Lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural China

This paper investigates how lineages, the commonly found organizations in rural villages of China, affect people's intra- and cross-lineage cooperative behavior. We use data from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002, which exclusively contains information about the lineage structure in these villages allowing us to classify three levels of lineage-based heterogeneity. Our identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of lineage-based heterogeneity. We find evidence that people in a village with higher lineage-based heterogeneity are less likely to exhibit reciprocity behavior within lineages or contribute to the provision of public goods that are jointly shared across lineages. The estimation results remain robust to the inclusion of various control variables and additional background characteristics. Finally, we examine a number of other economic outcomes and find that more homogenous villages do better than other types of villages.     

Regulation,Minimum Wage and Informality: Introduction to Symposium

Are markets in developing and transition economies over‐regulated or under‐regulated? This is a perennial question in the development discourse, but one for which answers appear to come more from preset ideology than from context‐specific analysis and evidence. These issues become even more pressing when the debate turns to the links between regulation, deregulation and inequality. The recent experience of rising inequality in many countries has also brought to the fore predictable policy positions. A key aspect of labor regulation in developing countries, and one becoming more prominent in the era of rising inequality, is the minimum wage. The range of issues around regulation, minimum wage and informality was addressed by papers presented to a conference held in New Delhi on December 17–18, 2014. The conference was co‐sponsored by the World Bank, UK Department for International Development, Cornell University and Columbia University. The organizers of the conference were Kaushik Basu, Stefan Dercon, Ravi Kanbur and Jan Svejnar. A selection of papers from the conference which passed the usual review procedures of the Review of Development Economics, and a further selection of papers from those submitted to the journal, form this symposium.     

Does the Group Leader Affect Repayment Performance Differently?

Theoretical models of group lending assume that all group members are identical in terms of their effect on repayment performance. In practice, however, this may not be true. We use a unique data set obtained from a survey of 160 borrowing groups in Jordan to investigate the impact of joint liability, screening and monitoring activities, and social ties of the group leader and other group members on repayment performance as measured by the intensity of default using a negative binomial II model. Our results suggest that the joint liability and screening activities of the leader are more strongly related to repayment performance than the same variables for the rest of the group members. Social ties of all members have a significant effect on repayment, while monitoring activities have no effect.     

Capital adjustment cost and inconsistency in income‐based dynamic panel models with fixed effects

After the seminal work of Nickell (1981), a vast literature demonstrates the inconsistency of ‘conditional convergence’ estimator in income‐based dynamic panel models with fixed effects when the time horizon (T) is short but the sample of countries (N) is large. Less attention is given to the economic root of inconsistency of the fixed effects estimator when T is also large. Using a variant of the Ramsey growth model with long‐run adjustment cost of capital, we demonstrate that the fixed effects estimator of such models could be inconsistent when T is large. This inconsistency arises because of the long‐run adjustment cost of capital which gives rise to a negative moving average coefficient in the error term. Income convergence will be thus overestimated. We theoretically characterize the order of this inconsistency. Our Monte Carlo simulation demonstrates that the size of the bias is substantial and it is greater in economies with higher capital adjustment costs. We show that the use of instrumental variables that take into account the presence of the negative moving average term in the error will overcome this bias.     

Green banking disclosure,firm value and the moderating role of a contextual factor: Evidence from a distinctive regulatory setting

The idea that green banking disclosure leads to increased firm value has been rightly considered as over-simplistic. This paper builds on key prior insights by investigating whether combining green disclosure with other contextual factor, such as non-performing loans, provides additional insight into the complex green disclosure–firm value relationship in a regulatory setting where green law has recently been enacted for the banking industry. We present an analysis of seven years of data sourced from listed banks in Bangladesh (2008–2014), with data analysed using multiple regression. Our findings indicate that, while green disclosure has a positive effect on the overall firm value of banks, this positive effect is negatively moderated by banks' non-performing loans. This research contributes to the knowledge by showing that green disclosure alone is insufficient for creating market value for banks. Additional contextual matters need attention to understand the impact of green disclosure in contributing to increased market value for banks.     

Redistributive innovation policy,inequality, and efficiency

We examine the efficiency and distributional effects of regressive and progressive public R&D policies that target high‐tech and low‐tech sectors using a heterogenous‐agent growth model with in‐house R&D and incomplete capital markets. We find that such policies have important implications for efficiency and inequality. A regressive public R&D investment financed by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive effect on individual savings and effort. It could, however, also lower growth and welfare via its effect on the efficiency–inequality trade‐off. Thus, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump‐shaped, admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. Using our baseline model, and the US state‐level GDP data, we derive the degree of regressiveness of public R&D investment in US states. We find that US states are more regressive in their R&D investment than the optimal regressiveness implied by our growth model.     

Replacement versus Historical Cost Profit Rates: What is the Difference? When Does it Matter?

This paper explains the Bureau of Economic Analysis methodology for computing historical cost and replacement cost measures of the net stock of capital in the US economy. It is demonstrated that there exists a threshold rate of inflation in the price of capital goods that keeps the percentage difference between the two capital stock measures constant. Hence, over periods when average inflation in the price index for capital goods is equal to the threshold value, historical cost and replacement cost profit rates would show equal percentage changes; an example of such a period for the US economy is 1946–2010.     

Dynamics of money, output and price interaction — some Indian evidence

The present study is an attempt to model the dynamic interactions between money, output and prices in a structural vector autoregression framework. The primary concern of the paper is to examine the sources of variations and response of one variable to changes in others in a system of economic variables in the Indian context. Using quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 1990Q4, we find that structural factors, in addition to monetary factors, play an important role in generating and sustaining the process of inflation and fluctuations in economic activity. An increase in money/credit supply is found to increase output and prices in the short-run and prices in the long-run, while a non-accommodating monetary policy is ineffective in controlling inflation even at the cost of substantial output losses, thereby indicating relative rigidities in price movements. Another interesting finding is that the monetary authority responds differently to different price shocks, exercising its leverage in altering the quantity as well as the composition of aggregate money supply. Our findings also indicate that the economy is characterized by relatively large and infrequent shocks to ‘price/cost’-related factors. Finally, our analysis suggests that a simple monetary targeting without adequate ‘supply side’ measures may not be able to serve the objective of maintaining growth with price stability.