Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) earn strictly higher material payoffs than do the material payoff maximizers. Implications of this finding for the theory of preference evolution are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.     

The role of interpersonal liking in building trust in long-term channel relationships

This article explores the important role of liking in the development of the buyer’s trust in the sales rep. The authors argue that liking’s role is richer and qualitatively different from that of the more cognitive antecedents of trust. They posit that many cognitive antecedents of trust operate mainly through liking. They argue that as the buyer-sales rep relationship matures, liking plays an even more important role in influencing trust. The authors empirically test a model delineating the mediating role of liking in developing trust. They find that when the relationship between the buyer and the sales rep is young, liking partially mediates the effect of similarity of business values and fully mediates the influence of frequency of personal interaction on trust. Moreover, as the buyer’s relationship with the rep ages, liking takes the foreground in trust development, while more cognitive antecedents recede into the background. Carolyn Y. Nicholson (Ph.D., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) is an assistant professor of marketing at Stetson University. Her current research areas include forms and uses of communication in distribution channels, trust and commitment in marketing relationships, and Internet marketing. Her research has appeared in theJournal of Retailing, along with numerous national conference proceedings. Larry D. Compeau (Ph.D., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) is an associate professor of marketing at Clarkson University. His research has appeared in theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing and theJournal of Business Research. He has recently coedited a special issue of theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing on pricing. His research has appeared in numerous national conference proceedings. Rajesh Sethi (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh) is an assistant processor of marketing at Clarkson University. His current research areas include new product development, cross-functional teams, Web-based new product development, and electronic commerce. He has published in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, and theJournal of Social Policy and Public Management. He also has published in numerous national conference proceedings.     

The Effectiveness of Sales Promotion Tools among Indian Consumers: An Empirical Study

Marketers use sales promotions to boost sales. Sales promotion tools vary in their effectiveness to elicit different sales responses. Companies have a specific goal when they choose to use any promotional tool. Many researchers believe that sales promotions are zero sum game. Unlike in the West, in India brand loyalists outnumber price buyers by 200%. This paper investigates the effectiveness of select sales promotional tools in generating different buying behaviors. The study reveals that sales promotions, in India, do not help in category expansion. They are effective measures for inducing brand switching, stock piling, and purchase acceleration.     

Can Quality‐Oriented Firms Develop Innovative New Products?

Research suggests that a strong focus on quality improvement can adversely affect exploration and thus the development of innovative new products. The focus on quality improvement including total quality management (TQM) has been termed quality orientation. The literature suggests that one way to reduce the adverse effect of a quality orientation on innovativeness is to adopt ambidextrous or dual organizational forms. However, dual organizational forms are cumbersome and expensive to implement. This paper argues that a less demanding structural arrangement for developing innovative products in quality‐oriented organizations involves the creation of cross‐functional teams that are explicitly encouraged to take risk and granted autonomy. In this model, the two dimensions of innovativeness—namely, novelty and appropriateness— are treated separately because quality orientation and encouragement to take risk can have differential effects on these two dimensions. A survey of 141 new product development projects reveals that quality orientation does not adversely affect product novelty in cross‐functional product development teams. However, encouragement given to cross‐functional teams to take risk leads to more novel products. On the other hand, while a quality orientation improves product appropriateness, encouragement to take risk affects it adversely. Quality orientation is able to mitigate the adverse effect of encouragement to take risk on appropriateness. But encouragement to take risk does not influence the relationship between a quality orientation and novelty. Autonomy improves the positive effect of encouragement to take risk on new product novelty but does not influence the effect of a quality orientation on novelty. Both novelty and appropriateness enhance a new product's performance, and both these dimensions of innovativeness partially mediate the effect of quality orientation and fully mediate the effect of encouragement to take risk on new product performance.     

Explicit solution of a general consumption/portfolio problem with subsistence consumption and bankruptcy

This paper solves a general continuous-time single-agent consumption and portfolio decision problem with subsistence consumption in closed form. The analysis allows for general continuously differentiable concave utility functions. The model takes into consideration that consumption must be no smaller than a given subsistence rate and that bankruptcy can occur. Thus the paper generalizes the results of Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi, and Shreve (1986).     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Restructuring in Telecommunications and its Market Impacts: An Event-Study Analysis

This study presents an assessment of the changes in the telecommunications industry and their impact on market returns. Events were identified from a sample of global telecom companies and assessed in terms of their favorable or unfavorable impacts. Based on event-study analysis with generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic specification, the impact was tested after incorporating dummy variables of different lengths. The results show interesting patterns in how the market views restructuring in the business model of telecom companies, organizational structure, alliances and mergers, and technological platform changes. Countries differ in how they view telecoms restructuring and what changes are considered beneficial by investors.