我的九条命

在我生命中各个阶段里，我与学术界不知不觉地频频有缘。启蒙时期，我科到名师的熏导业已浸淫于国学；经史子籍，无所不读，撰文作诗，直追唐宋，俨然是一个“小老学究”。当我入仕时，一秉传统士大夫的志趋，一心为国为民，在我自我流放期间，发现我唯一可谋生的本领是学术，我既没有继承万贯家财，也没有在当权时放出许多人情，作为经商的捷径，实际上，我曾试探经商之路，但是在没有有力的后台引见下，我意识到，要加入一家企业，条件是能够为其带来多少商机，我对这种用才标准并不欣赏，在此情形下，要做一个小企业家，其生活方式也难以适应，特别是对我的妻女是一种冒险。     

Market efficiency and cointegration: Some evidence in Pacific-Basin black exchange markets

This paper investigates the efficiency of the black exchange markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The study applies unit root and cointegration tests to examine black exchange market efficiency of Pacific-Basin countries. The generating process of black exchange rates appears to be a random walk. This is consistent with Gupta (1981) and other foreign exchange rate unit root test studies. Johansen cointegration tests are performed for these black exchange markets together with Japan and Singapore. The results suggest that there is at least one unit root among the black market exchange rates. Hence, black exchange markets are not collectively efficient.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

A theoretical foundation for Constant Market Share analysis

Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis is a popular tool for analyzing changes in exports of a country. Nevertheless, its theoretical foundations (and policy relevance) have been questioned. In this paper, we provide such a foundation by relating CMS analysis to a two-stage homothetic demand model. An indication of the empirical relevance of this relationship is given by comparing the CMS analysis with a two-stage Constant Elasticity of Substitution demand model applied to 1972–1976 data of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).Paper presented at the XX-th world conference of the Applied Econometric Association in Istanbul, December 1986. The research reported in this paper was carried out as part of the project Disequi-librium and Equilibrium in Demand and Supply, which is approved by the Dutch Office of Education and Sciences. Ivo J. Steyn and Philip A. ten Cate provided excellent research assistance. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

The case of the unpopular pay plan

Three years after launching the team-based Quality For All program, Top Chemical Company CEO Sam Verde was searching for a team-based compensation system that would reflect his company's new philosophy. With a committee gathered to discuss the issue, Verde confronts the fact that changing pay plans is an issue few people can agree on. "Very simply," explains vice president for compensation Gilbert Porterfield, "the plan is designed to give employees working on teams real incentives for constant improvement and overall excellence. The variable aspect of the system pays employees for the performance of their group." This doesn't sit well with the others. "It's going to punish teams like mine for the failings of others instead of rewarding us for the work we do and have already done," says packaging team representative Ruth Gibson. Another committee member feels that team-based anything is a "motivational happy land that doesn't square with how people really work." While Verde likes the proposed pay plan, he has doubts over whether his employees will accept the risk. Upper management has no problem basing 60% of its pay on TopChem's performance. But getting line employees to risk part of their salaries--even as little as 4%--on the ups and downs of the chemical industry may be more trouble than it's worth. Four experts on compensation reveal where Top Chemical went wrong in its plan and how Sam Verde might bring about change successfully.