Audit Committees,Boards, and the Quality of Reported Earnings*

I use data on 252 U.S. firms between 1994 and 2000 to study the relationship between audit committees and boards of directors with financial reporting quality. I initially document several changes in committee and board profile during the sample period. Results from logistic regressions suggest that measures of audit committee and board structure are related to earnings quality in a manner that is generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. This study contributes to extant knowledge by employing different earnings quality measures from prior studies, and by expanding the range of audit committee attributes deemed important in determining audit committee performance.     

Boards,ownership structure,and involuntary delisting from the New York Stock Exchange

This study examines whether the likelihood of becoming involuntarily delisted from NYSE is associated with a firm’s board of directors and ownership characteristics. To this end we compare 161 firms that were delisted from NYSE between 1998 and 2004 to a set of industry and size-matched control firms. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the likelihood of delisting is related to a firm’s governance characteristics. Our results on the importance of the board of directors are new to this setting and add to a large body of evidence linking corporate boards and ownership characteristics to corporate performance.     

Public procurement policy and the Czech industry

The aim of this paper is to specify the extent of buy-national policies of the Czech Republic and the impact of opening its public procurement market to domestic production and employment due to the Europe Agreements of 1995. Two series of indicators are proposed for measuring the impact of Czech buy-national policies. The first series outlines the behavior of the public sector vis-à-vis domestic production and imports. The second series sketches the industrial structure of the sectors which, following the above analysis, seem to be protected by preferential public procurement. The interaction of both series of indicators can provide information about the level of protection in terms of public procurement on a sectoral level. This paper is part of the Phare Program of Action for Cooperation in Economics, a research project launched by the Commission of the European Union. The authors gratefully acknowledge contributions by Andrew Cox and anonymous project referees. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.     

CO2 Emissions and Income Dynamics: What Does the Global Evidence Tell Us?

This paper analyzes the co-evolution of two major determinants of social welfare, namely, income and carbon emissions. In particular, by using a distribution dynamics approach based on Markov chains, we investigate the shape and behavior of the joint distribution of per-capita income and carbon dioxide emissions. We arrive at several interesting conclusions, especially in the context of international negotiations on climate change. First, evidence does not support theoretical models predicting the existence of a poverty-environment trap. Specifically, in the long-run two main groups of countries will emerge: poor versus polluting countries. Second, the typical development path leads initially to high emission levels and, subsequently, to high income. Third, the convergence process towards the stationary distribution is very slow. Finally, for carbon emissions, whenever it is observed, the environmental Kuznets curve seems to be only a transitory phenomenon.     

A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance for the experimental outcome.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Employability and the psychological contract in European ICT sector SMEs

This article explores the employability of information and communication technology (ICT) professionals from the perspective of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The first stage of analysis, based on over 100 interviews with managers of ICT supplier companies in seven European countries (Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the UK), showed most SMEs to have a generally ad hoc approach to managing the employability of their ICT professionals. Assessment and development plans were used primarily to keep skills current to business needs; however, the more developed northern European markets showed greater awareness of the ‘high commitment’ benefits of a more sophisticated approach towards career management (e.g. through mentoring or career planning). A second stage of analysis based only on UK interviews builds on this to propose a model of positive employer influence on psychological contracts through career and employability management practices.     

US shipping initial public offerings: Do prospectus and market information matter?

This paper examines the extent that public information, available prior to the initial public offering of shipping companies, is only partially incorporated in the final offer price. The sample includes shipping US initial public offerings that took place in the period 1987-2008, and the analysis employs a set of IPO, market, and firm specific characteristics. Our findings have both theoretical and empirical implications for shipping IPOs, and indicate that there is no asymmetry of information between participants in shipping IPOs. On the theoretical part, the partial adjustment theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) is supported, whereas the winner’s curse theory of Rock (1986) is rejected. On the empirical side, the probability of underpricing can be predicted by employing variables available to all IPO participants prior to the issue.