Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1‐A season

This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Streets, Malls, and Supermarkets

We develop a model of competition between shopping centers, comparing competitive outcomes in three alternative modes of retail organization, namely: streets (in which neither developers or retailers internalize agglomeration effects between products); malls (in which developers internalize); and supermarkets (in which both developers and retailers internalize). For a fixed number of centers: (i) converting streets to malls intensifies developer (but not retailer) competition, which increases product range (i.e., the number of shops built by the developers) and consumer surplus, reduces profits, and has ambiguous effects on welfare; (ii) converting streets to supermarkets intensifies retailer and developer competition, has ambiguous effects on product range (number of shops), reduces profits, and increases social welfare. With free entry both conversions reduce the number of centers and, if there is excess entry, conversion to supermarkets (but not malls) unambiguously increases welfare.     

The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Welfare Analysis

Changes in total surplus are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizing individual and aggregate consumer demand data with individual quasilinear and homothetic utility functions. Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare. For nonmarketed goods, we propose necessary and sufficient conditions on input market data for efficient production, i.e. production at minimum cost. Under these conditions we derive a cost function for the nonmarketed good, where producer surplus is the area above the marginal cost curve. We are greatful to helpful remarks and comments of the referees and the editor. The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through Grant BEC2002-2130, the Generalitat de Catlaunya, through Grant 2005SGR-00454 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA).     

Public Schools and In-migration in North Carolina Counties, 1975–80

Abstract . The migration model presented in this paper indicates (hat the academic quality of public schools, independent of their racial composition, is an important determinant of in-migration in North Carolina counties. The failure to control for school quality is shown to lead to a significant overestimate of the negative impact of school racial mix. These results accord with the Tiebout Hypothesis and with a growing body of other research which suggests that the distributions of public services and other amenities are the principal determinants of recent migration patterns in the U.S.     

Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs

Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1–t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integer (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all but persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1–1/4.We are grateful to Roy Mathias and Daniel Waterman for help with some technical matters, and to chairman Jim Follain and the Syracuse University Economics Department for financing the exchange that launched this project. Campbell's research was funded by National Science Foundation grants, SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

Banking lessons from the past: The 1938 regulatory Agreement interpreted

We show that the interagency 1938 Uniform Agreement on Bank Supervisory Procedures set the precedent for dynamically varying supervisory standards to conform to national macroeconomic policies and political agendas. Our evidence indicates that the conferences leading to the Agreement were motivated and dominated by the Federal Reserve. Contrary to the goals of the other banking agencies, the Fed sought greater leniency in bank examination in order to stimulate bank credit creation. This precedent for softening examination standards was paralleled in 1991–1992 when the administration and regulatory agencies attempted to offset a proclaimed credit crunch by subordinating bank examinations to the perceived need for more bank credit. The implied risk of trading off bank safety for short-lived economic policies merits more open national debate.Our earlier work on this topic was partially supported by the National Center on Financial Studies, University of California, Berkeley.     

Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices

Liquidity in private asset markets is notoriously variable over time. Therefore, indices of changes in market value that are based on asset transaction prices will systematically reflect intertemporal differences in the ease of selling a property. We define and develop a concept of "constant-liquidity value" in the context of a model that is characterized by pro-cyclical volume of trading. We then present an econometric model that allows for estimation of both a standard transaction-based price index and a constant-liquidity index. Our application to the NCREIF database reveals that, in the case of institutional commercial real estate investment, constant-liquidity values tend to lead transaction-based and appraisal-based indices in time, and also to display greater volatility and cycle amplitude. The differences can be significant for strategic investment policy viewed from a mean-variance portfolio optimization perspective.     

Locally Greater Vulnerability to Background Risk

Willingness to take on risk is influenced by the presence of fair and unfair background risks for decision makers who are risk vulnerable as defined by Gollier and Pratt [1996], for these decision makers are more risk averse when they possess such an uninsurable background risk. We present an alternative derivation of the index of local vulnerability based on Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] compensated increases in risk, such that risk aversion increases with the introduction of any small fair background risk if and only if the index of local vulnerability is positive. We establish that the increase in risk aversion is greater for those who are more vulnerable as measured by the index of local vulnerability.