Wall Street Occupations

Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”     

Coverage of Criticism of Activity‐Based Costing in Canadian Textbooks*

Textbook authors and publishers face a difficult decision regarding coverage of activity‐based costing (ABC). ABC could be presented in a strictly positive light, because it enjoyed immense popularity when it was introduced in the 1980s and it is still referred to in favourable terms in practitioner journals. On the other hand, ABC can be criticized on practical and theoretical grounds. Surveys report that a minority of firms adopt ABC, and there are indications of dissatisfaction among some users. In addition, ABC requires direct proportionality and the exclusion of common costs, which are difficult conditions to meet. In this paper, we first describe the practical and theoretical material supporting criticism of ABC that is available to be cited by textbook authors. We then review the coverage of this material in the five textbooks that are most widely used in Canadian universities and colleges.     

Technology, Environment and the Productivity Problem in African Agriculture: Comment on the World Development Report 2008

This paper is concerned with the need for a 'productivity revolution in smallholder farming' that the World Development Report 2008 (WDR08) identifies is required in sub-Saharan Africa. It reviews the technological options for such a productivity revolution in Africa, and how these are conditioned by the 'agriculture-based' model the WDR08 uses to characterize African economies. It argues that the model effects, firstly, a disconnection of agriculture from 'urban' Africa that constitutes its principal market and the source of investment and inputs with which to raise productivity, and, secondly, an adherence to unrealistic and sometimes contradictory assumptions about the way markets link agriculture to other parts of the economy.     

Banking on Agriculture: A Review of the World Development Report 2008

The World Bank's World Development Report 2008 repackages the development trope that assumes small-scale agriculture to be poor and inefficient and/or redundant in a world of supply shortages despite food abundance. The 'new agriculture for development' replaces smallholder knowledge with corporate inputs to channel food through 'value chains' to markets comprised of those with purchasing power. This essay questions the Bank's new vision, arguing that 'new wine in old bottles' will continue to supply affluence rather than 'feed the world' and sustain its agricultures, especially at a time when land is being commandeered for luxury foods (e.g. the livestock complex, all-season vegetables and fruits) and biofuels, neither of which feed the poor. Ironically, the reproduction of poverty remains the Bank's main source of legitimacy.     

Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms

We examine whether the value loss from diversification affects takeover and breakup probabilities. We estimate diversification's value effect by imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments and find that firms with greater value losses are more likely to be taken over. Moreover, those acquired firms whose losses are greatest are most likely to be bought by LBO associations, which frequently break up their targets. For a subsample of large diversified targets: (1) higher value losses increase the extent of post-takeover bustup; and (2) post-takeover bustup generally results in divested divisions being operated as part of a focused, stand-alone firm.     

Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends,Mutual-to-Stock Conversions,and Financial Distress

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual-to-stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital-impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.     

Commercial Lenders' Use of Accounting Information in Interaction with Source Credibility*

Abstract. The credibility of individual commercial borrowers, which lenders refer to as “character,” affects lenders' use of accounting information. This effect of source credibility is subtle compared to the effect of external audits on the use of financial statements in other contexts. It is hypothesized that accounting facts must be positive (supporting loan approval) for character facts to influence lenders' judgments and loan decisions. Character facts will not affect judgments or loan decisions significantly when accounting facts are negative (supporting loan denial). This accounting/character interaction is predicted to become stronger as lenders gain experience and develop criteria for evaluating character. In an experiment, lenders read a loan application that contained facts concerning accounting, character, and other information; the accounting and character facts were manipulated to be either positive or negative, resulting in four versions of the application. The lenders recommended approval or denial of the loan and estimated the likelihood that the loan would be fully repaid (a risk estimate). Interactive effects of accounting and character facts on lenders' loan decisions and risk estimates were found, but the accounting/character interactions generally did not vary with experience level. One notable difference was that experienced lenders never approved loans when accounting facts were negative, but inexperienced lenders sometimes did.