Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage

I test the hypothesis that short debt maturity attenuates thenegative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Using simultaneousequations with leverage and maturity endogenous, I find strongsupport for an economically significant attenuation effect.The negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage forfirms with all shorter-term debt is less than one-sixth as largeas the effect for firms with all longer-term debt. Short maturityalso increases liquidity risk, however, which negatively affectsleverage. The results suggest that firms trade off the costof underinvestment problems against the cost of liquidity riskwhen choosing short maturity.     

The Current Link Between Management Behavior and Ethical Philosophy

The current linkages between ethical theory and management behavior are investigated. The vignettes used in this investigation represent ethical dilemmas in the areas of coercion and control, conflict of interest, physical environment, and personal integrity. Overall, even with heightened ethical awareness the link between ethical philosophy and management behavior remains similar to that of the early 1990s. Generally, practitioners still rely heavily on the utilitarian ethical philosophy when making business decisions. However, more managers are now likely to select ethically appropriate actions either because it is ethical to do so, or because the consequences or risk of not doing so are too great. This shift could positively impact the ethical climate of business decision-making.     

Values and Beliefs Related to Ethical Decisions

Although there is reason to suspect thatpeople's values and beliefs influenceintegrity-related decisions, few studies haveexamined the values and beliefs related tomanagerial integrity. In the present study,197 students were asked to complete measures ofvalues and beliefs as manifest in theirpreferred courses of action when confrontedwith ambiguous situations. Subsequently, theywere asked to work on a managerial ``in-basket'task where the decisions made might result inharm to others or harm to the organization. Itwas found that values and beliefs were relatedto both types of decisions producing multiplecorrelations in the 0.40s. People whose valuesstressed growth and contributions to others, asopposed to personal gain, and believed actionswere under their control, as opposed toexternal control, exhibited greater integrity. The implications of these findings forunderstanding leader integrity are discussed.     

National Emissions Standards,Pollution Havens,and Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions

The present study shows that the availability of “pollution havens” can negate the effect of national legislation that tightens industrial greenhouse gas emission standards. In the perverse case, a unilateral tightening of said standards in Country A (a country with relatively stringent industrial emission standards) causes a representative multinational firm to emit more units of greenhouse gas in its global production. The article highlights the potential perils of unilateral action on environmental issues that are global in nature.     

Evidence and explanation for the Tariff-lobbying paradox: endogenous Tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises

Recent empirical evidence suggests that U.S. protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while U.S. trade barrier fell. We find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find two economic drivers cause the paradox between increasing protectionist lobbying and decreasing trade barrier. First, trade barriers decline as country capital-labour ratio endowments rise because of the rising political and economic power of capital that lobbies for free-trade. Second, factor intensities in production become more similar as factor-intensity convergence. This flattens the production possibility curve between exportable and import-competing production so that changes increased magnification in both factor rewards. In our panel, the magnification parameters are twice as high for capital as for labour (8.6 vs. 5.1). And, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to country capital-labour factor endowment ratios (.59) is nearly twice those of labour (.22). Increased magnification causes thus labour’s increased lobbying for protection to be more than offset by increased capital lobbying against protection. In short, while an increasing labour lobbies for protection as countries advance, combined tariff and non-tariff protection (OTRI) decline significantly as advanced countries get richer. This explains the tariff-protectionist-lobbying paradox.     

Redesigning nurse staffing plans for acute care hospitals

Johnson City Medical Center's approach to maximizing staffing in nursing units, particularly in acute care settings, had four primary goals: Identify opportunities to maximize the effectiveness of nurse staffing based on a review of core staffing schedules. Reduce cost duplication and improve workflow. Decrease the use of contract labor (with the goal of eliminating the use of contract labor). Develop financial dashboards for staffing that could be used by nursing managers.     

Internet resources and capabilities: Japanese SME risk-taking,industry and performance

This study investigates how Internet-related resources and capabilities are influencing performance in Japanese small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We use a structural equation modelling approach to test these relationships between Internet readiness, Internet capability, risk-taking perceptions and performance within Japanese SMEs (350 SMEs). Unlike other counterpart countries, such as South Korea, Japanese SMEs have been relatively slow in implementing Internet technologies into business practice. However, the results indicate that if Japanese SMEs allocate appropriate resources and deploy Internet capabilities these firms will benefit with performance gains. Further, we find that both the perception of risk-taking and the industry in which the firm operates are key factors in either inhibiting or enhancing the firm’s ability to leverage Internet-related capabilities for firm performance.     

Career concerns and mandated disclosure

This paper examines the effects of mandated disclosure on the design of contracts and induced behavior in the presence of career concerns. We analyze the impact of two key properties of a mandated performance measure that is publicly disclosed: its sensitivity to the agent’s effort and its informativeness about the agent’s ability. We show conditions under which the agent’s effort (and the firm’s output) and the pay-for-performance weight critically depend on these two properties. In particular, when the mandated measure is sufficiently noisy, the pay-for-performance weight always decreases relative to a setting with no mandated measure. But when the mandated measure’s noise is close to that of the existing performance measure, the effect of a mandated measure on the pay-for-performance weight depends on the effort-sensitivity and informativeness of the measure. We also characterize settings where a mandated disclosure would be desirable or not; variations arise because mandated disclosures can increase both effort and risk. Our results imply that mandating the public disclosure of performance measures, particularly measures that are relatively informative about ability but are difficult to influence through managerial effort, may have the unintended consequence of generating inefficiencies in firms’ employment contracts.