AIDS is your business

If your company operates in a developing country, AIDS is your business. While Africa has received the most attention, AIDS is also spreading swiftly in other parts of the world. Russia and Ukraine had the fastest-growing epidemics last year, and many experts believe China and India will suffer the next tidal wave of infection. Why should executives be concerned about AIDS? Because it is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy-cheap labor and fast-growing markets--in countries where people are heavily affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, investments in programs that prevent infection and provide treatment for employees who have HIV/AIDS are profitable for many businesses--that is, they lead to savings that outweigh the programs' costs. Due to the long latency period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms, a company is not likely to see any of the costs of HIV/AIDS until five to ten years after an employee is infected. But executives can calculate the present value of epidemic-related costs by using the discount rate to weigh each cost according to its expected timing. That allows companies to think about expenses on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs as investments rather than merely as costs. The authors found that the annual cost of AIDS to six corporations in South Africa and Botswana ranged from 0.4% to 5.9% of the wage bill. All six companies would have earned positive returns on their investments if they had provided employees with free treatment for HIV/AIDS in the form of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), according to the mathematical model the authors used. The annual reduction in the AIDS "tax" would have been as much as 40.4%. The authors' conclusion? Fighting AIDS not only helps those infected; it also makes good business sense.     

Equally-distributed equivalent utility,ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi?s impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit aversion to ex post inequality. We also relate this axiomatization to our axiomatization in a companion paper of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions. Given certain richness assumptions, the only social welfare functions that belong to both families are the utilitarian.     

The effects of air quality regulations on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants

This research examines the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) on the location decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants. We develop a panel data set to analyze plant births of polluting manufacturers over time as a function county-level attainment status of the federal standard for ozone pollution. We find that more stringent county-level environmental regulations impact pollution-intensive capital flows through deterring new plant births. We also find that the impact of stricter regulations varies by pollution-intensity of manufacturers, with results suggesting that federal guidelines have a greater impact on high pollution intensive manufacturers than more moderate polluters.      

A South African national economic and environmental policyframework

Most contemporary economic theories upon which conventional national accounting is based regard man‐made assets as productive capital to be depreciated against the value of production. Such production, without replenishment or renewal of the asset or capital stock, is not sustainable. Natural resource assets, however, are not valued in the same way. There is no accounting mechanism to reflect the decrease in potential future pro duction as the resource diminishes or deteriorates. In 1993, the United Nations adopted its guidelines for a ‘System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting’ (SEEA), which allows for the adjustment of the System of National Accounts (SNA) for natural asset stripping and degradation, providing a format for national accounting which assesses the viability and sustainability of economic growth. The concept of an SEEA for South Africa was pursued in 1994 as a pilot study. The framework to be devel oped was termed the South African National Economic Environmental Planning (SANEEP) model. The framework can be used to predict the environmental impact, in terms of natural resource use and degradation, of economic growth, both nationally and at the sectoral level. In addition, it can be used to test the sectoral economic impact, and thus the desirability of certain types of environmental economic instruments such as pol lution taxes, or the imposition of royalties on mineral extraction. Hence, the SANEEP framework has the potential to become a broad‐based, integrated environmental and economic planning tool. This article describes the SANEEP model, its information requirements and applications.     

Business ethics: a SWOT exercise

This paper reflects on the present state of business ethics. The question has become more complex in an era of globalisation: cross‐border activities make it particularly difficult for companies to formulate effective ethical programmes which are true to core corporate values. The author presents his reflection in terms of a SWOT analysis, examining the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats likely to be experienced by business ethics in the new millennium. He concludes that the challenge for business ethics is to work for global agreement on common values and common approaches to issues of integrity and trust in global business.     

International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage

Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand—it can use the second country to discriminate across consumers in the first country. Again, world welfare typically falls with arbitrage costs. When there is also local demand in the second country, world welfare may be increasing in arbitrage costs, even if output falls.