Budget preferences and direct utility

This paper extends a result of Sakai, who presented conditions for indirect preferences from which a utility function can be deduced if demand is single valued. It will be shown that—adding a “partial Lipschitz condition”—Sakai's theorem can be extended to multi-valued demand. Our result follows from the extension of a theorem of Hurwicz and Richter, who have shown that, under certain hypotheses on demand correspondences, an upper semicontinuous utility function f exists, so that the set of utility maximal elements μ_f(B) is contained in the choice set h(B) for every budget B. By our partial Lipschitz condition h(B) ?- μ_f(B) also follows.     

Micro and macroeconomic adjustment processes in East Germany — Ninth report

Micro and macroeconomic adjustment processes in East Germany — Ninth report     

A reformulation of the theory of demand by compensated demand functions

We present a formal approach to consumer demand by compensated demand functions. In accordance with the integrability theory or with the theory of revealed preference, we do not require the existence of a utility function, but we do assume certain hypotheses concerning functions describing rational behavior. In view of their properties, these functions can be interpreted as compensated demand functions. According to traditional neoclassical consumer theory, Shephard's lemma and the symmetry and negative semidefiniteness of the Slutsky-Hicks matrix can be shown. We shall also see that a convex, continuous, and monotonic preference ordering, which is representable by income compensation functions, can be introduced. It can also be shown that the existence of a compensated equilibrium can be derived within this approach by compensated demand functions. In order to obtain the existence of a compensated equilibrium under less stringent conditions we finally generalize the axioms assuming that a compensated demand correspondence is given.     

Environmental protection and the international raw materials economy

All production of mineral raw materials necessarily involves interference with the natural environment. National rules and regulations on environmental protection are intended to ensure that prospecting for, and the extraction and processing of, raw materials are conducted with as little damage as possible to the ecosystem. The following article surveys the effects of such measures on the international raw materials economy.     

On the pricing of forward starting options in Heston’s model on stochastic volatility

We consider the problem of pricing European forward starting options in the presence of stochastic volatility. By performing a change of measure using the asset price at the time of strike determination as a numeraire, we derive a closed-form solution within Hestons stochastic volatility framework applying distribution properties of the volatility process. In this paper we develop a new and more suitable formula for pricing forward starting options. This formula allows to cover the smile effects observed in a Black-Scholes environment, in which the extreme exposure of forward starting options to volatility changes is ignored.Received: July 2004, Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B28, 60G44, 60H30, 60E10JEL Classification: G13It is a pleasure to thank the anonymous referee for his valuable comments and suggestions on this paper. Furthermore, we would like to thank Holger Kraft, University of Kaiserslautern, and Alexander Giese, HypoVereinsbank AG Munich, for fruitful discussions and suggestions.     

Informieren – Anleiten – Dokumentieren

Die M?glichkeiten, eine Patientenschulung zu strukturieren sind vielf?ltig. Ob Methodenmix oder eine bestimmte Methode – Sie haben die Qual der Wahl. Das Ziel, die Erlangung von Kompetenzen zum eigenst?ndigen Umgang mit gesundheits spezifischen Problemen, sollte jedoch nicht aus den Augen verloren werden.     

When Overlapping Organisations Play Two-Level Games: IMF–EU Interaction in Credit Lending to Latvia and Greece

In the literature, the cooperation of the IMF and the EU in credit lending has been discussed either from a state-centric, bureaucratic or institutionalist perspective. In this article, we examine the Troika as a set-up of multiple organisational overlap providing bureaucratic agents with constraints and opportunities for strategic action. Taking Latvia and Greece as cases in point, we analyse who prevails in a situation of conflict and why. How do these international organisations manage to overcome their differences and reach consensus? Drawing on the Two-Level game approach, we argue that negotiators are more likely to prevail over each other when their respective win-set decreases. We find that different strategies to manipulate win-sets are decisive to explain both cooperation and assertiveness. Changing costs of no agreement during a lending programme as well as the institutional procedures for programme ratification facilitate the use of these strategies.     

Delegation and the Regulation of Risk

Political principals typically use low-cost “fire-alarm” signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D72, L51.