Client Externality Effects of Agents Selling Their Own Properties

This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents’ efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.     

Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders?

We reexamine the negative relation between firm value and the number of antitakeover provisions a firm has in place. We document that firms with characteristics indicating low power to bargain for favorable terms in a takeover, but also indicating high potential agency costs, have more antitakeover provisions in place. We also find that for these firms, Tobin's Q increases in the number of adopted provisions. These findings are robust to several methods that control for endogeneity. Our evidence suggests that adopting more antitakeover provisions is beneficial for certain firms and challenges the commonplace view that antitakeover provisions are universally harmful for shareholders.     

Shareholder Activism in REITs

Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non‐REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006–2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non‐EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non‐EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.     

Perceptions of Offensive Advertising Elements: A China–U.S. Comparison

ABSTRACT

As China continues to rapidly expand and further open itself to market forces, the People's Republic arouses significant interest as a new mega-market. Consequently, the influx of new business opportunities and advertising has resulted in Chinese consumers increasingly exposed to potentially offensive advertising. While some products and images may seem acceptable when advertised in the West, there are some that may offend Chinese cultural sensitivities. The purpose of this study is to better understand similarities and differences that exist between American and Chinese perceptions surrounding offensive advertising. The results highlight a number of statistical cultural differences that have business implications for international marketers.     

Best–worst scaling: A new method for advertisement evaluation

The evaluation and selection of advertisements with desired levels of attributes such as ethicality, likeability, humour, or information content, can be undertaken using a variety of methods. These include researchers' personal judgments, focus groups, expert panels, and ratings scale approaches. However, there is still no generally accepted systematic evaluation or selection procedure. This paper details a simple but powerful method known as ‘best–worst scaling’ (BWS) to evaluate and select advertisements on criteria of interest. BWS represents an important new tool for advertising researchers, advertising agencies and their clients, communications scholars, and policy makers to evaluate and select advertisements. This paper achieves three ends. First, it critiques existing methods of advertisement evaluation. Second, it demonstrates that BWS has greater validity than existing methods. Third, this is the first paper to present a worked example of how to use BWS, and demonstrate its use in an advertisement evaluation context. Importantly, BWS is not restricted to evaluating advertisements – it can be used to evaluate any items on criteria of interest.     

Power and responsibility: Advertising self-regulation and consumer protection in a digital world

While advertising self-regulation is generally considered effective in a closed, largely country-based system, the digital world in which we now live is an open and global system. This raises challenges for consumer protection from national regulators trying to enforce compliance from global media platforms, advertisers, and consumers. Applying the power-responsibility equilibrium, this study explores who has the power and who has the responsibility for advertising self-regulation in a digital world. In doing so, it takes an ethnographic approach, eliciting insights from 18 key stakeholders in the self-regulatory process, across the three geographical areas of Europe, United States, and Asia-Pacific. The findings highlight the need for more collaboration and alignment of self-regulatory systems and build a framework for action through embedding responsibility, aligning standards, initiating processes, and improving outcomes. Six recommendations are offered to restore the balance of power and responsibility.     

Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets

This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.