THE IMPORTANCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR WEALTH CONCENTRATION AND MOBILITY

The paper conducts an empirical analysis of the importance of entrepreneurship for wealth concentration and mobility using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The data shows a marked concentration of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs which is not merely a consequence of their higher incomes. The higher saving rates among entrepreneurs is one of the possible explanations for their higher asset holdings and this hypothesis is supported by the statistical tests conducted in the paper. The data also shows that entrepreneurs experience greater upward mobility in that they have a greater probability of moving to higher wealth classes, and this is not only a consequence of their higher incomes.     

Entrepreneurship in macroeconomics

This paper reviews the main studies on entrepreneurship conducted during the past two decades that are relevant for the understanding of various macroeconomic issues. I organize the discussion by distinguishing three groups of contributions. The first group includes studies whose main purpose is to understand the factors that affect the decision to become an entrepreneur. The second group includes studies that look at the aggregate and distributional implications of entrepreneurship for savings and investment. The third group deals with issues of economic development and growth.     

Central government accounting harmonization in EU member states: will EPSAS be enough?

A highly controversial topic in the EU is the need for harmonized accrual-based standards to improve the quality of public accounts and reduce differences (adjustments) between the micro-(governmental accounting) and macro- (national accounting) levels. This paper shows that a set of high-quality accounting standards, like the future EPSAS, are not going to be sufficient to overcome the present lack of harmonization. The authors explain why this is the case having researched accounting data from 28 EU member states.     

US Security Strategy and the Gains from Bilateral Trade

We explore the geo‐strategic determinants of bilateral trade flows between the USA and the rest of the world. We develop a three‐party model of security and trade patterns and use data on military assistance and troop deployments over the 1950–2009 period to validate its predictions. We find that security assistance has significant, positive impacts on the shares of bilateral trade between the USA and the recipient country, results that are robust to issues of reverse causality and hold across different sectors.     

Market-Share Import Restraints in Oligopoly

This paper contributes to the theoretical analysis of proportional import restraints; that is, restraints that are defined in terms of percentage market share rather than in terms of volume of imports. It is shown that an increase in the market share of foreign firms from zero has a negative effect locally on domestic welfare. In the case of a domestic oligopoly, domestic firms may prefer a proportional restraint over an equivalent volume restraint.     

Essential equilibria of discontinuous games

We introduce spaces of discontinuous games in which games having essential Nash equilibria are the generic case. In order to prove the existence of essential Nash equilibria in such spaces, we provide new results on the Ky Fan minimax inequality. In the setting of potential games, we show that games with essential Nash equilibria are the generic case when their potentials satisfy a condition called weak upper pseudocontinuity that is weaker than upper semicontinuity.     

Trading and enforcing patent rights

We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. We show that patent transactions arising from comparative advantages in commercialization increase litigation, but trades driven by advantages in patent enforcement reduce it. Using data on trade and litigation of individually owned patents in the United States, we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates across states as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strongly affect patent transactions, and that trade reduces litigation on average, but the impact is heterogeneous. Patents with larger potential gains from trade are more likely to change ownership, and the impact depends critically on transaction characteristics.     

Political intergenerational risk sharing

In a stochastic two-period OLG model, featuring an aggregate shock to the economy, ex-ante optimality requires intergenerational risk sharing. We compare the level of intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a benevolent government and by an office-seeking politician. In our political system, the transfer of resources across generations is determined as a Markov equilibrium of a probabilistic voting game. Low realized returns on the risky asset induce politicians to compensate the old through a PAYG system. This political system typically generates an intergenerational risk sharing scheme that is (i) larger, (ii) more persistent, and (iii) less responsive to the realization of the shock than the social optimum. This is because the current politician anticipates her transfers to the elderly to be compensated by future politicians through offsetting transfers, and hence overspends.