Cheating in Contests

Much of the interest in the study of sports from the perspectiveof an economist lies in the empirical application of contestsas efficient mechanisms for eliciting effort. Contestants respondto contest incentives, and these incentives include the incentiveto cheat. This paper discusses different forms of cheating:sabotage, doping, and match fixing. The paper discusses howthese forms of cheating arise and how they can be treated. Inparticular, we look at specific forms of cheating in soccer,baseball, and cricket. In the appendix we develop a simple modelof match fixing.     

Changing investment styles: style creep and style gaming in the hedge fund industry

Notwithstanding their common features, hedge funds remain an extremely diverse asset class. Information on fund styles is important for numerous purposes, such as portfolio construction, performance attribution and risk management. With fund self‐declaration being prone to (strategic) misclassification, return‐based taxonomies grouping funds along similarities in realized returns provide a useful alternative. We provide a consistent classification system of homogeneous groups of hedge funds based on self‐organizing maps. Whereas some fund categories such as managed futures are largely consistent in their self‐declared strategies, others, especially so‐called ‘equity hedge’ funds, display no or very limited return similarities. Furthermore, we also find evidence of fund managers performing undisclosed changes of their trading style over time. Those funds that misclassified themselves once are particularly likely to change their trading style again. Although style self‐declaration can, therefore, be quite misleading, our results indicate that hedge funds do not misdeclare their style strategically to improve their relative performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Efficiency, subsidies, and environmental adaptation of animal farming under CAP

The purpose of this article is to model the interaction between the targets of the current Comman Agriculture Politic (CAP): environmental adaptation, subsidies, and efficiency of animal farming. To this end we first have to identify the production frontier and relative efficiency level for each animal‐oriented farm in the sample. The production frontier and efficiency index for each type of farm (assuming no specific production functions) are identified using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) techniques. We then address the relationship between relative efficiency, farm size, and environmentally friendly behavior by carrying out a nonparametric regression of efficiency, on economic size, a proxy for the degree of environmental appropriateness, and regional dummies. Calculations of the efficiency of the farms including direct subsidies are compared with the counterfactual exercise in the case in which direct subsidies are not considered. Finally, we look for relations between subsidies and factors such as farm size, efficiency, and environmentally friendly behavior. One key result shows that, on average direct payments generally tend to increase efficiency. However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the percentage of direct payments rises. Direct payments are found to be positively related to environmentally friendly production, at least in Germany. However, in general, the direct payment system is not sufficient to offset the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the larger farms are more efficient.     

Dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions and the role of monetary conservatism

Assuming that macroeconomic policies are directed by distinct monetary and fiscal policy makers who cannot commit to future actions, we reassess the implications of monetary conservatism and fiscal impatience in a setting with nominal government debt. For environments where a non-negative steady state level of government debt (assets) emerges in the absence of conservatism and impatience, monetary conservatism induces accumulation of a higher stock of liabilities (assets) and has adverse (positive) welfare implications. This result obtains irrespectively of the degree of fiscal impatience and questions the unambiguous desirability of monetary conservatism traditionally found in the literature.     

Style analysis and Value-at-Risk of Asia-focused hedge funds

In this paper we identify risk factors for Asia-focused hedge funds through a modified style analysis technique. Using an Asian hedge fund index, we find that Asian hedge funds show significant positive exposures to emerging equity markets. For both a static and rolling period style analysis, our model provides a high explanatory power for returns of the considered hedge fund index. We further conduct a Value-at-Risk analysis using the results of a rolling window style analysis as inputs. Our findings suggest that the considered parametric models outperform a simple historical simulation that is purely based on past return observations.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.