Einige überlegungen für die ausgestaltung von transferzahlungen an haushalte

Summary Reflections on the Organization of Transfer Payments to Households. — Relatively few studies are extant that deal with the principles governing the redistribution functions of public budgets. This paper shows that neither the principle of general taxation, nor that of non-affection can here be applied. For the purpose of financing redistribution, the population should be classified into those taxed and those benefiting. Transfer payments to those benefiting, or remissions granted in their favour (gross effect) should coincide as far as possible with their actual benefit (net effect), so that taxation need not be unnecessarily increased. It is shown what a redistribution system fulfilling these conditions could look like in cases of loss of income through socially relevant causes (old age, illness, disablement, etc.) and in cases of additional charges (upkeep and education of children). Special stress is laid on determining the “zero line” within such a system. A similar study is undertaken with regard to vertical redistribution among market incomes. In this connection, standards are discussed with the aid of which politicians may render concrete their redistribution ideals. It is described in detail how the various approaches, especially the aims of vertical redistribution, can be combined with an adjustment of income among persons gaining their living and persons unable to do so, and how the whole can be made to form a well-balanced system. Finally, the question is discussed whether there are objective criteria of an optimal extent of redistribution, or whether this is a problem that can only be solved by political decision.

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Résumé Réflexions sur l’organisation des paiements de transfert aux ménages. — II y a relativement peu d’études qui traitent des principes qui règlent les fonctions de redistribution qu’ont les budgets publics. Cet article démontre que ni le principe de l’imposition générale, ni celui de la non-affectation n’y sont applicables. Pour pouvoir financer la redistribution, il faudrait classer la population en deux groupes: ceux qui sont chargés d’imp?ts et ceux qui sont secondés. Les paiements de transfert à ces derniers, ainsi que les dégrèvements en leur faveur (effet brut) devraient co?ncider autant que possible avec l’aide que ces personnes re?oivent actuellement (effet net), de sorte que l’imposition ne soit pas haussée inutilement. Il est démontré quel serait un système de redistribution qui remplirait ces conditions dans les cas de manque de revenu pour causes sociales (vieillesse, maladie, invalidité, etc.) et dans les cas de charges additionnelles (entretien et éducation d’enfants). L’auteur insiste surtout sur la détermination de la ?ligne zéro? dans un tel système. Une étude analogue est entreprise pour la redistribution verticale entre revenus. L’auteur y discute les principes à l’aide desquels les politiciens peuvent rendre concrets leurs idéaux de redistribution. Il explique en détail comment les différents points de vue, particulièrement les fins de la redistribution verticale, peuvent être combinés avec un ajustement de revenus entre ceux qui gagnent leur vie et ceux qui n’en sont pas capables, et comment tout cela peut être organisé en un système bien équilibré. Finalement, il discute la question s’il y a des critères objectifs d’une étendue optimale de redistribution, ou bien si cela est un problème qui ne saurait être résolu que par une décision politique.

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Resumen Algunas reflexiones sobre la estructuracion de transferencias estatales a economias domésticas. … Existen relativamente pocos estudios sobre los principios por los que se rige la politica de redistribuci?n del sector püblico. El présente anàlisis muestra, que el concepto de generalidad del sistema tributario y el principio de no afectación no deben aplicarse en el campo de la redistribuci?n. Con respecto a la financiaci?n de la redistribuci?n, la poblaci?n deberia quedar dividida en dos grupos: los contribuyentes y los beneficiados. La renta recibida por concepto de transferencias estatales o de reducciones impositivas (efecto bruto) deberia corresponder con el mejoramiento efectivo (efecto neto), para que no haya que aumentar la presi?n tributaria. Esto se analiza para el caso de una merma de ingreso, debida a fuerzas mayores (vejez, enfermedad, invalidez etc.), y de cargas adicionales (manutenci?n y educaci?n de ni?os), haciendo el au tor hincapié sobre la ?linea cero? en este sistema de redistribuci?n. Un anàlisis analogo lo efectúa el autor para el caso de una redistribuci?n vertical de ingresos de mercado. Discute criterios de los que se pueden valer los politicos para concretizar su programa de redistribuci?n. Minuciosamente describe c?mo se pueden vincular los diferentes objetivos de redistribuci?n de tal manera que resuite un sistema total consistente. Finalmente, el autor pregunta si existen criterios objetivos para fijar el volumen ?ptimo de la redistribuci?n o si éste queda determinado a través de decisiones polfticas, exclusivamente.

