A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

The Impact of Mexico's Retraining Program on Employment and Wages

This article analyzes the impact and effectiveness of the Mexicanlabor retraining program for unemployed and displaced workers—Programade Becas de Capacitación para Trabajadores (PROBECAT).The strategy followed is to compare the post-training labormarket experiences of trainees with those of a comparison group—amatched sample of unemployed individuals who were eligible for,but did not participate in, PROBECAT. The results of this exercisesuggest that participation in PROBECAT reduced the mean durationof unemployment for both men and women trainees and increasedthe monthly earnings of men, but not of women. The results alsoindicate that the post-training earnings effect varied systematicallyby level of education attained, with the largest earnings increases(of about 28 to 37 percent) found for men with six to twelveyears of education.