MEASURING THE BUSINESS STEALING,CANNIBALIZATION AND MARKET EXPANSION EFFECTS OF ENTRY IN THE U.S. MOTION PICTURE EXHIBITION MARKET*

Using a large and comprehensive theater level database covering over $18 billion in theater revenues over a five year period, I document the extent and nature of business stealing, revenue cannibalization and market expansion that occurred during the height of the 1990's boom in movie theater construction.     

Book Reviews

Technological Collaboration in Industry; strutegy, policy and internationalization in innovation
Corporate Venturing: Creating New Businesses within the Firm
Handbook of Innovation Management
Technology and enterprise in a historical perspective
Intellectual Property for Engineers
The Ernst & Young Business Plan Guide
crnagement as a New Technology
Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition     

Managers,Owners, and The Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis

This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range.