Extrinsic Cues and the Evaluation of Political Candidates

In a political landscape where the content of politics is getting more and more complex and political parties less and less different, voters often base their voting behavior on extrinsic rather than intrinsic cues, a bundle of extrinsic cues constructed as an image and based on perceived personal traits. Based on survey data from a sample of Norwegian voters, this paper tests how a political candidate's credibility, charisma, and physical attractiveness are related to voters’ judgments of suitability for a leading political position. Across three different politicians, the results show that credibility plays a significant role in the evaluations performed by voters. More surprisingly, charisma does not have the expected effect, and to voters, physical attractiveness is found to be more important than charisma.     

Economic Liberalism and the State: Dismantling the Myth of Naïve Laissez-Faire

The article offers a critique of the prevailing understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and classic nineteenth-century liberalism in contemporary international political economy (IPE) and offers a redefinition inspired by Polanyi and Gramsci. Within critical IPE studies, a consensus has emerged that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a simple attempt to roll back the economy and let loose free-market forces. However, this insight relies on contrasting neoliberalism with a classic liberalism, that is, a simple attempt to implement just this naïve laissez-faire ideology. In contrast, this article argues that nineteenth-century liberalism is also characterised by an active use of state and legislative power. Through a historical study of two cases from nineteenth-century Britain, Poor Law reform and the Gold Standard, the paper will argue that state action played a central role even during the heyday of laissez-faire liberalism. With a starting point in Polanyi’s dictum that ‘laissez-faire was planned’, this reinvestigation will point towards a need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the distinctions between economic theory, ideology, and practical policy, as well as pointing towards a general reinterpretation of the role of the state in liberal economic ideology.     

Market structure and diversification of mutual funds

This study characterizes a systematic relationship between the diversification incentives and the market structure of the mutual funds industry with investors differentiated by their attitude towards risk. With sufficiently low competition the subgame perfect portfolio equilibrium exhibits maximal risk differentiation. With intensified competition intermediate funds, i.e., those attracting investors with intermediate attitudes towards risk, select diversified portfolios. Finally, we offer a general characterization of how imperfect competition between risk-differentiated funds will generate an equilibrium relationship between risk and expected returns.     

金融危机下远期付款交单的风险及其防范

远期付款交单是一种商业信用,出口商的收汇安全主要取决于进口商的信用.在当前金融危机下,各国贸易保护主义抬头,政策多变、进口商破产增加,使出口商的收汇遇到更多的国家风险和进口商的信用风险.因此出口商在选用远期付款交单进行结算时一定要增强风险防范意识,注意考察进口国的相关政策及进口商的资信情况并投保出口信用险以规避自身风险.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets

We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First‐best is achieved by a strict no‐bailout and no‐profit‐confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare‐improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high‐cost patients.     

Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand

We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in the closed-loop solution than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is sufficiently high. However, this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low (and below unit costs). Sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated.     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.     

North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

A restatement of the case for speed limits

This paper provides a restatement of the case for speed limits. The paper argues that driver speed choice cannot be granted any normative status (i.e. be regarded as optimal from a societal point of view) unless it is “objectively” rational, even if it can be reasonably interpreted as “subjectively” rational. A distinction between “subjective” and “objective” rationality is very rarely made in modern analyses relying on the theory of rational choice, but it makes sense with respect to the choice of speed. Studies that have assessed which impacts of speed drivers consider, whether drivers correctly assess these impacts, and how drivers coordinate their choice of speed with other drivers are reviewed. It is concluded that driver speed choice is not “objectively” rational. It is concluded that the lack of rationality in driver speed choice implies that this choice needs to be regulated by means of speed limits.