The contribution of discretionary salt to total salt intake

The aim of this research was to investigate sodium consumption in a group of people, compare this consumption with dietary reference values and to identify sources of sodium in the diet. Participants were given weighed salt pots which were used for 8 weeks and a fully weighed dietary survey was conducted by each subject. The average daily sodium consumption of each subject was calculated and compared with the reference nutrient intake (RNI). Daily sodium intake was found to vary considerably, ranging from 1213 mg (53 mmol) (76% of the RNI) to 10 569 mg (460 mmol) (661% of the RNI). Average daily sodium consumption was found to be 5175 mg (225 mmol), well above the RNI of 1600 mg (70 mmol). The average contribution from discretionary salt was 15.0%, from processed foods 76.5% and from naturally occurring sodium 8.4%. Males were found to consume more sodium than females and a moderate correlation between age and daily sodium intake was found.     

RATIONALE FOR DISSENT: THE CASE OF FOMC MEMBERS

This paper investigates monetary policymakers' rationale for dissent to test for a hypothesized difference in policy preferences between bank presidents and members of the Board of Governors. The paper analyzes the cited reasons for dissent, the identity of the dissenter, and uses multiple regression to make inferences regarding the differences.
Examining the identity of dissenters and the given reasons for dissent yields four conclusions, (i) A broad base of bank presidents dissent for tighter policy because they want to control inflation by keeping monetary aggregates within targeted ranges. (ii) On the other hand, board members' dissent for tighter policy is dominated by one man–Henry Wallich—who apparently was disturbed by the inflationary outbreak during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Hi) Several board members dissent for looser policy to stimulate the real economy, (iv) But only a few bank presidents, primarily from the Northeast, dissent for looser policy with the same objective.
Regression analysis supports the assertion that bank presidents dissenting for tighter policy do so to keep monetary aggregates on target in order to control inflation. The analysis confirms Wallich's focus on inflation during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also allows for the possibility that the various board members dissenting for looser policy either have an inherent preference for looser policy or have diverse reasons for dissent.     

The Welfare Loss of the Voluntary Export Restraint For Japanese Automobiles

The welfare loss from the voluntary export restraint (VER) on Japanese automobiles was estimated for the first year of the VER (April 1, 1981 to March 31, 1982). The impact of quantity reductions on the price of Japanese and domestic automobiles was used to estimate the welfare loss. Losses were estimated separately for the domestic small car market and the Japanese market in view of the existence of product differentiation. Welfare losses ranged from $446 million to $1,386 million depending on the price elasticity of demand assumed for Japanese automobiles. The welfare loss for domestic automobiles accounted for only a small proportion of this loss. The VER had a minor impact on the domestic automobile industry where sales remained low due to general economic conditions and limited substitutability between domestic and Japanese cars. However, the limited assistance provided by the VER to the domestic automobile industry entailed considerable costs as demonstrated by the magnitude of the welfare loss. A considerable part of this loss could have been avoided if other forms of trade protection such as tariffs had been used instead of the VER.     

The Local Aggregate Effects of Minimum Wage Increases

Using variation in minimum wages across cities and controlling for differences in business-cycle factors and long-run local economic trends, we find that following minimum wage increases, both, prices and nominal spending rise modestly. These gains are larger for certain subcategories of goods such as food away from home and in locations where low-wage workers account for a larger share of employment. Further, minimum wage increases are associated with reduced total debt among households with low credit scores, higher auto debt, and increased access to credit.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.