Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union

Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984 suggests that competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for these changes. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality.     

A real options perspective on entrepreneurial entry in the face of uncertainty

In this paper we develop and test theory regarding whether entrepreneurs contemplating starting a new venture account for the value of the option to defer the entry decision. While others have illuminated the theoretical applicability of real options theory to entrepreneurship, empirical evidence in this context is lacking. Consistent with predictions derived from real options theory, we find that high uncertainty in the target industry dissuades entry, and that the irreversibility of the entry decision moderates this relationship. Furthermore, we find that the irreversibility of the investment decision can be influenced by industry‐level, firm‐level and even individual‐level factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Introduction to the symposium: The discipline of applied general equilibrium

Summary The use of general equilibrium models in applied research imposes a discipline in which model structures can easily be compared and contrasted and model results can be interpreted using a well understood and rigorously developed theoretical framework. These features allow researchers to compare results across modeling efforts and to build on the experience of others in deriving results and formulating questions. This paper first presents a brief critical history of applied general equilibrium analysis. It then summarizes the contributions of eight other papers in this issue.We are grateful to Gary Hansen, Ellen McGrattan, and Richard Rogerson for helpful discussions of this paper. We also want to thank the members of the Applied Theory Workshop at the University of Minnesota, who helped referee and edit the papers in this issue: Fernando Alvarez, Raphael Bergoeing, Betsy Caucutt, Ricardo Cavalcanti, Antonia Diaz, Ron Edwards, Andres Erosa, Terry Fitzgerald, Ron Gecan, Doug Gollin, Karine Moe, François Ortalo-Magne, and Marcelo Veracierto. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

In the trenches at the talent wars: competitive interaction for scarce human resources

A number of indicators suggest that the social norms that once deterred labor market competitors from hiring or “poaching” each others' employees are breaking down. This study explores the competitive interaction that results when one firm attempts to hire employees from a competing firm (known as “talent raiding”). Results suggest that attributes of the raiding firm, the targeted firm, and targeted human capital will affect how a targeted firm responds to a talent raid. The study suggests a number of tactics raiding firms can use to avoid retaliation and suggests tactics targeted firms can use to repel would‐be talent raiders. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The effect of futures trading on price variability in the market for onions

Conclusion This paper is in part a study of the operation of futures markets. The empirical evidence presented suggests that futures markets do reduce price fluctuations of traded commodities. Despite these facts, Congress eliminated futures trading in onions at the request of onion growers and shippers. As is often the case with political actions, the losses from the law are spread over a large number of individuals who do not have the incentive to become informed or to lobby on the matter, while the gains accrue to a smaller group with sufficient interest to lobby. Thus, in addition to shedding some light on the operation of futures markets, this paper is also a new illustration of an old maxim in political economy. Over 200 years ago, Adam Smith [11, p. 128] noted, People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. With the government becoming a larger and larger influence on the economy, producers are finding it to be more in their interest to organize with the assistance of the legislature.     

The pricing of U.S. IPOs by seasoned foreign firms

We examine the pricing of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) by foreign firms that are already seasoned in their domestic countries. Presumably, these equity offers have less downside risk for investors than typical IPOs since domestic share prices can be used to help establish a preoffer value for the firm's equity. In spite of the presumed diminished downside risk, we find that offers by firms from countries that impose foreign ownership restrictions and capital controls are on average underpriced, experiencing an average first-day return in the United States of 12.7%. This result stems in part from the underwriter's failure to price the issue to fully reflect the postoffer premium that often arises for the U.S. shares. In contrast, offers by firms from countries without ownership restrictions have an average first-day return of 0.0%.     

The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.     

Entry in the presence of dueling options

This paper investigates the influence of industry uncertainty on the decision by established firms to enter a new industry. Specifically, we examine the tension between the option to defer , which discourages entry in the presence of uncertainty, and the option to grow , which may encourage entry in the presence of uncertainty when there are early mover advantages. Empirical analysis on data from a broad array of industries revealed that the effect of uncertainty on entry is not monotonic. Our findings are the first to find support for the nonmonotonic effect of uncertainty that has only recently emerged in theoretical treatments of real options theory, and amplify the importance of considering both the option to defer and the option to grow when contemplating entry. Furthermore, we found evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and entry is moderated by: (a) irreversibility, which influences the value of the option to defer; (b) the total value of growth opportunities; and (c) early mover advantages, which magnify the value of growth options. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.