An Experimental Analysis of Modifications to the Centralized Milk Quota Exchange System in Quebec

Using experimental economics, this paper tests the potential impacts of modifying the centralized quota exchange system in Quebec with the intent of decreasing the quota price while minimizing negative impacts on auction effectiveness. Two separate treatments are applied to a uniform price auction similar to that employed in Quebec. The first treatment is an exclusion (5% or 15%) of the highest buyer bids and seller offers. The second is a tax (2% or 10%) on all units offered for sale that remain unsold. Various combinations of the two treatments are also tested. The results suggest that exclusion of the highest bids and offers can decrease the price of the quota and that a 15% exclusion rate is more effective than a 5% rate. The tax alone has little impact on quota price. The combination of the two treatments generates a more marked reduction in both the number of exchanges and the price of the quota than when the tax or the exclusion is applied individually. However, the combination of treatments results in a greater loss of economic efficiency. In all cases, relatively small market price reductions are realized at the expense of substantial losses in economic efficiency. La présente étude teste de manière expérimentale la capacité d'une modification au système centralisé de vente du quota à faire diminuer le prix du quota laitier au Québec tout en minimisant les impacts négatifs des changements sur l'efficacité de l'enchère. Cette modification consiste à appliquer deux traitements sur l'enchère de prix uniforme où s'échange le quota. Le premier traitement consiste en une exclusion (5% ou 15%) des mises les plus élevées des acheteurs et des vendeurs. Le second traitement est une taxe (2% ou 10%) appliquée aux unités que les vendeurs mettent en marché et ne réussissent pas à vendre. Différentes combinaisons de ces deux traitements sont également testées. Les données générées permettent de conclure que le mécanisme d'exclusion des mises les plus élevées permet de faire diminuer le prix du quota, l'exclusion de 15%étant plus efficace que celle de 5%. Pour sa part, la taxe seule a peu d'impact sur le prix du quota tandis que la combinaison des deux traitements entraîne une diminution du nombre de transactions et du prix du quota plus marquée que lorsque les traitements de taxe et d'exclusion sont appliqués individuellement. Cela a comme corollaire d'entraîner une perte d'efficacitééconomique plus importante. Dans tous les cas, des baisses de prix de marché relativement modestes sont réalisées au coût d'importantes pertes d'efficacitééconomique.     

Regional Integration as Diplomacy

Regional integration agreements are examples of second-bestpolicies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This articlebuilds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguouslyraise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes thattrade between neighboring countries raises trust between themand reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum interventionin that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. Thearticle shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboringcountries to tax imports from the rest of the world—thatis, to form a regional integration agreement—togetherwith some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports fromthe rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deepintegration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it isexogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deepintegration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous;and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries)has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare,and some form of domino effect exists.     

The impact of auctions on residential property prices

This study assesses whether the sale method in residential real estate markets – auction versus private treaty – is a determinant of sale price. Utilising a larger and richer dataset than previous research, we test for a price effect in auction sales in Sydney and Christchurch. When self‐selection biases are corrected for, using two‐stage hedonic regression analysis and a matched sampling procedure, we find no significant difference between prices of properties sold at auction to those sold by private treaty. This conflicts with the conclusions of previous research in the Australian and New Zealand housing markets, which have documented a price premium associated with auction sales.     

Economic Order Quantities, Volume Discounts, and Wealth Maximization

This study challenges the generally accepted managerial decision to accept a quantity discount if total, perperiod inventory and acquisition costs are reduced. In this paper, the economic order quantity model is reformulated within an explicit wealth maximization framework, and the reformulated model is then utilized to analyze inventory decisions when volume discounts are available. The results of the study indicate that the traditional method of analyszing volume discount opportunities may invoke wealth decreasing decisions.     

Governmental budgeting as ex ante financial accounting: The United Kingdom case

For many years now the academic governmental-budgeting literature has concentrated almost exclusively on the politics and economics of the budgetary process at the expense of the mechanical foundations. Consequently, we see an interesting but insulated discussion about political involvement and about the strengths and weaknesses of planning models. What we do not see is a discussion of the accounting perspective. This paper offers such a discussion. It explains local government budgeting as “ex ante financial accounting” and offers some important implications of this re-interpretation.     

Are organizational vegetables growing where you work?

The author breaks new ground with what may be the first taxonomy of supervisory and employee vegetables. He also offers some pruning tips to keep undesirable plants from taking root in your organization.