either an informal monetaryunion of the non-CFA countries, or a possible future monetaryunion of all ECOWAS members) be an effective ‘agency ofrestraint’ (Collier, 1991) on fiscal policies? We discussthe ways, both positive and negative, that monetary union couldaffect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscalrestraints considered in the literature about the European MonetaryUnion (EMU), and consider their applicability to West Africa.The empirical evidence, EMU literature and CFA experience allsuggest the possibility that monetary union could create thetemptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bail-out,or costs that are diluted through the membership. We concludethat a monetary union in West Africa can be an effective agencyof restraint on fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscalauthorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraintcriteria, applicable not just for accession to monetary union,but throughout the life of the union.     

Flawed Economic Models Have Misled RPM Policy: Changes in Canada,Europe and the United States

Some of the influential literature that supports the resale price maintenance efficiency view is flawed when it relies on presale services that do not modify the value-in-use of a good. Crucially, we consider that value-in-use may differ from prepurchase perceived value. We apply the value-in-use standard, which exposes the loss in consumer surplus in Bork’s model and reveals that even Bork’s dissenters significantly underestimate their calculated losses to inframarginal consumers. When consumer surplus is the antitrust/competition policy standard, our results suggest that a rule-of-reason regime where authorities or agencies bear the burden of proof can be unfavourable to consumers.     

The value of imperfect sample separation information in mixtures of normal distributions

This paper conducts a Monte Carlo study in order to evaluate the value of information in a normal mixture model when an imperfect sample separation indicator is available. For a variety of cases, computations are done on the ratios of asymptotic variances of the parameter estimators when sample separation is known versus when only the indicator is available. This study is patterned closely on a paper by Schmidt (1981), and obtains similar results when parameters appearing in Schmidt's model are allowed to vary. The new results here focus on the importance of the probabilities that the regime indicator is correct, for each of the two possible regimes.     

International Evidence on the Determinants of Private Saving

A broad set of possible determinants of private saving behavioris examined using data for a large sample of industrial anddeveloping countries. Both time-series and crosssectional estimatesare obtained. Results suggest that there is a partial offseton private saving of changes in public saving and (for developingcountries) in foreign saving, that demographics and growth areimportant determinants of private saving rates, and that interestrates and terms of trade have positive, but less robust, effects.Increases in per capita gross domestic product seem to increasesaving at low income levels (relative to the United States)but decrease it at higher ones.     

PERFORMANCE OF STOLL's SPREAD COMPONENT ESTIMATOR: EVIDENCE FROM SIMULATIONS,TIME-SERIES,AND CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA

Stoll (1989) introduces an intuitive procedure to estimate the basic components of the bid-ask spread (order-processing cost, inventory cost, and adverse-selection cost). He also provides reasonable estimates of the magnitudes of the order-processing, inventory, and adverse-selection costs of making markets for a large cross-section of NASDAQ/NMS stocks. Empirical applications of Stoll's model produce widely different estimates of the bid-ask spread components. We derive the sampling properties of Stoll's estimator of the realized bid-ask spread, i.e., the sum of the order-processing and inventory components. We test Stoll's model in simulations, using the ideal conditions implied by the model. We conclude that noise in serial covariance estimates causes estimates of the realized spread to be severely biased and highly unreliable in short time-series and small cross-sectional samples.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF PUNISHMENT SUBSTITUTABILITY IN CRIMINOMETRIC STUDIES

This study investigates the role of punishment substitutability in the empirical estimation of the economic model of crime. Using a dynamic panel data model fitted to a panel of Local Government Areas in New South Wales, Australia, we evaluate the effects of financial penalties and imprisonment on the crime rate. Our results show that crime is clearly a dynamic phenomenon, and that failure to incorporate both financial penalties and imprisonment can lead to a misspecified model. Furthermore, our results vary significantly for different crime categories, highlighting the importance of analysing specific crime categories separately.     

West African Currency Unions: Rationale and Sustainability

Drawing on the recent literature and experience of monetaryintegration in Europe, the paper examines the rationale forestablishing regional currency unions in western Africa. Despitedramatic economic, political and historical differences betweenthe two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary unificationmight well be beneficial for a number of the member states ofthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Themain reason is that the costs stemming from the loss of monetaryautonomy are often more than offset by the gains originatingin the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers. However,large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditureobjectives would not be attractive partners because they wouldbe expected to pressure the common central bank, creating excessiveinflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainabilityof a currency union critically depends on fiscal disciplineamong its members. We also explore the vulnerability of regionalmonetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall,the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strongfiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase andafter the establishment of the union. (JEL E58, E61, F42)     

Explaining the Transition between Exchange Rate Regimes*

This paper studies the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with time‐varying transition probabilities. The probabilities are parameterized as nonlinear functions of variables suggested by the currency crisis and optimal currency area literature. Results using annual data indicate that inflation and, to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime transition dynamics.