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Riassunto Alcune riflessioni per lo sviluppo progressivo di pagamenti di trasferimenti a bilanci. — Sui principi per lo sviluppo progressivo del settore di ridistribuzione dei bilanci pubblici ci sono relativamente pochi studi. L’articolo mostra ehe i principi délia generalità délia tassazione e il principio di non afiettazione non sono applicabili per il settore di ridistribuzione. Nel finanziamento délia ridistribuzione, la popolazione dovrebbe essere divisa in gravata e avvantaggiata. I pagamenti di trasferimenti che affluiscono agli avvantaggiati o gli sgravi fiscali (effetto lordo) che vanno a loro favore dovrebbero il piú possibile essere d’accordo con la posizione di miglioramento (effetto netto) effettivamente sopravvenuta, in modo che la quota d’imposta non sia aumentata senza nécessita. Per la perdita di reddito a causa di fatti sociali (vecchiaia, malattia, invalidità ecc.) e per aggravi supplementari (mantenimento ed istruzione dei figli) è mostrato corne possa presentarsi un sistema di ridistribuzione che adempia questa condizione. Inoltre è posto un valore spéciale alla determinazione délia ?linea zero? in taie sistema. Un’analoga ricerca è condotta per la ridistribuzione verticale all’interno del reddito di mercato. Nello stesso tempo sono discusse misure col’aiuto délie quali i politici possono concretizzare i loro obiettivi di ridistribuzione. In modo esauriente viene esposto come le diverse disposizioni, soprattutto l’obiettivo délia ridistribuzione verticale, con l’equilibrio del reddito tra lavoratori attivi ed incapaci al lavoro possano essere congiunti in un sistema generale in s’e chiuso. Infine viene discusso se ci siano obiettivi criteri per l’ottimale volume délia ridistribuzione o se essa sia una decisione da motivare soltanto politicamente.

     

II. Allgemeine und angewandte statistik

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

I. Allgemeine Wirstchaftslehre

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Multiple steady states,indeterminacy, and cycles in a basic model of endogenous growth

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that a basic model of endogenous growth with learning by doing may produce a rich array of outcomes. Starting point of our analysis is the Romer (1986a) approach. In contrast to Romer, however, we assume that one unit of investment shows different effects concerning the building up of physical and human capital, so that these variables cannot be merged into one single variable. With this assumption, it can be shown that multiple steady states, indeterminacy of equilibria, and persistent cycles may result in our model.     

On the optimal exploitation of interacting resources

The paper demonstrates — partly analytically and partly numerically — that traditional results in resource economics obtained from the study of only one resource do not carry over to ecologically interacting resources. As in the traditional approach, we also employ dynamic optimization. The limiting behavior of the trajectories is first studied analytically by letting the discount rate approach infinity. A numerical study is then undertaken by means of a dynamic programming algorithm in order to explore the fate of the resources for various finite discount rates. The relation of our results to results in optimal growth theory is also discussed.     

Using dynamic programming with adaptive grid scheme for optimal control problems in economics

The study of the solutions of dynamic models with optimizing agents has often been limited by a lack of available analytical techniques to explicitly find the global solution paths. On the other hand, the application of numerical techniques such as dynamic programming to find the solution in interesting regions of the state was restricted by the use of fixed grid size techniques. Following Grüne (Numer. Math. 75 (3) (1997) 319; University of Bayreuth, submitted, 2003), in this paper an adaptive grid scheme is used for finding the global solutions of discrete time Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations. Local error estimates are established and an adapting iteration for the discretization of the state space is developed. The advantage of the use of adaptive grid scheme is demonstrated by computing the solutions of one- and two-dimensional economic models which exhibit steep curvature, complicated dynamics due to multiple equilibria, thresholds (Skiba sets) separating domains of attraction and periodic solutions. We consider deterministic and stochastic model variants. The studied examples are from economic growth, investment theory, environmental and resource economics.