Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union

In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free‐rider problem in the setting of non‐monetary policies. The free‐rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non‐monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free‐riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non‐monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free‐rider problem; then constraints on non‐monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non‐monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation.     

Statistische eigenschappen van een vlambeveiliging met behulp van een gasontladingsbuis welke gevoelig is voor ultraviolet licht

Summary  The output voltage of a detector circuit containing a gas-filled tube sensitive to ultraviolet radiation can be used to indicate whether a flame is still burning or not. As long as the flame is burning the random nature of the discharges of the tube leads to random fluctuations in the output voltage, which can be considered as a Markov-process with dependent increments. The problem is to select an alarm level for the output voltage with a suitable chosen probability of exceedance while the flame is burning, in order to limit the probability of false alarm. In this article a method is given for determining upper and lower bounds for the distribution function of the output voltage at any moment, answering the question of the alarm level to be chosen. Results are given for a special circuit.