The Difference between Earnings and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud*

This paper examines the relation between earnings and operating cash flow to derive and test an indicator of financial statement fraud. Accrual measurement concepts indicate that financial statement fraud should be associated with high levels of earnings relative to operating cash flow. We demonstrate that the excess of earnings over operating cash flow is extreme in most fraud cases in years immediately prior to the fraud discovery based on a sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991. We compare the distribution of the earnings minus operating cash flow variable for fraud firms with that for a sample of 60,453 firm-years for firms listed on COMPUSTAT. We test a logistic regression model in which the discovery/nondiscovery of fraud is the dependent variable, and earnings minus operating cash flow is the explanatory variable. Other control variables are included in the model based on prior studies. Results are consistent with expectations derived from accrual measurement theory. We then examine the predictive ability of the model using our sample of fraud firms and a sample of nonfraud firms in the same four-digit SIC code industries. Observations for the fraud firms are for the fiscal year prior to the discovery of fraud. Observations for the nonfraud firms are for the same fiscal years as the fraud firms in the same industries. The predictive ability of the model, including the excess of earnings over operating cash flow, is substantially higher than the predictive ability of the model omitting this variable. We conclude that the earnings-operating cash flow relation provides important information for those interested in identifying financial statement fraud, especially when considered in conjunction with other factors associated with fraud risk.     

The Impetus for (and Limited Power of) Business Self‐Regulation: The Example of Advergames

When people complain, government agencies often respond. When regulations are threatened, businesses often offer reassurances that the problems can be handled with a self‐regulation code. However, past analyses of the power of self‐regulation find that while companies' voluntary adherence to self‐defined guidelines may effect some change in the activities of some companies, the inherent limitations of self‐regulation in the United States may restrict its ability to actually halt or control the undesired practices of others. The recent response by major food manufacturers and marketers to criticism of online games is an example of this mix.     

新创高科技企业供应链联盟的风险管理体系

对新创高科技企业供应链联盟风险进行了分类,包括错误选择合作伙伴的风险、财务风险、技术风险、市场风险和管理风险,并从慎重选择合作联盟伙伴、选择合适的联盟形式、合理规避市场和技术风险、建立联盟伙伴间信任关系四个方面论述了风险管理的对策。     

中国股票市场政策演进:公共选择视角

我国中央政府在股票市场中存在双重利益目标:国有企业筹资和资金使用效益最大化,且前者优先。基于此,中央政府对股票市场做出了初始政策安排。但在政策运行中,地方政府、上市公司、市场中介、投资者等经济主体出于各自利益目标,采取了不同行动策略,从而降低了资金使用效益,减少了国有企业筹资额,使得股票市场初始政策安排的收益不断“缩水”。     

Dairy product consumption in South Korea

The per capita daily consumption of dairy products increased approximately 2450% in South Korea from 1969 to 1987. The purpose of the present study was to determine the frequency with which urban South Koreans consume 10 common dairy products, and to find the socio-economic group most responsible for the increase in dairy product consumption. Data were collected on the dietary patterns and socio-economic backgrounds of 923 women, 880 children and 772 men in urban areas. This study showed that seven of 10 dairy products investigated were consumed evenly by both sexes, all age groups and income levels. However, three recently-introduced products (i.e. cheese, ice cream and butter) were found to be consumed most frequently by young Koreans in the high income level.     

Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols

We examine whether equity‐linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups.