Lower Bound Restrictions on Intensities in Data Envelopment Analysis

We propose an extension to the basic DEA models that guarantees that if an intensity is positive then it must be at least as large as a pre-defined lower bound. This requirement adds an integer programming constraint known within Operations Research as a Fixed-Charge (FC) type of constraint. Accordingly, we term the new model DEA_FC. The proposed model lies between the DEA models that allow units to be scaled arbitrarily low, and the Free Disposal Hull model that allows no scaling. We analyze 18 datasets from the literature to demonstrate that sufficiently low intensities—those for which the scaled Decision-Making Unit (DMU) has inputs and outputs that lie below the minimum values observed—are pervasive, and that the new model ensures fairer comparisons without sacrificing the required discriminating power. We explain why the low-intensity phenomenon exists. In sharp contrast to standard DEA models we demonstrate via examples that an inefficient DMU may play a pivotal role in determining the technology. We also propose a goal programming model that determines how deviations from the lower bounds affect efficiency, which we term the trade-off between the deviation gap and the efficiency gap.     

学会用钱说话

·质量专业人员在讨论到他们的活动所产生的财务影响时，往往会感到很困难。 ·要想引起管理者的关注，质量专业人员必须学习重要的财务术语，诸如像净收益、资产回报率等，并能够理解资产负债表和收支表。     

The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

Summary. This paper reexamines the condition (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilchas definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily.Received: 30 September 2002, Revised: 13 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D90, E13, E22. Correspondence to: Steven RussellWe thank Jon Burke, Subir Chakrabarti, Itzhak Zilcha and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations and/or comments.     

Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism by Chris Matthew Sciabarra

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

A theory of persistent income inequality

This paper explores the dynamics of income inequality by studying the evolution of human capital investment and neighborhood choice for a population of families. Parents affect the conditional probability distribution of their children's income through the choice of a neighborhood in which to live. Neighborhood location affects children both through local public finance of education as well as through sociological effects. These forces combine to create incentives for wealthier families to segregate themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods. Economic stratification combines with strong neighborhoodwide feedback effects to transmit economic status across generations, leading to persistent income inequality.     

An Austrian Theory of the Firm

The modern Theory of the Firm uses the concept of rent and makes implicit assumptions about equilibrium. An Austrian (Market Process) Theory of the Firm should have something to say about each of these. Two strategic perspectives are analyzed, the neoclassical microeconomic perspective (using the Ricardo-Marshall approach to rent) and the Market Process perspective (using the Fetter approach to rent). In a neoclassical world, rents indicate unsolved or unexploited inefficiencies as every hypothetical outcome is viewed against the standard of perfect competition. By contrast, in the Market Process world there is no single ideal standard by which to measure any particular outcome. All action takes place in an open ended universe in which the future is continually being created, in which competition is a discovery process.     

New Technology in Unionized Firms: Advantages of Mandatory Bargaining

U.S. Labor Law currently allows employers whose work forces are unionized to introduce new technologies without bargaining over the decision to do so. This forces unions to adopt inefficient strategies when negotiating collective bargaining agreements in an effort to minimize the impact of technological change on their members. Allowing unions to bargain over the decision to introduce new technologies would obviate their having to resort to these inefficient strategies. In addition, it might increase the likelihood of employees suggesting alterations in production processes that would increase the rate of technological change. For these reasons, this article advocates amending U.S. labor law to require employers to bargain over the introduction of new technologies.     

Some brief notes on the “unfinished business” of qualitative inquiry

The paper argues that there are a variety of implicit issues in qualitative inquiry that need to be addressed if the area is to develop in some normal science sense. This unfinished business is concerned with a deeper investigation of basic terms that are now simply taken for granted, such as theme and pattern. It also includes the need to develop rules which will assist in making and justifying how qualitative interpretations are made from the implicit processes of inference. Specific suggestions are made for accomplishing these issues.     

Experimental evidence of gender effects in arbitration decisions

The study investigates arbitrator gender and arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of 146 arbitrators rendered on a hypothetical sexual harassment case. Gender was not found to have a statistically significant effect on the decisions examined. However, other characteristics of the arbitrator—level of experience and level of education—were found to influence the arbitral decision.