How Does a Development Moratorium Affect Development Timing Choices and Land Values?

This paper investigates how a development moratorium affects choices of development timing and land values in a framework where both the value of developed property evolves stochastically and the development costs are fully irreversible. We assume that a regulator initially announces that land is not allowed to be developed during a finite period of time in the future. A developer, thus, must decide whether to develop land before the timing ordinance is imposed, or after it expires. The development moratorium reduces the developer’s option value from waiting and, thus, accelerates development. We also use simulation analysis to demonstrate how the other factors that relate to the demand and supply conditions of the real estate market affect this accelerating effect.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France

We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

A model depicting the relations among perceived stressors,role conflict and organizational commitment: A comparative analysis of Hong Kong and the United States

As managers and employees from different cultures begin to encounter one another in the workplace, the need arises to understand how organizational variables relate differentially based on one's culture. This study attempts to provide a preliminary examination of the relationship between stressors, sources of conflict and job commitment across two differing cultures, specifically the United States and Hong Kong. Although more similarities than differences between the two cultures were found, this study provides at least preliminary evidence that members of different cultures may perceive some stressors differently and exhibit different relationships between stressors and work attitudes.     

The law of one price: a test based on prices for selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture

The law of one price (LOOP) is an essential foundation of both the pure theory of trade and monetary theory. Strictly speaking, the law relates to prices of individual commodities. However, empirical tests of LOOP have often relied on aggregated data. In this paper, a model is derived and estimated using price data for 15 selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture. The results offer no support for the LOOP in the short run, and the results for the long run are mixed. It may be inappropriate, therefore, to assume that the LOOP holds generally in modelling exercises, particularly when models are used for policy purposes.     

International health law and consumer autonomy

Today, international health law and international consumer law are developing in the same direction and with much interaction. But the developments are not uniform. As international health law takes consumer protection into account, it tends to increase the gap between a Western international law and a Third World international law, and to emphasize the negative harmonization approach towards international health protection.Another problem concerns the unification of the rules of international health law and those of international consumer law. This problem is particularly difficult to solve, as the rules of international consumer law themselves are still far from being unified.

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Internationales Gesundheitsrecht und Verbraucherautonomie

Zusammenfassung Internationales Gesundheitsrecht und internationales Verbraucherrecht entwickeln sich heute in gleicher Richtung, obwohl sie anderen Quellen entspringen. Die wechselseitige Durchdringung nimmt zu, auch wenn die Enwicklung nicht einheitlich vor sich geht. Je mehr das internationale Gesundheitsrecht den Verbraucherschutz in sich aufnimmt, destomehr trennt es sich in ein Recht für entwickelte Staaten und ein solches für Dritte Welt-Länder. Ein vorwiegend negativ-abwehrender Zugang herrscht vor.Ein anderes Problem beinhaltet die Harmonisierung der Regeln des internationalen Gesundheits- und des internationalen Verbraucherrechts. Dies ist schon deshalb schwer erreichbar, weil das Verbraucherrecht selbst nicht einheitlich vorgeht. Die Probleme verschärfen sich, wenn man — ohne eine internationale Verbraucherinstitution wie die WHO — eine gemeinsame positive Gesundheitspolitik für Verbraucher erreichen will.

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Michel Bélanger teaches health law at the U.F.R. de Droit Public et Science Politique, Université de Bordeaux I, Avenue Léon Duguit, F 33604 Pessac, France.